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DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES IN AMERICAN 
COURTS-JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES UNDER THE 
U.N. DRUG TRAFFICKING CONVENTION BY FOREIGN 
DEFENDANTS KIDNAPPED ABROAD BY U.S. AGENTS 
M c l e  VI of the United States Constitutzon makes treahes 
"the supreme Law of the Land."' Through t h s  clause, the Fram- 
ers intended, among other thngs, to grant foreigners the nght 
to invoke treatzes in Amencan courts.' The Framers thereby 
hoped to avoid conflicts with a foreigner's home country3 The 
potentzal for such conflict nses when our government, rather 
than a pnvate party, depnves a foreigner of a nght protected by 
treaty Indivlduals-citzzens and foreigners alike-attemphg 
* Associate Professor, Pace Umversity School of Law. B.A., J.D., Fordham Unj- 
versity. I thank Professors Enc E. Bergsten, Donald L. Doernberg, John E. Noyes, 
Nicholas Triffin, and Gay1 S. Westerman for thelr comments upon an earlier draft of 
thls Article. 
1. Article VI states: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States whch shall be 
made m Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or whch shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges m every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thmg m the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (commonly referred to as the "Supremacy Clausen). 
Article I11 of the Constitution prowdes that the judiaal power ''extend[s] to all 
Cases, m Law and Equity, ansmg under t h  Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or whch shall be made, under thelr Authority." U.S. 
CONST. art. 111, 5 2, cl. 1. The Judiaary Act of 1789, the first legwlation the Senate 
considered, gave federal courts jurisdiction over disputes mvolvrng treaties. 1 Stat. 
73 (1789). 
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); see also znfra notes 70-74 and 
accompanymg text. 
3. Id. The Framers also hoped to preserve the rule of law and to protect the 
nghts of the mdiwdual. See znfia part IIA.2.a. 
4. Note, for example, the outrage Mexlcans a t  all levels of society expressed 
when the United States Supreme Court m United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 
U.S. 655 (19921, reversed a decls~on ordenng the return of a Merncan phys~aan 
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to invoke treaties in Amencan courts have, however, often been 
blocked by the judicially created non-self-executing treaty doc- 
tnne, under whch the courts rekse to enforce certsun treahes 
or treaty prowsions. Lower federal courts, in particular, have 
unjustifiably expanded the doctnne and frequently have applied 
the wrong ~ tandard .~  They have thus often frustrated the 
Framers' purpose, wolated the plan meamng of the Supremacy 
Clause, and failed to protect indiwduals' human nghts. 
'Ihs h c l e  unravels the non-self-executing treaty doctnne, 
exarmnes the invocation of a treaty as a defense to governmental 
action, and develops a test for when an individual (rather than a 
government) may assert a treaty defensively in state or federal 
courts. Lastly, tbs Article applies t h s  test to state-sponsored 
ludnapping and the U.N. Convention Agsunst Illicit Traffic in 
Narcohc Drugs and Psychotropic  substance^.^ The parties to 
whom Drug Enforcement Admmstration-pad agents had hdnapped from Memw and 
brought to the United States for tnal. See znfra notes 454, 457 and accompanying 
text. 
5. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989) (detemmmg 
that the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is non-self-executing and 
thus not mvocable by sanctuary movement members defending agamt  federal prose- 
cution for smuggling Central Amencan ~ m g r a n t s  clauned to be refugees), cert. 
denzed, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 
1987) (concluding that the High Seas Convention is non-self-executing); United States 
v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 873-84 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denzed, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); 
Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denzed, 218 P.2d 595 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 19501, rev'd on thzs zssue and afd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 
617, 620-22 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) ( d e t e m m g  that Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. 
Charter, the human nghts articles, are non-self-executing and thus not mvocable by 
a Japanese ~ m g r a n t  challengmg race-based restriction on o w m g  land); In re Me- 
dina, 19 I. & M. Dec. 734, 73435, 740-41 (1988) ( d e t e n m g  that the Geneva Con- 
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons m Time of War is non-self- 
executing and thus not invocable by a Salvadoran fighting deportation to her country 
m the middle of an armed conflict); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurrmg) (concluding that, among other 
treaties, the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons m Time of 
War and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pnsoners of War are 
non-selfexecuting), cert. denzed, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The 
Doctrzne of Self-Executing Beaties and U.S. v. PoshL Win a t  Any Prrce?, 74 Ahi. J. 
INT'L L. 892 (1980) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's deusion m United States v. Postal). 
6. Convention Agsunst Illicit Traffic m Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substanc- 
es, opened for szgnature Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (19881, reprznted rn 
28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) (entered mto force Nov. 11, 1990) [hereinafter U.N. Drug Traf- 
fichng Convention]. 
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t h s  treaty, whch was sponsored by the United States, barred 
one country's law enforcement agents &om operating without 
perrmssion on another country's soil and rejected a provision 
reqwnng a country to  extradite its own cihzens? Th~s  k c l e  
demonstrates that, had the Conventzon been in effect when the 
Supreme Court decided Unzted States v. Alvarez-Machazn: the 
Court would have been constrsuned, even under its flawed rea- 
soning in interprehng the extradihon treaty at issue there, to 
have recogmzed the challenge to the tnal court's personal juns- 
dictzon brought by the Mexlcan physician abducted .from 
Guadalajara by psud agents of the United  state^.^ 
To understand why courts generally should permit indivldu- 
als, and particularly foreigners, to invoke treaties defensively 
requlres an exarmnation of the status of treahes in Amencan 
law and, especially, a study of k c l e  VI, clause 2, of the Consti- 
tutzon. Part I1 analyzes the text and draftmg hstory of the Su- 
premacy Clause, the charactenstics of self-execuhng and non- 
self-executmg treaties, the United States' approaches to treaty 
interpretahon, and the manner m whch Amencan courts have 
interpreted treatzes when asserted defensively by individuals. 
Part I11 proposes a three-prong test for involnng treaties defen- 
sively Part IV analyzes the U.N. Drug Trafficlnng Convention, 
discusses the extraordinary drafbng hstory of the Conventzon's 
extradihon and antiforeign law enforcement articles, and shows 
how they ought to be interpreted in light of that hstory and in 
accordance with the more general rules of treaty interpretahon 
discussed in Part 11. After analynng these provisions, Part IV 
demonstrates how the general theory of treaty interpretahon 
and the proposed test combine to accord abducted foreign defen- 
d a n t ~ ' ~  the nght to invoke these two artzcles to challenge the 
7. Id. arts. 2, 6; see znfra note 318 (excerpting relevant paragraphs of Article 6); 
Appendix, znfra, a t  notes 525-32 (providing complete text of Article 2). 
8. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
9. See znfra part IV.C.1. 
10. The Convention deals solely with illicit drug tr&ckmg and protects only those 
hdnapped m relation to law enforcement efforts mvolvmg illicit drugs. Furthermore, 
the Convention protects nationals of the state from which the mdividual is abducted, 
not necessarily nationals of other states. This fact does not mean that those outside 
the Convention have no protection. Customary International law and human rights 
treaties generally prohibit state-sponsored abductions. See RESTATEMENT, (THIRD) OF 
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personal jurisdiction of state and federal courts. 
A. Treatzes and the Supremacy Clause 
1. Self- or Non-Self-Executzngz-A-A Questzon of Domestzc Law 
In the= relabons with one another, most countnes mew trea- 
ties as legal obligations, much in the same way that parties to a 
pnvate bilateral or multilateral contract regard such an agree- 
ment." The domestic courts of nation states, however, mew 
treaties through a different lens-that of their domestzc law, in- 
cluding applicable constitutional promsions. The lens may con- 
sist of transparent glass, hghly refracted glass, or glass so 
opaque as to transmit virtually no light whatsoever. Whether an 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 3 432 reporter's note 1 (1987) (inferring from Articles 3, 5, and 
9 of the Uluversal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Articles 7, 9, and 10 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that state-sponsored abduc- 
tions are illegal and noting that the Human Rights Committee established by the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that Uruguayan security agents 
violated Article 9(1) by hdnapping a Uruguayan refugee from Argentina). 
The United States Senate, however, has rendered the human nghts treaties 
that the United States has ratified largely non-self-executing. See, e.g., 138 CONG. 
REC. S4781, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Executive Session on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Furthermore, Amencan courts have been 
inconsistent m evmg effect to customary .international law. Compare The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law. 
m h e r e  there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legdative act or judicial 
deasion, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.") with 
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that 
customary mternational law applies m state-sponsored hdnapping cases only "in a 
situation in whch the government's conduct was outrageousn and thus violative of 
due process) (citing United States v. Toscanmo, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)); see 
also LOUIS Henhn, International Law As Law m the United States, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1555, 1565-66 (1984) (concluding that customary international law has the 
same status as selfexecuting treaties); Monroe Leigh, Is the Preszdent Above Custom- 
ary International Law?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (1992) (argumg that the executive 
branch exceeds its discretion when ordenng an extraterritonal arrest without the 
consent of the territorial sovereign state). But see Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board 
the Paquete Habanx Resolvrng the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary Inter- 
national Law, 25 VA. J. IN'l"L L. 143, 151 (1984) (asserting that customary interna- 
tional law is infenor to federal statute). 
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS pt. 1, ch. 1, mtroductory 
note. 
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indimdual may invoke a treaty m a domeshc court thus depends 
largely on the domeshc law of the country in question. When, 
without addihonal mplementing legslahon, domestic law per- 
mits courts to use a treaty promsion as the rule of decision, the 
treaty promsion is "self-exe~uhng."'~ When domeshc law re- 
quires mplementmg legslation to make the promsion effechve 
locally, the treaty promsion is "non-self-exe~uting."'~ Whether a 
treaty promsion is self-execuhng or non-self-execuhng is a ques- 
hon of domestic, not internahonal, law l4 Each country is re- 
qulred to carry out its international obligahons, but the country 
may choose any reasonable method of doing so.15 
For example, a clause in a bilateral treaty of amity and 
fnendshp may state as follows: "The parbes to t h s  treaty guar- 
antee that neither party's nahonals shall be subject to discnm- 
inahon in trade or employment."16 Assume that two countries, 
Atlanhs and Utopia, enter into a treaty of amity and hendshp 
contamng t h s  clause. Assume further that a mumcipality in 
Atlanhs demed A, a nahonal of Utopia legally residing in 
Atlanhs, a license to operate a tazn cab sennce. A met all of the 
mumcipality's requrements for the license but was demed solely 
because she was not an Atlanhs nahonal. The domeshc law of 
Atlanhs could permit A to  assert the treaty of fnendshp in 
Atlantis's courts to obtan an order, reqmnng the mumcipality 
to issue the license. Alternahvely, Atlanhs's execuhve could in- 
tervene with the mumcipality's offiaals to rescind the demal of 
12. Id. 5 111 cmt. h. 
13. Id. 
14. Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrzne of Self-Executing Treaties m the United States: A 
Critical Analyszs, 26 VA. J. INl"L L. 627, 650 (1986); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 5 111 cmt. h; RICHARD B. LILLICH & FFWNK C. NE~VMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL H ~ I A N  RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 73-74 (1979). 
15. See Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  651 (UStates detemme how to unplement thelr 
international legal obligations on the rnuxllcipal level."). Despite courts' statements 
that lntent of the parties determmes the self-executing question, "[tlhe negotiating 
parties are usually not concerned with the question of whether the treaty will 
be domestically valid or directly applicable [self-executing]." Id. a t  654. Thls 1s par- 
ticularly so with multilateral treaties. Id., FkWK N E r W  & DAW WEISSBRODT, 
INTERNATIONAL H u h m  RIGHTS 580 (1990). 
16. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340 (1924). InoAsakura, the Court inter- 
preted a sunilar treaty provision to bar discnmlnation agamst a Japanese national 
carrying out the trade of a pawnbroker. Id. a t  343. 
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the license and obtan a license for A." Under either approach, 
Atlantis has fulfilled its obligations under the treaty of amity 
and fhendshp. 
The first approach illustrates the operahon of a self-execuhng 
treaty provlsion. The second approach illustrates the operatzon 
of a non-self-executing provlsion, an approach. that requres 
implementing legslation to permit the individual to assert the 
treaty vlolahon in the state's courts. Usually, the state parhes 
do not care whch method the other state party or parhes adopt 
to fulfill their treaty obligahons.18 In our country, the available 
evldence suggests that the Framers of the Constituhon intended 
that the United States adopt the first approach, creahng a de 
facto rebuttable presumption in favor of self-execuhon. 
2. The Framers' Intent zn Makzng Treatzes the Law of the 
Land 
Through the Supremacy Clause,lg the Framers deliberately 
chose to make treaties law rather than merely a moral obliga- 
tion." They were well aware that England used a quite different 
17. Typically, A, the aggrieved national, would have to persuade her government 
to intercede on her behalf, Assummg that Utopia agreed to do so, it would use dip- 
lomatic channels to persuade Atlantis ofiaals to ensure that the mmcipal govern- 
ment grants A the license. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties m Domestic Le- 
gal Systems: A Policy Analyszs, 86 AM. J. INlJL L. 310, 31415 (1986) (explammg the 
terms "dualistn and "momst"). Persons w i t h  a momst state can Invoke the treaty 
and sue m a domestic court of the state to requlre that they be treated m accor- 
dance with the treaty standard. Id. a t  314. "In a dualist state, [however,] mterna- 
tional treaties are part of a separate legal system from that of the domestic law 
(hence a 'dual' system)." Id. Therefore, a treaty is not part of the domestic law, a t  
least not directly." Id. Persons m such a state may not go to court to enforce them 
nghts under the treaty: T h e  [foreign citizen's] only recourse 1s to persuade hu own 
government to use diplomatic means to encourage [the v~olating state] to honor its 
obligationfs under the treaty]." Id. at  31415. I have borrowed from Jackson m creat- 
ing the above hypothetical; he uses a quite slmilar one to illustrate the difference 
between a momst and a dualist state. 
18. As a matter of convention, the states leave to each party state's domestic lam 
the authority to choose the appropnate means of meeting treaty obligations. See 
supra note 14. 
19. See supra note 1. 
20. George Mason, delegate from Virenia, was one of the three h e r s  who re- 
fused to slgn the proposed Constitution. He set forth hls objections m a pamphlet 
that was later published m the Virgsnra Journal on November 22, 1787. George 
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system and purposely rejected England's approach. Under the 
British system, treaties are never self-executzng,2l and Par- 
liament must pass special legslahon for a treaty to operate 
domestzcally The Framers, however, wanted treaties to have the 
same status as do federal statutes. 
a. Treatzes Becomzng Law of the Land 
After the hostilihes between the Bribsh and the rebellious 
former colomsts ended in 1781, intense anti-Tory feeling contin- 
ued to gnp the newly independent Amencan states. As a result, 
many state le~slatures enacted statutes that permitted: (1) 
for~veness of debts owed to Tones (Britzsh citzzens),22 (2) 
Mason, Objections to the Constitution, VA. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprznted zn 1 THE DE- 
BATE ON THE C O N S ~ O N  345 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter 'I'm DE- 
BATE]. A federalist writing under the pseudonym of Civls Rusticus replied as'follows: 
"The mfraction of the present treaty [the Treaty of Peace with Great Britam] shews 
the necessity of treaties havlng the force of laws. " Civ~s Rusticus, Reply to 
Mason's Objections, Vk INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1788, repnnted zn 1 THE DEBATE, 
supra, a t  359. Many of the essays, mcludimg The Feederalist Papers, written either 
for or agmnst ratifying the Constitution, were written under pseudonyms. 
21. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT'S DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 437 (James McClellan & M.E. Bradford eds., 
1989) [heremafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of delegate Mercer mdicating that 
treaties m England were never final until voted upon by Parliament)..The Minority 
Report from the Pennsylvama Convention argued that the full Parliament had to 
approve treaties for them to have effect locally: "It ~s the unvaned usage of all hee 
states, whenever treaties mterfere with the positive laws of the land, to make the 
intervention of the legslature necessary to eve  them operation. Thls became 
necessary, and was afforded by the parliament of Great-Brib." The Address and 
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvanza to Thezr 
Constituents, PA. PACKET DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprznted m 3 TIIE 
CO~PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 161 (Herbert J. Stormg ed., 1981). As mdicated, 
although Mercer and the mmority report correctly noted the English practice, thev 
argument did not prevail. See Essays of an  Old W h g  111, INDEP. GMETTEER (PHILA.), 
Oct. 1787-Feb. 1788, repnnted m 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, a t  27. In 
objecting to the Supremacy Clause, the author noted that 
even m England the parliament ~s constantly applied to for thelr sanction 
to every treaty whch tends to mtroduce an -ovation or the slightest 
alteration In the laws m bemg, the law there is not altered by the treaty 
itself; but by an act of parliament whch c o n h s  the treaty, and alters 
the law so as to accommodate it to the treaty. 
Id. Agam, although the author correctly identified English practice, h s  ultimate 
argument failed. 
22. See, e.g., Citation Act, 1782 N.Y. Laws ch. 1 (An Act Relative to Debts Due to 
Persons Withm the Enemy Lmes). 
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confiscation of Tory pr0perty,2~ and (3) recovery in trespass for 
the Tones' use and occupation of Americans' land confiscated by 
the Brihsh dunng the war.z4 Such statutes vlolated h c l e s  IVY 
V, and VI of the Treaty of Peace of 1783 with Great B r i t a n ~ . ~ ~  
Protecting Tones' nghts had been one of Great Britan's chef 
demands in negohahng the Treaty of Peacez6 and in granhng to 
the United States numerous nghts and pn~ileges.~' In retaliahon 
agamst the conhued enforcement of the anh-Tory statutes, Great 
Britan refused to evacuate several garnsons on the Great Lakes 
and allowed its soldiers to capture some 3000 Amencan slaves.28 
Anti-Tory statutes also shaped the thnhng  of Alexander 
Hamilton, one of the most influenhal Framers of the Constituhon, 
who has been credited with calling the Constituhonal Con- 
~ention.~'  Hamilton saw the Supremacy Clause as resolvlng a t  
23. See, e.g., Confiscation Act, 1779 N.Y. Laws ch. 25 (An Act for the Forfeiture and 
Sale of the Estates of Persons Who Have Adhered to the Enemes of Thm State 
m Respect to all Property W i t h  the Same). Note that some of the anti-Tory statutes 
were enacted before the war ended. 
24. See, e.g., Trespass Act, 1783 N.Y. Laws ch. 31 (An Act for Granting a More 
Effectual Relief m Cases of Certam Trespasses). 
25. Article IV of the Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783, between Great Britam and 
the United States, provided as follows: "It 1s agreed that creditors, on either slde, shall 
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value, m sterling money, 
of all bona fide debts, heretofore contracted." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 
(1796) (quoting Article IV of the Treaty). Article V of the Treaty prowded: "That all 
persons who have any interest m confiscated lands, by DEBTS, should meet with no 
lawful mpediment ~n the prosecution of then just nghts." Id. at  238-39 (quoting 
Article V of the Treaty) (emphasis by capitalization m onpa l ) .  The treaty was ratified 
on January 14, 1784, and went into effect on April 9, 1784. 
26. On January 14, 1784, the Continental Congress ratified the Treaty of Peace with 
Great B r i m  and called on the states to stop confiscating Tones' properties and to 
repeal laws preventing the collection of debts owed to Tories by Amencan citizens, all 
of whlch conduct wolated the Treaty. 1 THE DEBATE, supra note 20, a t  1069-70. The 
states, however, failed to heed the mjunction of the Congress. 
27. Under the treaty, Great B r i b  recogruzed not only the Independence of the 
United States but also its "clam to the territory west to the Mississippi, north to 
Canada, and south to the Flondas." 1 HARRY J. CARh!AN ET At., A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 215 (3d ed. 1967). Furthermore, Great Britam granted the United 
States f ~ h m g  nghts on the banks of Newfoundland, in the mshore waters of the 
British dormnions m Amenca, and m the unsettled bays and harbors along Canada's 
eastern coastline. Id. 
28. See znfia note 51. 
29. RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON,  ADIS IS ON, JAY, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 194-95 (1985). 
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a single stroke two crihcal, Interrelated problems: first, assunng 
a strong central government; second, protectxng the nghts of 
foreigners and thereby encouraging foreign investment, spealnng 
with one volce m mnternahonal commerce, and avoiding fnctlon 
with other c o ~ n t n e s . ~ ~  After the war ended, but before the 
Constituhonal Conventzon, Hamilton had handled a lawsuit, 
Rutgers v. Waddington:' dealing with a treaty violation. The 
state court's reachon to the vlolatxon and the popular response to 
the court's oplmon Indelibly Impressed upon hun the need to 
elevate the status of treahes In the new ~onstitutxon.3~ 
In Rutgers, Hamilton represented a Tory who had been sued for 
trespass under the New York s ta t~te .3~ After occupying New 
York City In 1778, the British selzed some real property In the 
City and let two Tones operate a brewery on the prerrnse~.~~ 
They pad  no rent fi-om 1778 to 1780 but, upon order of the 
Brihsh Commande?-ln-Chef, pad rent into a poor person's fund 
thereafter until 1783.35 After the war, the Amencan owner3%f 
the property sued under New York's Trespass Act to recover 
damages for the use and enjoyment of the property dunng the 
occupahon.3' 
Under the treaty, neither side was entitled to recover for 
selzures made dunng hostilitxes.3' In a r p n g  before the New 
30. Id. a t  184-85. 
31. N.Y. Mayor's Ct., 1784, removed by writ of error, N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1784-1785, cited 
zn 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAbmTON 289-316 (Julius Goebel, Jr., ed., 
1964) [heremafter LAW PRACTICE]. 
32. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, a t  526-27. 
33. Id. a t  289. 
34. Id. The merchants' names were Benjamm Waddington and Evelyn Pierrepont. 
35. Id. at  290. 
36. Id. a t  289. The owner's name was Elizabeth Rutgers. She fled New York City 
when i t  was captured by the British dunng the summer of 1776. Id. 
37. Id. a t  291. 
38. Article M of the Treaty of Peace of 1783 provlded as follows: 
That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions com- 
menced agamst any person or persons, for, or by reason of any part, whch 
he or they may have taken m the present war: and that no person shall, 
on that account, suffer any future loss or damage, either m  IS person, lib- 
erty, or property; and that those who may be m confinement on such 
charges, a t  the time of the ratification of the treaty m Amenca, shall be 
immediately set a t  liberty, and the prosecutions so commenced, be 
discontinued. 
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York Mayor's Court, Hamilton emphasized that the leg-itlmate 
interests of foreigners had to be re~pected.~' He relied upon the 
Treaty, the Articles of Confederation, and the law of nations.40 
The court rejected the treaty argument and, in a somewhat 
confusing opinion, deterrmned that the legslature could not have 
intended the statute to  apply when it would vlolate the law of 
nations.41 In a Solomon-like holding, appreciated by neither side, 
the court gave judgment to the Amencan owner for the penod 
from 1778 to  1780, for whch the Tory occupants had pad  no 
rent,42 but gave the occupants43 judgment for the penod from 
1780 to 1783, dunng whch they had paia rent under the order of 
the British military 
A test case, Rutgers received mde publicity Although Hamilton 
thought that the court had failed to  uphold the Tones' nghts 
under the treaty, anti-Tones nevertheless denounced the opin- 
ion.45 Rutgers and its stormy reception persuaded Hamilton that 
mahng treaties legally enforceable was the only means of 
protecting the interests of foreigners in state courts.46 
Meanwhile, enforcement of the anti-Tory statutes led to 
continued Bntish repn~als.~' After investigahng Britan's com- 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 273 (1796) (quoting Article VI of the Treaty). 
Hamilton argued that Article VI protected by implication an individual m the 
defendant's position. The phrase "nor any prosecutions commenced aganst any person 
or persons, for, or by reason of any part, which he or they may have taken m the 
present warn suggests that a British Army licensee could not be prosecuted for having 
occupied real property seized dunng the conflict. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, a t  
298-99. 
39. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, at  299, 305. 
40. Id. at  297, 304-05. 
41. Id. a t  308-09. 
42. Id. at  306-07. 
43. Judgment actually ran to Joshua Waddington, their agent, and the named party 
in the lawsuit. Id. a t  291. 
44. The court reasoned that the Tory occupants were not acting under military 
orders until 1780 and that the lepslature did not intend to have the Trespass Act 
apply in such a way as to violate the law of nations, which provlded for no 
compensation for property seized under military orders. Id. at  308-09. 
45. The State Assembly passed a resolution criticizmg the decision for "it. tendency 
subversive of all law and order" to undermine the authority of the lepslature. Id. at  
312 (quoting NY Assembly Journal, 8th Assembly, 1st meeting 33 (Oct. 4Nov. 29, 
1784)). 
46. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, at  282; MORRIS, supra note 29, a t  44-45. 
47. MORRIS, supra note 29, a t  148. 
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plants that the states had vlolated the treaty by enacting and 
enforcing the anlz-Tory laws, John Jay48 issued h s  famous 
catalog of infkaclzons to the Conlmental Cong~ess.~~ Jay had 
conducted a thorough inveslzgalzon and informed the Congress of 
h s  conclusion that the states had vlolated the treaty first:' By 
1787, Great Britsun had made clear that it would carry out its 
treaty obligalzons only if the Amencan states honored their 
commitments to the Tones.51 To help resolve t h s  issue, Federal- 
ists exhorted the Continental Congress to adopt a constitutional 
provlsion malung trealzes supenor to state constitulzons and stat- 
utes and enforceable by individuals in state courts:' In the end, 
48. Jay had been president of the Continental Congress, one of the diplomats who 
negotiated the Treaty of Peace, an ambassador to Spam and Great Britam, and later 
the first Chef Justice of the Supreme Court. 1 WiLLIAhI JAY, THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY 
v-vi (1972). 
49. According to Jay, these infractions occurred before British soldiers captured 
slaves. MORRIS, supra note 29, a t  149. 
50. Id. at  148-49. Documents now available reveal, however, that Britrun, though 
unquestionably incensed about the United States' violations of the treaty, used them 
as a pretext to violate the treaty themselves: 
[Alt a secret meeting m the British Colomal Office on April 8, 1784-the 
day before the treaty went mto effect-the British dec~ded to retam [ the4 
posts [in the Northwest Temtones] m order to enlist the a d  of fnendly 
Indians m checkulg the advance of Amencan settlement and to protect the 
lucrative Scottish Canadian fur trade m the Northwest. 
CAR~ZAN ET AL., supra note 27, a t  241. 
51. On February 28, 1786, the British government told John Adams that the British 
would not evacuate t he r  forts m the Northwest Temtones until the Amencans met 
thelr treaty obligations by permitting British creditors to collect them debts and by 
compensating the Tones for confiscations. 'I'HE DEBATE, supra note 20, a t  1073. The 
states' anti-Tory statutes and refusal to honor contracts with British creditors caused 
continued fnction between the United States and Great B r i m .  m s  dispute was not 
resolved until the Jay treaty was ratified m 1795. The treaty called for, among other 
thmgs, the payment of English creditors as ongmally provlded m the Treaty of Peace 
of 1783. FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAhmmN 317 (1982). Great Britan did not 
abandon her posts on Amencan soil until 14 years after the Treaty of Peace was 
signed. Id. 
52. James Madison stated that, for a treaty "[tlo render succeeding laws vold, it 
must have more than the mere authority of a law [that would only repeal all 
antecedent laws]." 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 327 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1975). An 
earlier letter to Madison had complamed that a lack of uniform compliance among the 
states as to treaty obligations with Great Britam left B r i m  a t  liberty to capture 
Amencan ports and Amencan slaves. Id. at  63. Madison also noted m The Federalist 
that, because the state constitutions differed, "it mght happen that a treaty or na- 
tional law of great and equal importance to the states, would ~nterfere with some and 
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the Congress passed a resolution calling upon the states to repeal 
laws that were "repugnant to the treaty "53 More importantly, the 
resolution asserted that treaties are "part of the law of the land, 
and [are] not only independent of the will and power of such 
[state] Le~slatures, but also binding and obligatory on them."" 
TIxs resolution was the forerunner of the treaty provision in the 
Supremacy Clause, whch the Constitutional Convenizon Included 
in Arhcle VI a few months later.55 
Drawing on h s  experience in Rutgers, obsennng the results 
of the anti-Tory statutes? and convinced of the utter folly of 
thrteen loosely joined independent states, Hamilton concluded 
that the new constitution needed a supremacy clause "buttressed 
by an independent judiciary "57 Consequently, he devoted much 
of h s  energy to supporting the Supremacy Clau~e.'~ He subse- 
not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid m some of the states 
at  the same time that it would have no effect in others." 10 rd. a t  425 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison)). 
53. MORRIS, supra note 29, a t  149. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. On March 21, 1787, only a few months before the Constitutional Convention, 
Hamilton argued for passage of his bill repealing that part of the Trespass Act that 
prohibited pleas of military justification: "He s a d  no state was so much Interested m 
the due observance of the treaty, as the state of New-York; the British havlng 
possession of its western frontiers. And whch they hold under the sanction of our not 
having complied with our national engagements." 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMIG 
TON 121 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) [heremafter PAPERS]. 
On April 17, 1787, less than a month before the convention, he argued for the 
passage of an "Act Repealing Laws Inconsistent with the Treaty of Peace." The act 
was passed by the N.Y. Assembly but failed to pass in the Senate. 1 LAW PRACPICE, 
supra note 31, a t  524 11.196. 
57. MORRIS, supra note 29, a t  47. 
58. Hamilton's proposed constitution, whch he apparently gave to Madison a t  the 
close of the Constitutional Convention, contmned a clause that closely resembled the 
Supremacy Clause: 'The laws of the United States and the treaties whch have been 
made under the articles of confederation and whch shall be made under the con- 
stitution shall be the supreme law of the land and shall be so construed by the Courts 
of the several states. k." 4 PAPERS, supra note 
56, a t  270 (quoting art. VII, 5 6 of Alexander Hamilton's proposed constitution) 
(language stncken ~n ongmal). Although Hamilton did not draft the Supremacy Clause, 
his writings both before and after the convention, h s  proposed constitution, hls actions 
in the New York Leeslature to abolish the anti-Tory statutes, and hs addresses to 
the New York state ratieing convention evince his commitment to the Supremacy 
Clause. MCDONALD, supra note 51, a t  95-115. Luther Martin, the Maryland delegate 
and states' rights advocate, drafted the final verslon of the Clause. MORRIS, supra note 
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quently explaned h s  posilzon at length in four separate issues of 
the Federalist  paper^.^' 
For example, in Numbers 22 and 80 of The Federalist, he 
discussed two related issues: first, for trealzes to have any effect, 
courts must have the authority to apply them and individuals 
generally must have the nght to  invoke thea; second, to avoid 
conflicts with other countries, foreigners must receive access to 
our courts and the nght to invoke treaties as the rule of deci- 
~ion.~'  Specifically, in Number 22, he wrote: 
A c~rcumstance, whch crowns the defects of the confederahon, 
remans yet to be mentioned-the want of a judiciary power. 
Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define 
thew true m e m g  and operahon. The treahes of the United 
States to have any force a t  all, must be considered as part of 
the law of the land. Thew true mport as far as respects m- 
divlduals, must, like all other laws, be ascertamed by judicial 
deterrmnahon~.~' 
On the need to recopze foreigners' nghts in courts, Hamilton 
wrote in Number 80: 
The muon will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers 
for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an  
Injury ought ever to be accompamed with the faculty of 
preventmg it. As the demal or perversion of jushce by the 
sentences of courts, as well as m any other manner, is with 
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that 
the federal judiciary ought to have copzance of all causes m 
whch the cihzens of other countnes are ~oncerned.~' 
Hamilton later made clear, in Number 80, that state and federal 
courts must acknowledge the nghts of foreigners to invoke trealzes 
29, at 218. 
59. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 22, 33, 78 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, 
supra note 2. 
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supm note 59; THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 2. 
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 59. 
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 2. This particular paper of The Fedemlist 
was published less than three weeks before the critical New York State Convention, 
in whch Hamilton has been credited with t m g  around a majority of the delegates 
who had been opposed to ratifying the constitution. MCDONALD, supra note 51, at 114 
15. 
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to prevent such foreigners from complarung to their home 
countries about unjust treatment a t  the hands of the United 
States' federal or state  government^.^^ 
Hamilton's dismay about the treaty violations was broadly 
shared by the F r a ~ n e r s ~ ~  and extended to some antz-Federal- 
i ~ t s . ~ ~  One important anti-Federalist opposed the Constitutzon as 
written, and the treaty power in particular, because the Suprema- 
cy Clause implicitly excluded the House of Representahves and 
because nothng in the proposal expressly placed constituhonal 
limits on the treaty He nevertheless acknowledged that 
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 2. In that same essay, Hamilton expanded 
on h s  concern about avoiding hostilities by provlding foreigners with recourse to 
independent national tribunals empowered, among other thmgs, to apply treaties and 
domestic law as the rule of deasion: 
But it is a t  least problematical whether an unjust sentence agamst a 
foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex 
locz, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon  IS sovereign, as 
well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or the general laws 
of nations. 
4 PAPERS, supra note 56, a t  668; see also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 
AM. J .  I N f i  L. 760, 762 (1988) (quoting William Dame, a North Carolina delegate to 
the Constitutional Convention: "It was necessary that treaties should operate as laws 
on mdividuals. They ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made. They 
involve in their nature not only our own nghts, but those of foreigners [and should 
be protected by the federal judicid.") For very good discussions of the Framers' 
intent in malung treaties the law of the land, see Paust, supra, and Carlos M. 
Vtizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Indivzduals, 92 CoLm. L. REV. 1082, 
1097-1110 (1992). 
64. Benjamin Franklin proposed adding the language concemg treaties to the first 
draR of the Supremacy Clause. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, a t  45. In movlng 
to give Congress a veto power over state legislation, Charles Pinckney, delegate of 
South Carolina, noted, among other thmgs, that the states repeatedly molated foreign 
treaties. Id. at  86. In seconding the motion, James Madison remarked that the states 
"evmced a constant tendency to vlolate national Treaties." Id. a t  87. 
65. See, e.g., A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire on the Federal 
Constitution (Oct. 10, 17871, zn 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 21, a t  
86, 88 (decrymg the inability of the confederation to honor the law of nations or 
enforce the treaties). 
66. Essay XIII of Brutus, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, repnnted m 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI- 
FEDERALIST, supra note 21, a t  377, 428-29 ("For as treaties will be the law of the 
land, every person who have rights or pnvileges secured by treaty, will have a d  of 
the courts of law, in recovering them."). Stormg classifies the essays of Brutus as 
"among the most important Anti-Federalist writings." Id. a t  358; see also Essays of an 
Old Whzg III, supra note 21, reprznted zn 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 21, a t  27-28. 
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treatles must have the force of law 67 The two major proposals 
that became the focus of the debate In the Constituhonal Conven- 
tion recopzed the importance of the treaty power.'j8 Both the 
New Jersey plan, whch favored states' nghts, and the Virgnla 
plan, whch favored a strong central government, elevated treatles 
to the status of law and made them supreme over inconsistent 
state statutes6' In sum, the Framers were anxlous to  avoid dis- 
putes with foreign co~ntnes'~ that mght anse if we denled 
foreign cihzens either treaty nghts or access to our courts.71 
Aside from avoiding conflicts with other states, the Framers 
desired to establish a uniform fore~gn trade policy and to  encour- 
age wealthy foreigners to do business with, and to move to, the 
United  state^?^ The Framers also wanted to demonstrate to the 
world the respect that the new natlon held for the rule of law 73 
67. Essays of an Old Whzg III, supra note 21, reprznted m 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI- 
FEDERALIST, supra note 21. 
68. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, a t  113, 117-18. The New Jersey plan was 
largely rejected; the constitution that emerged resembles the Virgnia plan m broad 
outline. The Supremacy Clause, however, does find part of its root structure in the 
New Jersey plan. 
69. Id. 
70. James Madison, however, criticized the New Jersey plan for not gomg far 
enough to prevent treaty molations: "Will it prevent those violations of the law of 
nations & of Treaties whch if not prevented must mvolve us m calamities of foreign 
wars? The tendency of the States to these molations has been manifested in sundry 
instances." Id. at  139. In h s  preface to the constitutional debates, Madison noted that 
the authority of the Continental Congress to make treaties binding on all the. states 
had been Ignored not only concemg the Treaty of Peace but also concemmg treaties 
with other countries. Id. a t  19-20. 
71. In a thoughtful article, one commentator noted that 
the Framers were concerned about treaty violations in part because such 
violations could offend other states and perhaps lead to calamity and war. 
The Franers empowered foreign nationals to utilize our courts to enforce 
the nation's treaty commitments m part to cure any such violations before 
they gave m e  to mternational friction. 
Vhzquez, supra note 63, a t  1160 (emphasis in onqnal). 
72. At the Virgnia Convention, James Madison sad: 'We well know, slr, that 
foreigners cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts, and t h s  has prevented 
many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting 3 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 583 (1888)), cert. denzed, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
73. In Pennsylvama, James Wilson, a delegate to the Convention, stated: "we] will 
show the world that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the char- 
acter of the United States; that the judges of the United States will be enabled 
to carry it mto effect." Id. a t  763 (quoting 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, a t  490) 
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To accomplish these objechves, the Framers made treahes the su- 
preme law of the land, enforceable by individuals in state and 
federal courts.74 
b. The Supreme Court's First Interpretatzon of a Treaty 
Seven years after the ratificahon of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton75 had its first opportunity to 
construe a treaty-the Treaty of Peace between the United States 
and its former colomal master, Great B r i t a~n .~~  In finding that 
the treaty rewved the debts citizens owed to Britxsh subjects, the 
Court concluded that the treaty overrode inconsistent state law 77 
The Court thus permitted the Tory creditors to invoke the treaty 
in a lawsuit agsunst Amencan debtors, much as Hamilton had 
urged in R u t g e r ~ . ~ ~  Ware effectuated one of the purposes of 
mahng treatxes the law of the land-avoiding internahonal 
conflict. By enforcing the treaty, the Court prevented Brihsh 
creditors fiom demanding that Great Britan take achon aganst 
the United States for failing to honor the nghts of Britxsh cibzens. 
(alteration in ongnal). 
74. The Supremacy Clause solved the most critical issue faclng the 13 newly mde- 
pendent states-fonng a strong central government without necessarily usurpmg the 
sovereignty of the mdividual member states. Rather than gmng Congress- the power 
to veto state lemslation, whch Madison proposed in the Virgma plan, the Supremacy 
Clause instead made federal law and treaties supenor to state law, mplicitly granting 
to the federal courts the authority to deterrmne when state laws contravened federal 
statutes and treaties. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, 8 2. 
75. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
76. Id. 
77. Justice Chase stated: 
[Tlhe treaty of 1783 has supenor power to the Legzslature of any State, 
because no Legslature of any State has any h n d  of power over the 
Constitution, whch was its creator [and] it is the declared duty of the 
State Judges to determine any Constitution, or laws of any State, contrary 
to that treaty (or any other) made under the authority of the United 
States, null and vord. National or Federal Judges are bound by duty and 
oath to the same conduct. 
Id. a t  237 (Chase, J., concurring) (a11 members of the Court filed an opmon); accord 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 360 (1816); see Paust, supra note 
63, a t  765 nn.35-37 (collecting early Amencan cases finding treaties self-executing). 
78. The treaty did not gve such a creditor a cause of action expressly, but the 
Court, nevertheless, allowed the creditor to invoke the treaty m the tnal court. Ware, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) a t  243-44; see supra note 25 and accompanymg text. 
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Both the states' blatant vlolations of the treaty and the firm 
belief that the nghts of foreigners had to be respected to stave off 
foreign hostilibes and to encourage foreign trade and investment 
underlay the Framers' crafhng of M c l e  VI, clause 2 of the Con- 
stitution. The underlying assumphon shared by both detractors 
and advocates of M c l e  VI was that M c l e  VI gave.indivlduals 
the nght to assert treahes in federal and state courts as rules of 
decision. 
B. Base of the Non-Self-Executzng Treaty Doctrzne zn the Unzted 
States 
1. Orzgzn of the Doctrzne 
At .first glance, the non-self-executing treaty doctnne appears 
to vlolate the Framers' intent that individuals be able to assert 
applicable treabes in state and federal courts. Certsunly, a broad 
or incorrect interpretahon of the doctnne may have that effect. 
One needs to exarmne carefully how the doctnne arose and how 
narrowly circumscribed it is to understand its purpose in Amen- 
can treaty law The doctnne of non-self-execuhon did not emerge 
here until 1829, forty-two years after the sigmng of the Constitu- 
bon. Narrowly interprebng a treaty between the United States 
and Span, the Supreme Court in Foster & Elam v. Neilson7' 
instituted the doctnne in t h s  country. 
A treaty is m its nature a contract between two natzons, not 
a legdative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object 
to be accomplished; espeaally so far as its operatzon 1s lnfra 
tenitonal, but is c m e d  mto executzon by the sovereign power 
of the respectzve parhes to the mstrument. 
In the United States a different pmaple 1s established. Our 
Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, 
consequently, to be regarded m Courts of justzce as eqmvalent 
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself 
without the a d  of any legislahve provision. But when the 
terms of the stzpulatzon Import a contract, when either of the 
parties engages to perform a particular ad, the treaty address- 
79. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
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es itself to the polihcal, not the judicial department; and the 
le~slature must execute the contract before it can become a 
rule for the Court?' 
Foster held that the treaty was non-self-executing but later 
overruled itself upon closer examinabon of a translabon of the 
Spamsh text. The treaty dealt with the validity of Spamsh land 
grants made In Flonda before it became part of the United States. 
The eighth article of the treaty in the English ongnal stated: 
[A111 the grants of lands made before the 24th January, 1818, 
by h s  Catholic majesty, or by h s  lawful authorihes, m the 
smd territones ceded by h s  majesty to the United States, shall 
be ratified and confirmed to the persons m possession of the 
lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid 
if the territones had remamed under the dommon of h s  
Catholic majesty 
The emphasized language differed in the Spamsh ongnal; 
translated, the Spamsh text s a d  that such grants "shall remazn 
ratified and ~onfirmed."'~ Notxng that the Spamsh version 
conformed to International practlce and construng both ongnals 
together, the Court reversed itself and found that the treaty 
language was self-e~ecuting.'~ 
Apparently, the Court initially had read the language "shall be 
ratified and confirmed" not to be mandatory84 but to be a future, 
executory obligabon-that is, meamng that the grant "will be 
ratified and confirmed" after the treaty was to come Into force.85 
80. Id. a t  314. 
81. Id. a t  274 (quoting the "Flonda Purchase Treaty" between the United States and 
Span  of February 22, 1819) (emphasis added). 
82. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833) (The Spanish version 
of t h s  article IS: Y'odas las concesiones de terrenos queduran ratijicados y 
reconoczdas a las personas que esten en posesion de ellas.") (emphasis added). 
83. Id. a t  87-88. 
84. The Supreme Court has recognized that "shalln generally means mandatory. See 
rnfra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also REED DICKERSON, THE FUN- 
DAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING § 9.4 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that "shalln indicates an 
obligation to act). 
85. The Ninth Circuit employed a similar analysls in Islamc Republic v. Boeing Co., 
771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985). Islamzc Republic dealt with the executive agreement 
between the United States and Iran over the release of the Amencan hostages and 
of the unfreezing of Iraman assets 1n the United States. The court concluded that the 
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Commentators have crihcized Foster's disbction between 
executory and executed treaty provlslons as ~nworkable.'~ Self- 
execuhng treahes may come into effect at a hture date.87 
Because, after more closely exammng the treaty language, the 
Court overruled Foster, that case should be read for the narrow 
proposihon that a treaty or treaty provlsion that makes itself non- 
self-execuhng is non-self-execuhng and thus reqrures implement- 
ing legslahon to be ~nvoked in court.88 A more encompassing 
aspect of the doctnne concerns whether enforcing the treaty 
vlolates separabon-of-powers pnnciples. 
2. Separatzon of Powers, Prznczples of Contract, and 
Non-Self-Executzng Treaty Terms 
Diggng out the foundahon of the United States' non-self- 
executmg treaty doctnne reveals that the doctnne rests largely on 
constitutional grounds. Detemmng whether a treaty 1s self- 
execuhng or non-self-execuhng is a question of domesbc law '' In 
the United States, the Supremacy Clause forms the base of t h s  
applicable domestic law The Clause's hstory and plan meamng 
suggest that the Framers presumed that most treaties would be 
self-execubng. By enforc~ng some treaty terms, however, the 
courts mght usurp the power of a co-equal branch of government 
or othemse vlolate the Constitut~on.'~ To avoid such conflicts, 
pact was "couched m executory language" and quoted the follomng terms: "[Tlhe 
United States agrees to termznute all legal proceedings m United States courts m- 
volmng clauns agamst Iran , [agrees] to nullifj, all attachments and judgments 
obtamed therem, [agrees] to prohibit all further litigation based on such clazms, and 
[agrees] to bnng about the fermrnution of such clazms through binding arbitration." Id. 
at  1283 (quoting from the Accords between the United States and the Islam~c Republic 
of Iran) (emphasis added by the court). Because of the asserted executory character 
of these Accords, the court found them non-self-executing. Id. a t  1283-84. 
86. Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  685; accord Paust, supra note 63, a t  770-71. 
87. See Oscar Schacter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provz- 
smm zn Amerxan Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 645 (1951). 
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 9 111(4)(a) (1987). T h s  con- 
tractual pnnciples component of the doctnne of non-self-executing treaties is discussed 
m the next section. Commentators also have phrased the rule of Foster more generally 
as follows: "Thus, a treaty whlch requlres no leaslation to make it operative w i t h  
the national legal order is s a d  to be 'self-executing.'" BURNS H. WESTON. ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL. AW AND WORLD ORDER 191 (1980). 
89. See supra part IIA.1. 
90. Although not clear from the wording of the Supremacy Clause, a treaty may not 
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the courts have declared such treaty terms non-self-executing.g1 
These potential constituhonal vlolahons typically involve 
separahon-of-powers conflicts. A treaty term is not self-execuhng 
if it requlres achon that the Constituhon authonzes only Congress 
to perform. For example, by purpohng to declare war or by re- 
qumng the allocahon of funds, a treaty would usurp the House's 
constitutional role and would be ~nenforceable.'~ A treaty term 
is not self-executing if it is nonjusticiableg3-that is, if its j ~ d i ~ l a l  
enforcement would usurp exclusive, constituhonally granted 
executive power over critical foreign policy issues.94 A treaty term 
vlolate the Constitution. Re~d v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957). 
91. See Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.) (peace treaty 
regarding patents on industrial property), cert. dented, 280 U.S. 571 (1929); Sei Fujii 
v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denred, 218 P.2d 595 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 19501, rev'd on thrs =sue and affd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (en 
banc); RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 111 reporter's note 5 (citing 
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913)) (givmg effect to wngressio- 
nal mew that rndustnal property treaty was non-self-executing). For a discussion of Ser 
Fujii, see rnfra note 108 and accompanymg text. 
92. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 0.C. Cir.) (noting that, in the followmg 
areas, among others, the t r e a t y - m h g  power is not "concurrentn with congressional 
power: Congress has exclusive authority to declare war, to appropriate money, and to 
rmse taxes) (quoting Article I, 8 9, cl. 7, of the Constitution: "No Money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury, but rn Consequence of Appropnations made by Law."), cert. 
denred, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 111 cmt. 
1, a t  47-48. For a conflicting mew, see Paust, supra note 63, a t  775-81, m whch the 
author argues that Congress does not have exclusrve power to allocate funds or to m e  
taxes. Consequently, except for declarations of war, Paust would not render treaties 
non-self-executing for want of the approval of the House of Representatives. Authorities 
have asserted that cnmrnal offenses may not be established by treaty because that 
power requves congressional action. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 8 111 cmt. 1, a t  48. But see Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 618 
(1927) (implymg that the United States' cnmrnal junsdiction could be expanded by 
treaty alone). 
93. Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that Congress 
may violate a treaty and finding nonjusticiable a lawsuit to compel the president to 
comply with a treaty in the face of Congress's clear intent to vlolate the pact), cert. 
denred, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). 
94. The political question doctrine rests on the separation of powers. Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Three principal questions underlie the doctnne: "(i) Does the 
issue Involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a 
coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that 
a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations 
counsel agamst judiaal mtervention?" Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) 
(Powell, J., concurring); see Baker, 369 U.S. a t  217 (formulating a slmilar six-prong 
test that Justice Powell has summanzed and reduced to three). 
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A party asserting the political question doctnne must receive an affirmative 
response to a t  least one of the above three questions. By makmg treaties the "supreme 
Law of the Land" and by extending judicial power all Cases m Law and Equity, 
ansing under Treaties," the Constitution textually commits the handling of treaty 
questions to the judiuary, leading to a negative response to the first question of Jus- 
tice Powell's summary of the Baker test. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; zd art. 111, 8 2, 
cl. 1; see also supra note 1 (observmg that the Judiuary Act of 1789 gave jurisdiction 
to federal courts m treaty cases). 
The second question mvolves whether Ujudiually discoverable and manageable 
standards" exlst to resolve the dispute, Baker, 369 U.S. a t  217, and whether 
adjudicating the case enmeshes the judiuary m nonjudicial policymakmg, zd. Answering 
t h s  question depends largely on the treaty m question and the court's expenence m 
construmg such treaties or consbung statutes havmg provisions similar to such 
treaties. On the one hand, a treaty prohibiting the development of space-based 
antiballistic ms i l e s  (ABMs) and a dispute over whether developmg space-based ABM 
systems vlolates the treaty, for example, may engage the court m nonjudiud 
policymakmg. On the other hand, treaties dealing with extradition and sunilar subjects 
come w i t h  the courts' expenence and core functions. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 8 43,  a t  76 (2d ed. 
1987). 
The thmd question-the prudential test-mqulres whether judiual action shows 
abject disrespect towards another branch, whether there rs "an unusual need for 
unquestiolllng adherence to a political declslon already made," Baker, 369 U.S. a t  217, 
or whether such a declsion will cause "embarrassment from multifanous pronounce- 
ments by vanous departments on one question," d. In thrs context, the Issue 1s 
whether the need to speak m one volce m foreign affam renders the question political. 
RESTATE~~ENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 112 cmt. c. To avoid such a possibility, 
the Court has adopted a general rule of deferring to the executive m mterpreting 
treaties and m handling other mternational law questions. Id. The Court has, however, 
occasionally rejected the executive's mterpretation. See, e.g., Perkms v. Elg, 307 U.S. 
325 (1939) (reversmg the Executive's deternunation that an mdivldual was not a 
citizen pursuant to a treaty); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 
5, 18 (1936) (concluding that, absent authonzation by statute or treaty, the President 
lacked power to surrender a fugitive to France); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 
(1933) (disagreemg with the government's mterpretation of a treaty allowmg search of 
vessels off the U.S. coast); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (finding no 
statutory authonzation for the Navy's seizure of a Damsh vessel). 
Political questions m the fore~gn afFrurs context are a matter of line drawmg. 
Nevertheless, the history of Article VI and of case law that has mterpreted treaties 
suggest that the line should be drawn to make only the exceptional case nonjusticlable. 
Because Congress can breach and the executive can denounce a treaty, those branches 
have the power to avoid complying with a treaty if considered m the broader mterests 
of the federal government. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. 996; Diggs, 470 F.2d 461. When 
a treaty unposes direct responsibility upon the executive, only a usurpation of the 
president% role m foreign affam or of the president's constitutional power as com- 
mander-m-chef would render the question nonjustiuable. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. a t  
999 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952) (reversmg a presidential order because the president IS bound by the 
Constitution m time of war); LOUIS I%NKN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
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is not self-executing if it is so vague that, by construing the term, 
courts would be encroachng upon the exclusive power of the 
president and the Senate to make treahes. By applylng a vague 
term to a specific case, a court could de facto legslate at vanance 
with what the president and two-thrds of the Senate intended in 
mahng the treaty into law 95 Courts test t h s  last potential 
separatzon-of-powers conflict by closely exarmning the treaty lan- 
guage to deterrmne whether it speaks in words of command and 
uses sufficiently preclse terms to impose a legal obligahon. 
Generally, American courts have reksed to apply a treaty when 
it merely exhorts the states to "use best efforts" or to "promote" a 
given ob~ect ive~~ reasoning that such language does not connote 
a legal obligation but merely a moral obligation or aspirahon. In 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca?' the Supreme Court compared the 
language of Arhcles 33.1 and 34 of the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees." Although not dealing expressly with the 
221-22 (1972) (commenting on the limited Ye~slative power" of the courts m foreign 
affaus); Jordan J. Paust, Is the Preszdent Bound by the Supreme Law of the 
Land?-Forezgn Affairs and National Security Reexammed, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
719, 727 n.24 (1982) (citing, among other cases, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900) (voiding an executive selzure of an enemy vessel m time of war)); Vhquez, 
supra note 63, a t  1128-33 (discussmg the separation-of-powers issues underlymg 
justiclability inqumes). But see Malvma Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court 
Deczsion in Alvarez-Macham, 86 AM. J. INTSL L. 736 (1992) (argumg that the Alvarez- 
Machazn decision can be defended on the ground that it posed a political question); 
Michelle D. Goum, Note, United States v. Alvarez-Macham Waltzzng with the Politicd 
Question Doctrzne, 26 CONN. L. REV. 759 (1994) (argumg but deplormg that the real 
basis for the Court's declsion m Alvarez-Machain was the political question doctnne). 
95. Iwasawa, supra note 14, at  672; see also WAYNE R. W A V E  & AUSTIN W SCOTT, 
JR., CRIMINAL LAW 90 n.2 (2d ed. 1986) (citing James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 
(1948), for the proposition that separation of powers prohibits Congress from "pass[mgl 
the law-making job on to the judic~ary" by enacting an ambiguous statute). 
Additionally, a vague term does not; eve  fau w m g  to the party agamst whom the 
provlslon is enforceable. Id. a t  91. f i s  policy consideration, however, appears to apply 
only to duties unposed on individuals, not duties unposed on the government. These 
two policy concerns likewise underlie the vold-for-vagueness doctnne. See Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
96. See, e.g., In re Alien Children Litig., 501 F Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 19801, 
afPd unreported mem., (5th Cir. 19811, a f d  sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952) (en banc). 
97. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
98. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267. 
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doctnne of self-execubng treabes, the case is instructive in 
d i s h n p s h n g  mandatory from hortatory language. b c l e  33.1 
provldes: "No Contracbng State shall expel or return ('refouler') a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the fionbers of territories 
where h s  life or fieedom would be threatened on account of h s  
race, religion, nahonality, membershp of a parbcular soclal group 
or polibcal opi~uon."~~ In contrast, Article 34 provldes that 
contracbng states "shall as far as possible facilitate the as- 
similabon and naturalizahon of refugees."100 The Court stated 
of the latter provlsion: 
Plhe provlsion is precatory; it does not requrre the mplement- 
mg authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are 
eligible. Thus, as made bmding on the United States 
through the Protocol, Article 34 provldes for a precatory, or 
disCretionary, benefit for the enhre class of persons who qualify 
as 'refugees,' whereas Article 33.1 provldes an entitlement for 
the subcategory that 'would be threatened' with persecuhon 
upon thelr return.''' 
A case involving the Charter of the Orgamzabon of Amencan 
States (OAS) also illustrates the critena for mandatory lan- 
guage.lo2 h c l e  47 of the Charter provldes as follows: 
The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, m accordance 
with then constitutional processes, to ensure the effechve 
exercise of the mght to  educahon, on the followmg bases: 
(a) Elementary educahon, compulsory for children of school 
age, shall also be offered to all others who can benefit from it. 
When provlded by the State it shall be without charge.lo3 
99. Id. a t  6276 (emphasls added). 
100. Id. (emphas~s added). 
101. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. a t  441. 
102. In  re Alien Children Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 1980), afd 
unreported mem., (5th Cir. 1981), afPd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
Thls case and the above quoted language are discussed m NE- & WEISSBRODT, 
supra note 15, a t  580-81. 
103. Charter of the Orgmzation of Amencan States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 
119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered lnto force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1951); Protocol of 
Amendment to the Charter of the Orgmzation of Amencan States, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 
47, 21 U.S.T. 607, 672, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, 340 (entered into force for the United 
States, Feb. 27, 1970) (emphasls added). 
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The court held that the OAS charter language was not sufllciently 
mandatory to establish a rule of law binding in an Amencan 
court. The court noted that the emphasized words are "not the 
hnd  of promssory language whch confers nghts in the absence 
of implemenhng leg~slation'"~~ but also indicated that, had that 
preamble been absent, subsection (a) would have passed muster 
under the self-executzng treaty doctnne.lo5 
Besides requinng mandatory language, most United States 
courts have held that general treaty language does not Sve nse 
to a legal obligatzon-that the language must be specific for an 
individual to invoke the treaty in a domestic court.lo6 When 
interprehng an imprecise treaty term, a court runs the nsk of 
legslating and thereby encroachng upon the president's and the 
Senate's exclusive treaty-mahng power. State and lower federal 
courts have imposed quite ngorous requrrements in many cases, 
suggesting a veiled attempt at limihng treaty applicahon in 
United States  court^.'^' 
104. In re Alien Children Litig., 501 F Supp. a t  590. 
105. Id. 
106. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denzed, 429 U.S. 
835 (1976); Amencan Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F Supp. 756, 769-70 & n.7 (N.D. 
Cal. 1989) (finding the following Article (Art. 1) of Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons m the Time of War too vague to be enforced: T h e  High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con- 
vention in all c~rcumstances."); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurnng) (finding non-self-executing the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons m Time of War (Fourth 
Geneva Convention)), cert. denzed, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Postal, 589 
F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir.) (holding that Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas 
established only a general principle, not law), cert. denzed, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Huynh 
T h  Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (criticizmg generality of the treaty 
language); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985) 
(holding that the United Nations Protocol IS not self-executiig and that the Umversal 
Declaration of Human Rights is "merely a non-bmding resolution"), affd on other 
grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1989) (de- 
terrrrrmng summarily that the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees IS non- 
self-executing), cert. denzed, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 
486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting summarily m dicta that Article 6 of the Convention 
on the High Seas is not self-executing when the Coast Guard attempts to board m 
international waters a foreign vessel suspected of drug smuggling). Article 6.1 provldes 
that "[s]hps shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save m exceptional cases 
expressly provided for m international treaties or m these articles, shall be subject to 
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For example, Sez Fujii'08 is often considered the semnal case 
on non-self-executzon. In that case, a Japanese national challenged 
a Califorma statute that prohibited foreigners from o m n g  land 
in Califorma.log The Califorma Court of Appeals concluded that 
the statute molaked Arbcles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter.''' 
The Supreme Court of Califorma affirmed--on due process 
grounds-and expressly rejected the grounds relied upon by the 
lower court. "' 
h c l e  55 provldes that the United Nahons "shall promote 
umversal respect for, and observance of, human nghts and 
fundamental freedoms for all without dishnchon as to race, sex, 
language, or religion," and, in Arbcle 56, the member nations 
'$ledge themselves to take jomt and separate actzon in cooperatzon 
with the Orgamzatzon for the achevement of the purposes set 
forth in b c l e  55."'12 After analyzing the language of the 
preamble and Articles 1,55, and 56 of the Charter, the Califorma 
Supreme Court detemned that the latter ti-+o arhcles were not 
self-e~ecut;mg."~ The court reasoned that the two arlxles were 
not "clear [or] definite" enough to "manifest[ an] intenhon" that 
they operate without the sud of mplemenhng leg~slation'" and 
further noted that "[tlhey state general purposes and objectives of 
1 the United Natzons Orgmzabon and do not purport to impose 
legal obligahons on the indimdual members or to create nghts in 
pnvate persons."'15 The Califorma Supreme Court asserted that 
other articles, in contrast to Arhcles 55 and 56, did contan clear 
and definite language,'16 indicating that they stated a legal rule 
that could operate domeshcally '17 
its exclusive jur~diction on the hlgh seas." Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (for the United States, Sept. 30, 1962). 
108. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denzed, 218 P.2d 595 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 19501, rev'd on thzs zssue but afPd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 617 
(Cal. 1952) (en banc). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. a t  481, 487-88. 
111. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 617, 620 (Cal. 1952) (en banc). 
112. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56 (emphasis added). 
113. Sec Fujii, 242 P.2d a t  620. 
114. Id. a t  621. 
115. Id. a t  620-21. 
116. See zd. a t  621 (citing Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 
1947) (concludiig that Articles 104 and 105 are self-executing)). 
117. Article 104, for example, promdes: "The Orgamzation shall enjuy i the territory 
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Sez Fujii provoked considerable scholarly commentary, most of 
it critical."' Although the language of Articles 55 and 56 of the 
U.N. Charter is not as precise as one mght msh,"' United 
States courts have had little hesitahon in c o n s ~ n g  much vaguer 
terms fkom the Constitubon, such as "due process," "equal 
protectzon of the laws," and "reasonable searches and seizures." 
Amencan courts, both state and federal, also routinely interpret 
such nebulous terms as "reasonable foreseeability," "good faith," 
and "proxlmate cause."120 
of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exeruse of its 
functions and the fulfillment of its purposes." U.N. CHARTER art. 104 (emphasis added). 
Article 105 provides: 
1. The Orgamzation shall enjoy m the territory of each of its Members 
such pnvileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its 
purposes. 
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and offiuals of 
the Orgamzation shall similarly enjoy such pnvileges and ~mrnunities as 
are necessary for the independent exercise of them functions in connection 
with the Organization. 
Id. art. 105 (emphasis added). 
118. See, e.g., LILLICH & NEWMAN, supra note 14, a t  76; Kathryn Burke et al., 
Application of International Human Rights Law In State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 291, 303-04 (1983); Quincy Wnght, National Courts and Human Rights-The 
Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INf l  L. 62 (1951); Comment, U.N. Charter Invalidates Alien 
Land Law, 2 STAN. L. REV. 797, 809 (1950). Contra Manley 0. Hudson, Charter Pro- 
vlsrons on Human Rights m Amencan Law, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 545 (1950) 
(argung that Articles 55 and 56 are not self-executing). One commentator has implied 
that Ser Fujii is the Plessy v. Ferguson of human nghts law. R. LILLICH, INTERNA- 
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 116 (2d ed. 1993). 
119. Some human nghts groups have argued that the Umversal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have become recogmzed as "authoritativen m- 
terpretations of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Consequently, they lend suffiuent 
specificity for Articles 55 and 56 to be enforced in a domestic court. NE\VMAN & 
WEISSBRODT, supra note 15, a t  582 n.14. 
120. For example, trylng to establish "universal tests" for proxlmate causation IS 
"demonstrably erroneousn because determmmg causation is "a matter of common sense 
and moral intuitions." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 158 (1987) 
(quoting Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause zn Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 317 
(1912)). Compare United States v. Knowles, 26 F Cas. 800 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 
15,540) (finding a shlp's master not guilty for failing to turn a boat about to attempt 
rescue of a crew member who had fallen overboard because but-for causation had not 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt) with Commonwealth v. Howard, 402 k 2 d  674 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (findig pmxunate causation satisfied when a defendant-mother 
of five-year-old child failed to mtervene when the mother's boyfriend physically abused 
the child, resulting m death). 
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Other provisions of the U.N. Charter have been held self- 
execubng in only a handful of cases, the most noteworthy being 
Sazpan v. Unzted States Department of 1nterzorl2' In that case, 
cibzens of Micronesia, a trust territory adrmnlstered by the 
United States, sued to challenge the granting of a lease to 
Continental Axlines for the construction of a hotel on public land 
next to Micro Beach, an important hstoncal, cultural, and recre- 
ational site.122 h c l e  VI of the Trusteeshp Agreement for the 
Pacific Islands123 provldes that the United States shall "promote 
the econormc advancement and self-suffiaency of the inhabitants, 
and to t h s  end shall regulate the use of natural resources" and re- 
qures the United States to take steps to "protect the inhabitants 
aganst the loss of their lands and  resource^."'^^ Nobng that the 
Trusteeshp Agreement was the plantiff-islanders' '%basic 
constitubonal document," the Ninth Circuit deterrmned that the 
&cle was self-executmg and that the plantiffs could invoke it in 
their a ~ b o n . ' ~ ~  
In deciding whether a treaty term 1s sufficiently precise, courts 
also consider whether its terms are cast negatively Negalzve 
treaty provisions-namely, obligalzons not to act-are more likely 
121. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 19741, cert. denzed, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); see also Keeney 
v. United States, 218 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (concluding that U.N. personnel 
rules forbidding disclosure of confidential information accorded defendant, a U.N. 
employee, a pnvilege agamst testifying about an employment matter). 
122. Salpan, 502 F.2d a t  93. 
123. 61 Stat. 3301, 3301-02 (1947). 
124. Id. a t  3302. 
125. Sarpan, 502 F.2d a t  98. The court reqwred the followmg factors to be 
considered: 
[Tlhe purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence 
of domestic procedures and mstitutions appropnate for direct unplemen- 
tation, the viability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and 
the Immediate and long-range soclal consequences of self- or non-self exe- 
cution. 
Id. a t  97 (citation omitted); cf. Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Frolova requlred an exarmnation of slmilar factors: 
(1) [Tlhe language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the clr- 
cumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations 
imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative 
enforcement mechamsms; (5) the unplications of permitting a pnvate nght 
of action; and (6) the capability of the judiaary to resolve the dispute. 
Id., see Vgzquez, supra note 63, a t  1120 n.140 (criticizing the Frolova formulation as 
one that hdes the real issues compnsmg the doctrme of self-executing treaties). 
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to  be judged self-executing than are affirmative provlsi~ns.'~~ 
'lks rule of constructzon probably rests, in part, on the fact that 
negatively drafted provlsions are often more preclse than are 
affirmative ones12' and, in part, on the fact that the negahve 
nature of such a treaty term implicitly elirmnateslZ8 the need for 
implementing 1egslatz0n.l~~ 
Aside from the constitutzonal and separahon-of-powers 
considerations, the doctnne of non-self-executzon draws on 
contractual principles. A treaty term is not self-executing if it 
- 
expressly makes itself non-self-executing. In Cardenas v. 
Smzth,13' for example, the mutual legal assistance treaty includ- 
ed such a term: "[Tlhs Treaty shall not gve nse to a nght on the 
part of any person to take any action in the United States to 
suppress or exclude any evidence. "I3' The contractual pnnci- 
ples cat ego^-y132 contemplates the narrow express exceptzon 
126. Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702 (1878); Baldford v. State, 
20 Tex. App. 627, 640-41 (1881); Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  674 n.228 (citing Ware 
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244-45 (1796)). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 8 111 reporter's note 5 (19871, states: "Obligations not to act, or to act only 
subject to limitations, are generally self-executing." Id. 
127. Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  674-75. 
128. The Supreme Court considered Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, a 'trery able" 
opimon, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS !j 111 reporter's note 5. The court m Hawes explamed why 
negative treaty provlsions are self-executing: 
When a treaty provldesl that certazn acts shall not be done, or that certam 
limitations or restnctions shall not be disregarded or exceeded by the 
contracting parties, the compact does not need to be supplemented by leg- 
islative or executive action, to authonze the courts of justice to decline to 
ovemde those limitations or to exceed the prescribed restnctions, for the 
palpable and all sufficient reason, that to do so would be not only to 
violate the public faith, but to transgress the "supreme law of the land." 
Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at  702-03 (emphasis added) (also quoted m RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 9 111 reporter's note 5). 
129. In addition, negative treaty provlsions presumably would not requrre any 
allocation of funds. Such provisions are less likely to run afoul of the Constitution and 
the separation-of-powers doctnne. See supra note 92 and accompanymg text. 
130. 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
131. Id. a t  918. 
132. See Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); supra notes 79-88 
and accompanying text. The Court, in essence, held that the parties to the treaty had 
delegated to the executive branch the task of fulfilling a prormse, an executory 
obligation over whch the treaty parties did not assume m e d i a t e  mternational 
responsibility. See supra part II.B.l. 
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provision, as exemplified in Cardenas, and two other situatzons: 
(1) a domestzc unplementahon clause, a fwly common clause that 
calls upon the treaty p d e s  to enact domestzc le~slatzon to unple- 
ment the treaty, and (2) a reservatzon by the Senate that expressly 
renders the treaty or some of its terms non-self-e~ecutzng.~~~ 
To understand domestzc unplementatzon clauses reqwes an 
analysis of the nature of treahes and the recognitzon of a mscon- 
cepgon about the intent of the parhes. Some Amencan courts 
have discussed whether the treaty parties intended to make a 
treaty self-executmg or whether they intended for individuals to 
invoke the treaty in United States ~ 0 u r t s . l ~ ~  Tlxs notzon of 
intent, however, is largely a fi~tzon.'~~ Most parties to an in- 
ternatzonal conventzon are indifferent as to how individual states 
carry out then mternatzonal obligahons, as long as they do so.136 
133. If the Senate attaches a reservation to the treaty makmg it non-self-executing, 
then the treaty IS non-selfexecuting. Thls question IS one of domestic law, and the 
Senate may, m ratifying the treaty, d e t e m e  whether i t  is self-executing. Blindly 
attachmg such reservations to treaties, however, may have the unwanted effect of 
encouragmg other state-parties not to take thev treaty obligations senously. See 
N E m m  & WEISSBRODT, supra note 15, a t  591 (criticlung reservations depnvlng 
human nghts covenants of thev character as bemg selfexecuting); M. Cherif Bassioum, 
Reflections on the Ratificatwn of the Internationnl Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1173 (1993) (The 
Senate's practice of de facto rewriting treaties through reservations, declarations, 
understandings, and provlsos leaves the mternational credibility of the United States 
shaken. "); Lon F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concernzng 
"Self-Executing" and "Non-SelfExecuting" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 516-17 
(1991) (concluding that %on-self-executing declarationsn may u n d e m e  treaties 
domestically and mternationdly). Aslde from the Senate, the president also may play 
a role m d e t e m g  whether a treaty IS selfexecuting. Because the courts pve 
deference to the executive m treaty mterpretation, the president's statements about the 
treaty bemg selfexecuting or non-selfexecuting may mfluence a court's ultimate 
deterrmnation of the question. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 5 111 
cmt. h (1987). 
134. See, e.g., More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 
1992) (holding that, because an mternational agreement g o v e m g  employment nghts 
of Filipmo workers on United States bases did not show that parties mtended to 
confer a pnvate nght of action, plamtiff workers may not sue for Chs tmas  bonus 
notwithstanding treaty pmvlsions stating that "[e]mployees shall receive as a m u m ,  
m addition to thev bas~c wages,. [sic] (c) Chmtmas bonus: [elquivalent to one- 
half month's pay") (ormssion m ongmal). 
135. RESTATE~ENT (!CHlRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 111(4) cmt. h (observmg that the 
mtent of a party other than the United States is irrelevant to the Issue of self- 
execution m the United States); see supra note 15. 
136. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 15, a t  580. 
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Furthermore, most states cannot ratify a self-executing treaty 
because, like Great Britain, their constitutional systems forbid 
it.13' When these states are party to a treaty with the United 
States, they cannot have intended that the treaty be "self-execut- 
ing."138 Since nation-state parlxes generally do not cons~der how 
each state will fulfill its obligations domestically, saylng whether 
the parhes intended13' or did not intend to promde indimduals 
with nghts under the treaty promsion misses the mark. 
A domestic implementation clause should be exarmned in ths 
context. Generally, such a clause merely enforces the rule of 
customary international law that each state is "bound to take 
every measure necessary to gve full effect to the treaty (pacta 
sunt ser~anda)." '~~ A domestic 1mplementat;lon clause usually 
indicates that the state parties deslre that all parhes individually 
take whatever steps necessary to  bnng the treaty into force in 
their own country Such clauses are often directed at countnes 
like Great Britzun, whch cannot enter into self-executmg treahes. 
Consequently, countnes like the United States, whch can enter 
into such treaties, may not need to take any measures to make 
the treaty effective in domestic courts."' In addihon, a domeslxc 
137. A falrly small number of states have adopted the doctme of self-executing trea- 
ties, including Argentina, Austna, Belgum, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexlco, The Netherlands, Spam, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and other European Community countries. Richard B. Lillich, International Human 
Rights Law m U.S. Courts, 2 J. TRANSNA?"% L. & POL'Y 1, 4 n.14 (1993) (citation 
omitted). 
138. Richard B. Lillich, Invokrng International Human Rights Law zn Domestic Courts, 
54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 373 (1985) (noting that, because few countnes have adopted 
the doctme of self-executing treaties and most have "little interest m the mechmcs 
by which other countries fulfill their international obligations under a treaty," trylng 
to determme the "'intent of the parties' to most multilateral treaties [has] only 
marpnally greater chances of success than medieval attempts to capture the ucomn) .  
Aside from the constitutional prohibitions on certmn states, "intent analysis" for self- 
execution purposes does not mean analysis of the parties' actual intent as revealed m 
the travauz preparatorres (preparatory work or drafting history). The mtent IS largely 
manifested objectively, that is, gleaned from the language of the treaty itself. See 
Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  655. 
139. Of course, the parties may Include express language purporting to make a treaty 
self-executing in the parties' domestic courts. Such language, however, is not a condi- 
tion precedent to makmg a treaty term self-executing, and a state's courts would still 
have to refer to domestic law to determme whether such a clause is self-executing. See 
supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
140. Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  660. 
141. A general implementation clause typically contams language such as the 
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implementahon clause may be limited to some articles of the 
treaty but not to others.142 In the absence of more specific 
language, therefore, a court should not draw the conclusion that 
domeshc mplementahon clauses render a treaty or treaty prow- 
sion non-self-execuhng. 
C. Supreme Court Precedent on Treaty Interpretatzon and on 
Treaty-Based Jurzsdictzonal Challenges 
1. The Unzted Stages' Approach to Treaty Interpretatzon 
Tradihonally, United States courts have construed treahes 
liberally to effectuate their underlpng purpose and to honor the 
plan mearung of the treaty language: "It is a general principle of 
construchon with respect to treahes that they shall be liberally 
construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the partzes 
to  secure equality and reciprocity between them."143 United 
States courts frequently have resorted to the drafing h~s to ry l~~  
to glean the purpose145 and mea~lmg'~~ of a treaty term."' 
follomg: Each state party undertakes to adopt, m accordance with its constitution, 
the measures necessary to give effect to the promslons of t h s  treaty. See zd.  Some 
courts have found implementation clauses to be dispositive on the question of a 
treaty's non-self-execution. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurrmg) ("A treaty that prowdes that party states will take 
measures through then own laws to enforce its proscnptions emdences its mtent not 
to be self-executing.") cert. denzed, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v; Postal, 589 
F.2d 862 (5th Cir.) (finding that Articles 17 though 29 of the High Seas Convention 
rendered Convention non-self-executing), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). Such a mew, 
however, mlspercexves (1) the manner m whch states are obligated to carry out mter- 
national law and (2) the character of self-executing treaties. See supra notes 134-42 
and accompanying text. 
142. See Iwastwa, supra note 14, a t  660. Accordingly, a treaty may have both non- 
self-executing provlslons and self-executing provlslons. See Warren v. United States, 
340 U.S. 523, 526 n.2 (1951); Sel Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (en 
banc); supra notes 111-20 and accompanymg text. 
143. Geofkoy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 
(1961); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Jordan v. Tasho ,  278 U.S. 123 (1928); 
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902). 
144. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Kolovrat, 366 
U.S. 187; Nielsen, 279 U.S. 47; Jordan, 278 U.S. 123; Tucker, 183 U.S. a t  437. 
145. See, e.g., Trans World h l ines ,  Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984) 
(construmg the Warsaw Convention limiting amlines' liability); Kolovrat, 366 U.S. 187 
(construng the Treaty of Commerce between United States and Serb~a); Ford v. United 
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (interpreting anti-hovermg treaty between Great Britam 
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They appear to regard the drafting hstory of treahes as analogous 
to the legslatzve hstory of statutes148 and have rejected a 
literal-mnded approach to treaty interpretahon. 
Jushce Scalia, however, has attempted to persuade the 
Supreme Court to adopt a plan meaning, textualist approach.149 
and the United States prohibiting boarding of vessels to search for then-illegal alcohol 
except when the vessel was w i t h  one hour's travel distance of a party's coastline); 
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (interpreting the extradition provisions 
of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 between Great B r i k  and the United 
States). 
146. Given the president's predormnant forelgn affaws role, courts, when mterpreting 
a treaty, qve great weight to the president's construction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 5 326 (1987). The courts, nevertheless, have "final authority" con- 
cermng treaty interpretation and may reject the mterpretation of the executive branch. 
Id. Compare Kolovrat, 366 U.S. a t  194 (stating that courts qve executive Interpretation 
"great weight") with Perluns v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 348 (1939) ( d e c l h g  to follow the 
Attorney General's oplmon). 
147. Purpose analysis operates on both the macro and rmcro levels. The ovemding 
purpose of the treaty helps inform mterpretation as does the specific purpose of a 
particular treaty provision. See HARRY W. JONES ET AL., LEGAL METHOD 345 (1982). 
148. Reporter's note 1 of 5 325 of the Restatement (Third) of Forelgn Relations 
observes the ease with which our courts have resorted to negotiation hstory: Wnited 
States courts, accustomed to analyzing leqslative matenals, have not been h e s i b t  to 
resort to travaux pre'paratorres." See, e.g., h France v. Salts, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); 
Trans World Azrlines, 466 U.S. 243. 
149. In United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (19891, the Court interpreted a bilateral 
tax treaty with Canada. The majority quoted language consistently used m pnor 
decisions utilizmg drafting hstory: "The clear Import of treaty language controls unless 
'application of the words of the treaty according to thelr obvlous meanmg effects a 
result inconsistent with the mtent or expectations of its signatones." Id. a t  365-66 
(quoting Sumitomo Shoji Amenca, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,180 (1982); Maxuno 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)). The Court proceeded to apply p l m  meanmg 
analysis and then to examme extmsic evidence of the parties' mtent, ruling that both 
the plan meaning and the extmsic evldence demonstrated that treaty parties mtended 
to permit the IRS Commissioner to direct a United States bank to turn over to 
Canadian tax authorities bank records of a Canadian national. Id. a t  366-70. 
Concurrmg, Justice Scalia sharply criticized the majority for resorting to extnnslc 
evldence, including the preratification leqslative hstory matenals when, according to 
hm,  the text of the treaty was clear. 
The critical question, however, is whether [the mtent of the parties] 
is more reliably and predictably achleved by a rule of construction whch 
credits, when it is clear, the contracting sovereigns' carefully framed and 
solemnly ratified expression of those mtentions and expectations, or rather 
one whch sets judges m vanous jurisdictions a t  large to ignore that clear 
expression and discern a 'genume' contrary mtent elsewhere. 
Id. a t  371 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring). Justice Scalia would have qven "authoritative effect" 
to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent only had the treaty provision been 
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The difficulty with t h s  approach150 is that it often puts formal- 
Ism ahead of the p d e s '  actual lntenlxons in mahng the treaty 
or statute.151 Even a textualist, like Juslxce Scalia, will exarmne 
1eg.lslalxve or d r a b g  hstory if the relevant provlsion is ambigu- 
ous as applied to the facts.152 Deterrmmng whether the language 
is ambiguous as applied, however, is a subjectwe undertakmg that 
is difficult to carry out without first exarmmng the purpose, leg- 
lslalxve or drafhng hstory, and context of the relevant provlsion 
and the treaty (or larger statute) of whch it is a part.153 
- 
ambiguous. Id. a t  373 (Scalia, J., c o n c m g ) .  He believed, however, that the use of 
preratification legdative h t o r y  matenals was Improper because "[tlhe question before 
us m a treaty case 1s what the two or more sovereigns agreed to, rather than what 
a smgle one of them or the lewlature of a smgle one of them, thought it agreed to." 
Id. a t  374 (Scalia, J., c o n c m g ) .  But see Detlev F. Va@, Senate Matenak and 
Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J. INTI, L. 
546 (1989). 
150. Interpreting a treaty on the basis of drafting h t o r y  can l ikeme be abused, 
sometimes resulting m judge-made law contrary to the authentic intentions and 
expectations of the parties. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitians Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 
(1993) (discussed znfia note 154); see also G. F'itzmawce, The Law and Procedure of 
the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certazn Other Treaty 
Poznts, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INTI, L. 1, 8 (1951) ('Tt IS emdent that t h  method [of 
mterpreting to further objects, pnnclples and purposes of the treaty], taken beyond a 
certam pomt, would mvolve tribunals m legdative Instead of judicial or mterpretative 
functions. '9. 
151. See, e.g., Cammetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 486, 491 (1917) (employmg 
the plam meanmg of the words "any other m o r a l  purpose" of the Mann Act, whch 
was auned a t  combatting prostitution, to mclude males who engage m extramarital 
sexual relations with any woman, whether or not she was a prostitute whom the male 
transported acmss state lines). T h s  plam meanmg mterpretation permitted the 
government to abuse its power. See, e.g., CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN 
AND THE SECRETS 120-21 (1991) (noting that the Hearst cham of newspapers stopped 
covenng the Senate's Teapot Dome heanngs after the Bureau of Investigation, the 
predecessor to the FBI, threatened to prosecute William Randolph Hearst under the 
Mann Act for t a h g  h s  nustress across state lines). 
152. Stuart, 489 U.S. a t  371 (Scalia, J., c o n c m g ) ;  see also Zicherman v. Korean Am 
Lmes Co., LM., 116 S. Ct. 629, 632 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (refusmg to apply the plam 
meanmg rule to the term "damagesn of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention g o v e m g  
International au transportation, reasonlug that the general meanmg of the term was 
overly broad). In construing t h  term, Justice Scalia relied Instead upon the travauz 
priparatozres, the postratification conduct of the parties, and the context provlded by 
another related article w i t h  the Convention. Id. a t  633-35. 
153. Judge Anzilotti of the Permanent Court of International Justice analyzed the 
problems with the plam meanmg rule as follows: 
But I do not see how it IS possible to say that an article of a convention 
is clear until the subject and a m  of the convention have been ascer- 
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Justzce Scalia has recently joined at least one opimon that 
rejected the clear plan-meamng interpretahon, instead relylng 
heavily on the delegates' debates In negotiatmg the treaty 
tamed. Only when it is known what the Contracting Parties intended 
to do and the a m  they had in new is it possible to say either that the 
natural meamng of terms used in a particular article corresponds with the 
real intention of the Parties, or that the natural meanmg of the terms 
used falls short of or goes further than such intention. 
WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL. LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-67 (1962) 
(quoting Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Concemmg Employment of Women 
Dunng the Night, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. Am) No. 50 (Anzilotti, J., dissenting) (argumg 
that the article stating that a "[wloman without distinction of age shall not be 
employed during the mght m any public or pnvate[l undertakmg" applied only to 
women perforrmng manual labor and not to women workmg as supernsors or 
managers)); see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947) ("words are inexact symbols"); Harry W. Jones, The 
Plazn Meanzng Rule and Extrznszc Azds m the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 
WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 16 (1939); Charles B. Nutting, The Ambzguity of Unambzguous 
Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 519 (1940). But see WESTON ET AL., supra note 88, a t  
142-43 (quoting Comments of Sir Erzc Beckett on the Report of M.H. Lauterpacht (of 
the Second Commzsszon of the Institute of International Law) on the Interpretation of 
Treaties, 1950 Annume de L'Institut de Droit International 437-39 (endorsmg the plam 
meamng approach and noting that "the task of the court is to mterpret the treaty and 
not to ascertan the Intention of the partiesn)). 
154. Sale, 509 U.S. 155. Haitians challenged Presidents Bush and Clinton's policy of 
interdicting Haitian refugees on the h g h  seas, failing to prowde them an asylum 
hearmg, and retunvng them to Haiti, then a country with one of the worst human 
rights records in the hemsphere. AMNESTY INTERNATION& REPORT 1994, a t  149, 150 
(1994) (noting, among other thmgs, that m 1993 "torture and ill treatment of detamees 
was mdespread"); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1992, a t  132 (1992). The 
U.N. Protocol on Refugees prowdes as follows: No state "shall ape1 or return 
frefouler') a refugee zn any mnnner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where h s  
life or fieedom would be threatened on account of lus race, relison, nationality, mem- 
bershlp of a particular social group or political opuuon." United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276 
(emphasis added). The mqority oplruon, whch Justice Scalia joined, stramed to avoid 
the plan meamng of "returnn and "refouler." The majority concluded that "returnn does 
not mean "returnn and relied primarily upon two delegates' comments dunng the 
negotiations to contradict both the pla~n language of the treaty and its underlymg 
purpose, namely, to protect refugees from persecution. See Sale, 509 U.S. at  184-87. 
The authoritative French Dictionary, the French eqluvalent to Webster's, defines 
"refouler" as: "1 fane reculer (des personnes) [Ex.] Refouler des envahzsseurs." MICRO 
ROBERT DICTIONNAIRE DU FRANCAIS PRIMORDIAL 912 (1977). Translated, thui means: 
(1) to make (persons) go back [Ex.] To send the mvaders back." A French-English 
dictionary defines "refouler" as follows: "to dnve back, repulse; zmmzgrant to turn back. 
COLLINS ROBERT--CONCISE FRENCH-ENGLISH-ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY 318 (1981). 
Substituting "turn backn for "return" gives a stronger reading m favor of the refugees: 
"No state shall turn back in any manner whatsoever." 
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That interpretahon, unfortunately, also flew in the face of the 
treaty's He and the Rehnqulst Court as a whole have 
been crihcized for tahng a result-onented approach to treaty 
interpretahon.15" 
Thus far, the Court apparently has not accepted Jushce Scalia's 
textualist argument.'57 While recopzing that canons of inter- 
pretation establish fine rather than bnght l i n e ~ , ' ~ ~  Amencan 
155. Sale, 509 U.S. a t  189 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting). 
156. Dawd J. Bederman, Revzualist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 953 (1994). This commentator observed that the Court somersaults through the 
treaty canons, exconating the Court for its stramed approach m defiance of the plam 
mearung m Sale. Id. a t  987-92. 
157. By j o m g  m the majority's oplnlon m Sale, Justice Scalia apparently demon- 
strated h~ unwillingness to accept the textualist argument m every case m whch the 
plam mearung E clear. See also Zicherman v. Korean An Lmes Co., Ltd., 116 S. Ct. 
629, 63435 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (relymg upon extrinsic a d s  to mterpret a treaty term). 
158. Karl Llewellyn observed that, when Interpreting statutes, courts freely and 
flexibly use directly opposlng canons of construction, such as construmg one statute 
according to its plam mearung and another according to E purpose. KARL N. 
LLEIvJiX..LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960). Llewellyn 
arranged opposmg canons of construction m two columns, labelling one column "thrust" 
and the other "parry"--e.g., Thrusk "A statute cannot go beyond its text." Parry: '"To 
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." Id. at 522. His ob- 
servations apply equally to mterpreting treaties. See, e.g., An France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 
392 (1985); Trans World Anlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984). 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority m Azr Fmnce, relied upon the plam mean- 
mg rule m mterpreting the word "acudent" &om Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, 
whch limits =lines' liability. Azr France, 470 U.S. a t  394, 400. Rejecting plamWs 
cornplant concemmg an ear mjury, Justice O'Connor concluded that "accident" means 
an "unusual or unexpected occurrence." Id. a t  396. She emphasized that "[tlhe analys~s 
must begm, however, with the text of the treaty and the context m whch the written 
words are used." Id. a t  396-97. 
A year earlier, however, m Trans World Azrlines, while mterpreting a different 
article of the same treaty, Justice O'Connor, agan  writing for the majority, stressed 
that the purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to limit a carrier's liability for lost 
cargo and to "set a stable, predictable, and internationally uniform limit." Trans World 
Azrlines, 466 U.S. a t  256. In d e t e m g  the purpose, Justice O'Connor relied upon 
state practice and the treaty's drafting history. Id. a t  252-53. The treaty linked the 
extent of au carriers' liability for lost cargo to the value of gold. Id. a t  247. Avoiding 
the treaty's plam mearung, the Court approved the lower maxunum liability formula 
not l i e d  to the current pnce of gold. Id. a t  251. The dissent stressed the plan 
mearung of the treaty term, criticizing the Court for "rewrit[ingln the Convention. Id. 
a t  261-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As with any written document, there 'is a strong 
presumption that the literal mearung ~s the true one, especially as agamst a 
construction that is not rnterpretation but perversion. '"1 (alteration m ongmal) 
(quoting The Five Per Cent. Discount Cases, 243 U.S. 97, 106 (1917)); see also 
Frankfurter, supra note 153, a t  544 (''In the end, language and external ads,  each 
Heinonline - -  3 7  Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 4 3 5  1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6  
courts should resume the tradihon of construng treahes liberally, 
pahcularly when dealing with the nghts of the individual: 
"Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal splrit, and, 
when two construclxons are possible, one restnchve of nghts 
whch may be clamed under it and the other favorable to them, 
the latter is to be preferred."15' To resume ths tradihon reqwes 
not only examining and attemphng to Bve effect to the plan 
meaning but also, among other thngs,"jO the drafing hsto- 
ry,161 the purpose of the treaty as whole and the treaty provision 
accorded the authority deserved in the circumstances, must be we~ghed In the balance 
of judiclal judgment."). 
159. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924). 
160. Although a treaty prevails over a pnor congressional enactment, Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1 (19571, and a pnor congressional enactment prevails over a preexisting 
treaty, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), the Court has taken pams to 
construe an apparently conflicting treaty and statute as bemg consistent with one 
another, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) ("A treaty will not be 
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on 
the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.") see United States v. Palestine 
Liberation Org., 695 F Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). For sunilar reasons, the Court 
should apply the same rule of construction to statutes that conflict with customary 
international law and should construe treaties so as not to conflict with custom: "[Aln 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remans. " Murray v. Schooner C h m g  Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
161. The international law of treaty mterpretation follows a more restnctive approach 
than that typically followed by United States courts. The Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties, whch codifies t h s  approach, adopts a herarchy emphasizmg the 
plam meanmg rule and, secondarily, purpose and contextual analysis: "A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary m e m g  to be gven to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for stgnature, May 23, 1969, art. 
31.1, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 [heremafter "Vienna Conventionn]; see ~OUIS HENKIN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 475-78 (3d ed. 1993) (reproducmg Jimknez de ArBchaga, Znterna- 
tional Law zn the Past Thzrd of a Century, [I9781 RECEVIL DES COURS 1, 42-48 (noting 
the herarchal approach of the Vienna Convention to treaty mterpretation)). The 
Vienna Convention permits the use of extrinsic matenals (draftimg hstory) only when 
the treaty language is "ambiguous or obscuren or when the plam meamng m- 
terpretation would lead to a "manifestly absurdn or "unreasonable" result. Vienna Con- 
vention, supra, art. 32. The practice of international tribunals, however, does not ap- 
pear to be as restrictive as the rules themselves would suggest. See RESTATE~~ENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELM"I'ONS 5 325 reporter's note 1 (obsewmg the favly mdespread 
use of travauz preparatozres by mternational tribunals). 
The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Although stating that the Convention is declaratory of customary mternational law, the 
State Department Office of Legal Advlser suggests a broader rule for draftimg b t o r y  
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at issue, the context in wlvch the treaty was made, and any 
postformahon conduct of the parhes.16' The Court has observed 
a sunilar principle in statutory construchon: "In expounding a 
statute, we must not be gulded by a single sentence or member of 
a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its 
object and In applylng a nonrestnchve approach to 
treaty interpretahon, Amencan courts are better able to effectuate 
the authentic intent~ons'~~ of the parties and to recogmze nghts 
than does the p l m  m e m g  of the Convention Articles 31 and 32: "As a matter of 
judicial and executive practice, negotiating hstory, like the legslative hlstory of a 
statute, IS frequently relied upon m U.S. domestic law and m mternational law to 
mterpret treaties." CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO 
INTERNATIONAL L W 147 (1981) (citing Department of State File Nos. P8O 0124-1938, 
P80 0115-1502). 
162. T ~ I S  approach to treaty Interpretation draws from the traditional United States 
approach and that of the draft convention on treaties prepared by the Harvard 
Research in International Law. The dr&s Article 19 prowdes as follows: 
(a) A treaty is to be mterpreted in the light of the general purpose whch 
it is Intended to serve. The hlstoncal background of the treaty, travaw 
preparatorres, the cucumstances of the parties a t  the time the treaty was 
entered mto, the change m these cucumstances sought to be effected, the 
subsequent conduct of the parties m applymg the prowsions of the treaty, 
and the conditions prevailing a t  the time the mterpretation IS bemg made, 
are to be considered m connection with the general purpose whch the 
treaty IS mtended to serve. 
29 AM. J. INTT, L. 937 (Supp. 1935) (quoting Article 19). 
163. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (Rehnqmst, J.) (quoting with 
approval United States v. Heus of Bolsdor6, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850). T h s  
approach resembles the mternational-law doctnne of maxunum effectiveness: 
other thmgs bemg equal, so to speak, texts are to be presumed to heve 
been mtended to have a definite force and effect, and should be mterpreted 
so as to have such force and effect rather than so as not to have it, and 
so as to have the fullest value and effect consistent with them wording (so 
long as the m e m g  be not stramed) and with the other parts of the text. 
Fitzmaunce, supra note 150, a t  8 (smgle emphasis m o n p a l ,  double emphasis added); 
see also rnfra note 430. Another helpful test considers what the parties to the treaty 
would have regarded as the correct decision if they had addressed the issue ex ante. 
See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 161, a t  1124. 
164. In treaties of a constitutional nature, such as the U.N. Charter, a teleologxal 
approach gomg beyond the mtent of the parties to further goals of mternational order 
may be appropnate: 
[Tlhe interpretation of the San Francsco mstruments will always have 
to present a teleologxal character if they are to meet the requuements of 
world peace, cooperation between men, mdiwdual freedom and social prog- 
ress. The Charter IS a means and not an end. To comply with its w, 
one must seek the methods of lnterpretation most likely to serve the 
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due the individual. 
2. Treaty-Based Challenges to Trzal Courts' Personal 
Jurzsdictzon 
Two lines of Supreme Court cases deal with self-executzng 
treatles that depnve a domeshc court of personal junsdictIon. The 
first line involves extraditzon treahes and the specialty doc- 
tnne-the doctnne that prohibits the requesting country &om 
prosecuting a fugitive for offenses besides those that the asylum 
has designated in its extraditlon order.166 The second 
line involves the Prohibition-era antl-hovenng treaties that gave 
limited nghts to the United States Coast Guard to seize on the 
h g h  seas foreign shps engaged in smuggling alcoholic beverages 
Into the United States.16' 
The Court established the specialty doctnne ln Unzted States v. 
Rauscher The United States had asked Great Britsun to 
extradite a ship's officer who allegedly murdered a crew member 
aboard an Amencan vessel. Upon being extradited, however, the 
officer was not charged with murder but with assault and In- 
fliction of cruel and unusual pumshment upon a crew member. 
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty between the United States and 
natural evolution of the needs of mankmd. 
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 161, a t  479 (quoting Advlsory Oplmon Concemg Compe- 
tence of the General Assembly for the Adnmsion of a State to the United Nations, 
1950 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Azevedo, J., dissenting)); see also zd. a t  479 (quoting the declslon of 
the European Court of Human Rights m the Deumeland Case, 86 I.L.R. 376, 408 
(1986), for the proposition that the European Convention on Human Rights should be 
construed "in the light of modem day conditions obhmng m the democratic societies 
of the Contracting States and not solely according to what mght  be presumed to have 
been in the mnds of the drafters of the Convention"); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., 
'!?HE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967); cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) 
(plurality opimon) (applymg the rubnc of evolvlng standards of decency to hold that 
the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of murderers under the age of surteen). But 
see Gerald Fitzmaunce, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our 
"Interpretation" of It? 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (1971). 
165. The "requesting staten is the country seekmg extradition. The "requested staten 
or "asylum state" is the country holding the fugitive, the country from whom 
extradition IS sought. 
166. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, a t  354-64. 
167. See znji-a notes 200-28 and accompanying text. 
168. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
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Great Britmn made murder, but not t k s  lesser cnme, an 
extraditable offense.169 The Court ruled that the United States 
had vlolated the treaty by trying the officer on a charge different 
fiom that upon whch Great Britan had granted extraditzon. The 
Court implicitly concluded that the tnal court lacked personal 
junsdicizon, reversed the convlctzon, and ordered that the 
defendant be even the opportunity to return to the asylum 
state.170 The Court reasoned that the detailed procedures estab- 
lished by the treaty, the language of the preamble restnctmg 
extraditzon to "certam cases," the probable policles underlying that 
restnctzon, and the treaty language itself demonstrated that the 
purpose of the provlsion was to limit extraditzon to the seven 
enumerated offenses.171 
Nothmg in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, however, suggests 
that the parhes Intended to grant lndivldual fugihves any nghts, 
limits the cnmes on whch the requestzng country may charge the 
fugitive, or hn ts  about a remedy in the event of a treaty vlola- 
t z ~ n . l ~ ~  The treaty173 commands what the parhes should 
do-for example, surrender persons accused of murder or assault 
to commit murder-but IS silent concemg what the parhes may 
not do. It does not expressly prohibit trylng an extradited person 
for other than the extraditable 0ffen~es.l~~ The drafters could 
have inserted an express provlsion in the treaty. "The competent 
authoritzes of the requeshng state may charge, try, and sentence 
the fugitzve only for cnmes for whch she is e~tradited.""~ 
169. The treaty provides: 
[Tlhe [parties] shall, upon mutual requsitions by them, deliver 
up to justice all persons who, bemg charged with the cnme of [I] murder; 
or [21 assault with rntent to commit murder, or [31 prracy; or [4] arson; or 
[51 robbery; or [61 forgery, or the [71 utterance of forged paper, committed 
w i t h  the junsdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found, 
w i t h  the tenitones of the other. 
Id. a t  410-11 (quoting the Webster-Ashburton Treaty between the United States and 
Great Britrun) (emphasis added). 
170. Id. a t  422-23. 
171. Id. 
172. See supra note 169 (quoting the relevant treaty language). 
173. Rauscher, 119 U.S. a t  422-23. 
174. The dissent stressed thls pomt. Id. a t  434 (Waite, C.J., dissenting). 
175. Cf. Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64, 66 (1899) (finding that extradition treaty 
between United States and Canada mcluded explicit language recopzmg nght of 
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Like most extradihon treahes, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
was made primarily to benefit the two partles, not the fugihves to 
be extradited.17'j The Court in Rauscher nevertheless inferred 
that the government had vlolated the defendant's nghts by 
chargng h m  with a nonextraditable ~ m m e , ' ~ ~  concluding that 
the object and purpose of the treaty provlded nghts residing in the 
lndivldual extradited178 as well as in the states-part~es."~ 
Rauscher was thus a direct beneficiary of the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty, but not necessarily an intended beneficiary"" Fur- 
- - - - - -- 
speaalty). 
176. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 319. 
177. More contemporary court oplmons have dinded on whether the asylum state 
must protest the prosecution's filing additional charges for the doctnne of speaalty to 
apply. A full diicusslon of the question of protests as necessary for standing and the 
related question of wavers are beyond the scope of t h s  Article. See Michael B. 
Bernacch, Note, Standing for the Doctrtne of Specialty In Extradition Tieaties: A More 
Liberal Exposition of Prcvate Rights, 25 LOY. LA. L. REV. 1377, 1386 nn.72-73 (1992) 
(collecting the leading cases requmng asylum state protest-United States v. Kaufinan, 
874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir.) (finding that only asylum state may complam of treaty 
nolation), cert. denwd, 493 U.S. 895 (1989); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that nght of specialty 1s held by the asylum state), cert. 
dented, 475 U.S. 1016 (19861, vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Ci. 1993), 
cert. denced, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d 
Cir. 1962) (ruling that the asylum state, not the fugitive, possesses nght of speaa1ty)- 
and allowing defendant the nght to r a se  objection-United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 
715, 721 (11th Cir.) (holding that defendant may rase  whatever objections asylum 
state may rase), cert. denled, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. k o n ,  813 F.2d 
146, 151 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (ruling that defendant has nght to r a s e  treaty nola- 
tions); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (allowmg a fugitive to 
assert extradition treaty nolations), cert. dented, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986)); supra note 280; 
see also United States v. Sensl, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that, as 
supreme law of the land, specialty pronslon may be asserted by fugitive), afd on 
other grounds, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
178. The Court expressly rejected a lower court's holding in another case that only 
the state parties can Invoke the treaty m the event of a nolation. The lower court 
held: 
m h i l e  abuse of extradition proceedings, and want of good faith m resorb 
mg to them, doubtless constitute a good cause of complamt between the 
two governments, such complamts do not form a proper subject of 
mvestigation m the courts, however much those tribunals mght  regret that 
they should have been permitted to arise. 
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1886) (quoting Judge Benedict's rea- 
solllng m another extradition case mterpreting the Webster-Ashburton Treaty) 
(alteration in on~na l ) .  
179. Id. a t  422. 
180. Id. a t  431. A defendant may not be t r~ed for other charges "until a reasonable 
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thermore, the Court expressly rejected the argument that a 
defendant's only remedy was to seek the intervention of "the 
Execuhve Departments of the respechve  government^."'^' 
Recopnng the nghts of indivldual pnsoners to invoke the 
treaty, according to the Court, "relieve[d]" the "tension" between 
the executive branch and our state courts.182 Such federal 
interference in state court proceedings causes resentment, whch 
is elirmnated by provlding the indivldual defendant the nght to 
assert the treaty in all cases.lg3 The Court also believed that the 
rule of specialty encouraged asylum states to surrender defen- 
dants.ls4 If asylum states learned that extradited persons are 
rouhely tned for cnmes other than those for whch they were 
extradited, then the requested state mght, in the future, be more 
reluctant to deliver requested fugih~es. '~~ Indeed, shortly before 
the Court decided~Rauscher, Great Britsun refused to deliver a 
fugihve, asserhng those preclse grounds.lS6 
Rauscher reflects the long-standing recognihon that extradihon 
treabes are self-exe~uting.'~' It exemplifies the hnd  of case that 
does not pose separahon-of-powers concerns. Extradition has a 
time and opportunity have been even hun, after hs release or tnal upon such 
[charges upon whch he has been extradited], to return to the country from whose 
asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings." Id. a t  430. The Court 
relied upon treatises and a line of state and federal cases. Id. a t  431. 
181. Id. a t  426. Rauscher repudiated the lower court's position and held that 
~ndiurduals as  well as state parties have the nght to invoke the treaty. Id., see supra 
note 17. 
182. Rauscher, 119 U.S. a t  430. 
183. Id. 
184. The Court m Rauscher also noted that two acts of Congress apparently 
supported its position. Id. a t  423. The first, codifying extradition practice, authonzed 
the Secretary of State to deliver up to a foreign government a fugitive "to be trzed for 
the crtme of whzch such person shall be so accused, and such person shall be delivered 
up accordingly." Id. (quoting United States Rev. Stat. 8 5272). The second statute, also 
dealing with extradition, allowed the President to take fugitives delivered up to the 
United States and to provlde for thew safekeepmg "until the fmal conclus~on of hs 
tnal for the cnmes or offences specified in the warrant of extradition." Id. (quoting 
United States Rev. Stat. § 5275). Neither of these statutes, however, prohibits the tnal 
of the fugitives surrendered to the United States for other cnmes. The Court mdicated 
that it used the statutes solely to bolster its holding in constnung the treaty itself. 
Id. 
185. Id. a t  419. 
186. Id. a t  415-16. 
187. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, a t  7476. 
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lengthy hstory of being regulated by the ~udiciary, '~~ and de- 
termining the nghts of those accused of a cnme is exclusively 
withn the judicial power.189 Since the early years of the Repub- 
lic,lgO courts have interpreted extraditzon treaties and have 
applied them to individuals. The courts thus have considerable 
experience in determining whether an accused is properly before 
them and properly charged.lgl 
Rauscher is further illuminated by Ker v. I l l ino~s. '~~ In Ker, 
the United States b red  a messenger to  go to Peru to deliver 
extradition papers requesting Ker's extraditzon.lg3 Upon arnval, 
the messenger did not present the extraditzon papers to the proper 
authonties but instead forcibly abducted Ker and returned hun to 
the United States.lg4 Ker was subsequently indicted, trred, and 
convicted of larceny and embez~lernent.'~~ Ker challenged the 
lower court's personal junsdiction, asserbng the illegality of h s  
capture and removal from Peru.lg"n rejectzng Ker's arguments, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that havlng physical custody of the 
defendant sufficed to establish personal ~unsdictzon, regardless of 
the manner in whch that custody was obtaned.lg7 The Court 
distinguished Rauscher, noting that the government had vlolated 
a treatylg8 in that case, whereas the Ker abduction, though ille- 
188. Id. a t  71-101. 
189. See United States v. Robins, 27 F Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) 
(concluding that extradition treaties are self-executing and holding that Article I11 of 
the Constitution extended the courts' judicial power to extradition treaties despite the 
absence of congressional leeslation on extradition). Congress did not enact leg~slation 
governing extradition until 1848. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at  72. 
190. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at  71-72. 
191. See rd. 
192. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker was declded the same day as Rauscher The same 
Justice wrote the majority opinion in both cases. Ker is usually linked with Fnsbie v. 
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (The  Ker-Fnsbie Doctr~ne"). In Frrsble, the defendant was 
ludnapped in Illinois and brought to Michigan, where he was likemse arrested, tned, 
and conv~cted. Id. at  520. The result was the same as in Ker; the illegality of the 
ludnapping did not defeat the trial court's personal junsdiction over the defendant. Id. 
a t  522. 
193. Ker, 119 U.S. a t  438. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at  438-39. 
196. Id. at  439. 
197. Id. at  440. 
198. Id. at  443. Ker also has been distinguished on the ground that Ker involved a 
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gal in Peru, did not vlolate any treaty with that country lg9 
Aside .from the specialty cases, individuals have used the 
Prohibibon-era anb-hovenng treabes to challenge a tnal court's 
personal junsdicbon. In Cook v. Uncted States;O0 Jusbce 
Brandeis, wr ihg  for the Court, relied upon the hstory leading up 
to  such a treaty to infer a remedy in favor of a pnvate indivldu- 
al.'O1 Before the treaty, the United States Coast Guard had been 
boarding and seinng foreign vessels, cargoes, and crews outside 
the then-recogmzed internakonal three-mile limit.202 The vessels 
had been carrymg liquor to smuggle into the United States dunng 
Prohibit~on.'~~ The Court noted that Great Britan had protested 
United States mterdicbons strenuously, asserting that the United 
States was vlolabng internabonal law and that contmuing t h s  
policy would create "a very senous si t~akon."~~* 
In response to the Bribsh protests, the two countnes began to 
negobate a treaty to  resolve then-  difference^.'^^ Britan rejected 
United States proposals for a mutual twelve-mile limit.206 After 
further negobabons, the United States accepted, with slight vana- 
bons, Britsun's counterproposal: the limit would equal one hour's 
traveling distance measured by the mammum speed of the seized 
In Cook, the vessel was boarded 11.5 miles &om the 
pnvate hdnappmg-the United States had not authonzed the party's abduction, 
whereas, for example, the United States, through the DEA, did authonze the abduction 
of Alvarez-Macham. See United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 682 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
199. Ker, 119 U.S. a t  443. Nor did the abduction vlolate the Constitution or any 
United States statute. Id. at  444. 
200. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
201. Id. a t  112-22. 
202. Id. a t  113. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. a t  115. 
205. Id. a t  115-16. 
206. Id. at  116. 
207. Article II(1) and (2) of that treaty provldes as follows: 
(1) His B r i t a ~ ~ c  Mqesty agrees that he will rase  no objection to the 
boardimg of pnvate vessels under the British flag outs~de the limits of 
territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its temtones or 
possessions m order that enqmes  may be addressed to those on board 
and an exammation be made of the shp's papers for the purpose of ascer- 
tammg whether the vessel or those on board are endeavonng to lmport or 
have unported alcoholic beverages mto the United States, its temtones or 
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Amencan ~oast.~'' The vessel was capable of traveling ten miles 
per Hence, the seizure took place outside the agreed 
upon distance. The sbp's master was subsequently fined 
$14,286.18 for violating United States statutes prohibihng the 
importation of He appealed.211 
The issue on appeal was whether the distnct court had 
junsdichon over the vessel and the slup's master despite the fact 
that the vessel was taken in violation of the treaty The treaty 
language provlded for compensahon but s a d  notlung expressly 
about a defense to a fine. Nevertheless, the Court inferred such a 
term from the treaty language, concluding that the shp's master 
had the nght to assert the treaty and that the government's 
possessions m violation of the laws there m force. When such enquvles 
and exammation show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the 
vessel may be instituted. 
(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has committed or 
is committing or attempting to commit an offense agamst the laws of the 
United States, its territones or possessions prohibiting the unportation of 
alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the 
United States, its temtones or possessions for adjudication m accordance 
with such laws. 
Convention Between the United States and Great Britiun for Prevention of Smuggling 
of Intoxicating L~quors, May 22, 1924, U.S.-Great B r i m ,  43 Stat. 1761-62 (1924) 
[heremafter Anti-Hovenng Treaty]. Article IV of the treaty, whch dealt with clams 
for compensation, provlded as follows: 
Any clam by a British vessel for compensation on the grounds that it has 
suffered loss or Injury through the unproper or unreasonable exerclse of the 
nghts conferred by Article I1 of t h s  Treaty or on the ground that it has 
not been even the benefit of Article I11 [permitting passage of liquor 
through the U.S. destined for a foreign port or for use on board] shall be 
referred for the joint consideration of two persons, one of whom shall be 
nommated by each of the High Contracting Parties. 
Effect shall be even to the recommendations contamed m any such 
jomt report. If no jolnt report can be agreed upon, the clam shall be 
referred to the Clams Commission established under the provisions of the 
Agreement for the Settlement of Outstanding Pecuruary Clams signed at  
Washmgton the 18th of August, 1910, but the clam shall not, before 
submission to the tribunal, require to be mcluded in a schedule of clams 
confirmed m the manner therem provided. 
Id. a t  1762. 
208. Cook, 288 U.S. a t  107. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at  108. 
211. Id. at  108-09. 
212. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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vlolatxon of the treaty depnved the tnal court of personal 
junsdictlon: 
The objechon to the selzure is not that it was wrongful merely 
because made by one upon whom the Government had not 
conferred authority to seue, at the place where the seuure was 
made. The objection IS that the Government itself lacked power 
to seize slnce by the Treaty it had unposed a territorial limita- 
kon upon its own authority Our Government, l achg  
power to selze, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject 
the vessel to our laws. To hold that adjudication may follow a 
wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect 
of the Treaty 
Th~s  mnterpretabon helped the United States meet its treaty 
obligabons with Great Britan. The treaty itself arose because 
Britsun sharply protested the United States' interdichng British 
vessels on the h g h  seas. Had the Court upheld the tnal court's 
jmsdicbon, Bribsh protests presumably would .have escalated 
because, not only would the United States have disregarded the 
mnternabonal three-mile limit, but it also would have vlolated an 
agreement between the parlzes to resolve t h s  specific problem. 
Furthermore, the Court's mterpretalzon is mn accord with one of 
the Supremacy Clause's purposes-avoiding hcbon with other 
governments. By m h g  treabes the supreme law of the land and 
thereby gmng mndimduals, including foremgners, the nght to rase  
treaty nghts in Amencan courts, the Framers hoped to reduce 
potenbal conflict with the foreigners' home c ~ u n t n e s . ~ ~ ~  The 
Court in Cook expressly foresaw t h s  potenbal conflict215 and 
prevented it from developing. 
Cook posed no separabon-of-powers concerns because it dealt 
solely with a prosecubon brought by the execubve branch. The 
master who had been fined was a direct beneficiary of the treaty 
terms and probably an intended beneficiary, but the Court did not 
explore whether the parlzes to the treaty Intended to grant 
persons in that class the nght to  challenge a court's jmsdicbon. 
213. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22 (citing, m cornpanson, United States v. Rauscher, 119 
U.S. 407 (1886)). 
214. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text. 
215. Cook, 288 U.S. at 115. 
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The Court relied upon Ford v. Untted States216 to find the treaty 
self-executing.217 
In Ford, the defendants-shp officers-sought to oust the 
court's junsdichon, argcung that the government vlolated the 
same anti-hovenng treaty in seinng the vessel and prosecuhng 
them.218 The defendants clmmed that the vessel was seized in 
international waters well beyond the one-hour traveling dis- 
tan~e.~l' The treaty language, however, did not expressly gwe an 
indindual apprehended in violation of the treaty a nght to 
challenge the personal junsdichon of a United States Distnct 
Court or of any other The vessel alone was gven a 
remedy, that being only an arbitral clam for "the Improper or 
unreasonable exercise of the nghts conferred by Arkcle I1 of t h s  
Treaty or on the ground that it has not been gven the benefit of 
Article III."221 
The government relied upon Ker v. I l l i n o z ~ . ~ ~ ~  The Supreme 
Court, however, dishngcushed Ker, concluding that the anh-hov- 
enng treaty provlded a defense to individuals wrongfully seized 
and arrested:223 
The Solicitor General answers, on the authority of Ker v. 
Illinots, that an illegal seizure would not have ousted the 
junsdictzon of the court t o  try the defendants. But the Ker case 
does not apply here. It related to a tnal m a state court, and 
t h s  Court found that the illegal selzure of the defendant 
therem vlolated neither the Federal Constitutzon, nor a federal 
law, nor a treaty of the United States, and so that the validity 
of ther  tnal after alleged seizure was not a matter of federal 
cogmzance. Here a treaty of the United States ts directly 
znvolved, and the question is quite different.224 
216. 273 U.S. 593 (1927). 
217. Cook, 288 U.S. at 119 (citing Ford, 273 U.S. 593, and a letter from the 
Secretary of State to the House Committee on forelgn a f f m  to the same effect). 
218. Ford, 273 U.S. at 600. 
219. Id. at 605-06. 
220. See zd. at 599. 
221. Id. at 609 (quoting Article N of the treaty). 
222. 119 U.S. 436 (1886); see supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text. 
223. See Ford, 273 U.S. at 606. 
224. Id. at 605-06 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Heinonline - -  37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 4 4 6  1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6  
19961 DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES 1447 
The Court Implied that the officers could assert the treaty as a 
defense to the distnct court's cnmnal jun~dic t ion .~~~ The officers 
were direct beneficlanes of the treaty provision prohibibng seizure 
of Bribsh shps. They were not, however, necessarily intended 
benefi~ianes.~~~ 
Rauscher, Ford, and Cook teach that defendants may trump the 
Ker-Frzsbze doctnne and oust the tnal court of personal junsdic- 
bon when agents of the United States have illegally seized such 
defendants from abroad in vlolabon of a treatyzz7 In addition, 
Rauscher implicitly held that a direct beneficiary of a treaty may 
invoke that treaty as a defense and that there need not be any 
shomng that the defendant was an intended beneficiary or that 
the treaty itself expressly granted individuals in the defendant's 
class any n g h t ~ . ~ ~ '  m e  Ford facts and holding gve nse to a 
smilax- inference. 
225. See d. at  606. 
226. The Court held, however, that the government did not violate the treaty m 
arresting the defendants, for the tnal court, as the proper finder of fact on t h s  issue, 
determmed that the vessel was w i t h  the one-hour travel distance from the Califorma 
coast. Id. a t  605. The Court also ruled that the treaty did not, by ~mplication, give 
indimduals on the s h p  unmunity from c m a l  proceedings. Id. at 610-11. 
227. Although concluding that the DEA hdnappmg did not violate the extradition 
treaty with Mexlco, the Court m Alvarez-Macham did acknowledge that, had the 
hdnappmg m fact molated the treaty, the Ker-Frxbze doctnne would not have applied. 
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992); see also Jacques 
Semmelman, Due Process, Internntional Law, and Jurxdiction over Crtmznal 
Defendants Abducted Abroad Extraterritormlly: The Ker-Fnsble Doctnne Reexahtzned, 
30 C~LUM. J  TRANSNAT'L L. 513, 525-29 (1992). Many lower federal courts, however, 
have gone out cf them way to avoid recopzmg defenses based on treaty. In United 
States v. Toscamno, 500 F.2d 267, 269-70, 278-80 (2d Cir. 19741, the court rejected an 
application of the Ker-Fnsbze rule and concluded that the tnal court lacked personal 
junsdiction, ruling that the state-sponsored hdnappmg, coupled with torture, beatings, 
and ill treatment (1) shocked the conscience and violated due process and (2) vlolated 
international treaty. The mternational-law prong of that decision, however, has not 
been followed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 5 433 reporter's note 
3 (1987) (citing United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 19841, cert. dented, 
471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Lma, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denzed, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States 
er rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); 
United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
228. See Rauscher v. United States, 119 U.S. 407, 432-33 (1886). 
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111. PROPOSED TEST FOR ASSERTING A TREATY DEFENSIVELY 
A. Afirmatzve Versus Defenszve Treaty Invocatzon 
Authorities have differed on the appropnate standards for 
implylng a pnvate cause of action for damages under a treaty 
One approach is to do so when the treaty passes the test for 
lmplylng a nght of action under a federal statute.229 The Court, 
however, has made such an implication increasingly difficult. The 
plantiff must now show not only that Congress intended especial- 
ly to benefit the class of persons of whch she belongs but also 
that Congress intended to create such a cause of action.230 
Another commentator has suggested that treaties are more a h n  
to constitutional provisions and that, consequently, the less 
restnchve critena for lmplylng nghts of achon from the Constitu- 
229. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 
73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 401-02 (1988) (arguing that human nghts treaties pass the Cort 
test for implication of causes of action). 
230. The Court has followed an increasmgly narrow path in unplylng nghts of action. 
Under Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (19161, and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426 (19641, the Court implied a pnvate nght of action "whenever the statute 
in question appeared to fall short of attamng congressional goals." Brett Witter, Note, 
Lamb v. Phillip Moms, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir 1990): The Sirth Circuit Gets 
Sheepzsh on Forelgn Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 5 TRANSNAT'L U I V .  533, 548 
n.121 (1992). In 1975, however, the Court restncted the bases upon whch a cause of 
action could be implied from a federal statute, establishing the followmg critena: 
[l][I]s the plsuntiff "one of the class for whose especml benefit the statute 
was enacted[?]" [2][I]s there any indication of legdative mtent, explicit 
or ~mplicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? 131 [Ils it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the le~slative scheme to imply 
such a remedy for the plamtiff? [4][Ils the cause of action one 
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the 
States, so that it would be mappropriate to infer a cause of action based 
solely on federal law? 
Cort v. Ash, 422 US. 66, 78 (1975). Over the next seven years, the Court agam made 
the test more difficult, emphas~zing the second Cort factor, which requlred plamtiffs 
to show that Congress had intended to grant mdividuals m plamtiffs' class a pnvate 
cause of action. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Ihc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 
374 (1982); Califorma v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293-97 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chcago, 441 U.S. 677 
(1979). The Supreme Court has smce further restncted the test. See Karahalios v. 
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527 (1989); Henry P 
Monaghan, Federal Statutory Reu~ew Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUhl. L. 
REV. 233, 246 n.91 (1991) ("The four factors have been reduced to the question of 
le~slative intent. "1. 
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hon should applya1 Some argue, however, that a pnvate nght 
of acbon should be rejected altogether, unless the treaty expressly 
grants such a nghLa2 
A s s e d g  a treaty-based cause of achon for damages, however, 
fundamentally differs from lnvolnng a treaty as a defense to a 
governmental action. The difference rests on the lnteractlon 
between the Supremacy Clause, the Take Care Clause, the nature 
of defenses, and the judiciary's role under h c l e  I11 of the 
Constituhon. The Supremacy Clause makes treabes the law of the 
land, as are federal statutes and constitutional provlslons. Under 
the Take Care Clause,233 the Constituhon requres the executive 
to enforce the law, whch Includes legally ratified treabes. If the 
treaty 1s self-execuhg, the execuhve IS obligated to enforce the 
treaty domeshcally as well as mnternahonally Besides malung 
treahes law, the Supremacy Clause makes them supenor to 
231. Vzizquez, supra note 63; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16, 18-19 (1980). 
(upholding a Bivens-type remedy as available under the Eighth Amendment when 
federal pnson offiuals deliberately mterfered with a pnsoner's medical needs and 
rejecting the govenunenR argument that Congress had preempted an mplied damage 
action through the 1974 amendments to the Federal Tort Clarms Act); Dams v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230-35 (1979) (implymg a cause of action for damages under 
the Fifih Amendment m favor of a staff member who alleged that her employer, a 
Congress member, had engaged m gender-based discnrmnation); Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) 
(holding that, when the "case mvolves no speclal factors counselling hesitation m the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress," an mdivldual whose home and person were 
searched by federal agents m violation of the Fourth Amendment had stated a cause 
of action for damages). But see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420 (1988) 
(holding that wrongful termmation of Soual Security benefits did not result m an 
unplied nght of action to recover damages for a v~olation of due process); Bush v. 
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983) (holding that federal personnel matters demanded 
Court deference to congressional expertise, m that a remedial scheme provlded by 
Congress allowed "memgful  remedies for employees who may have been unfmly 
disciplined for makmg critical comments," while acknowledgmg that'the wngresslonal 
remedy was not as effective as the Bivens remedy). 
232. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring), cert. dented, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) ( rewpwng a cause of action under the Alien Tort 
Statute on the ground that customary mtemational law bars torture and is 
synonymous with "the law of nationsn); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F Supp. 1531 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987). 
233. Section 3 of Article I1 of the Constitution provldes m relevant part that the 
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. 11, 
8 3. 
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inconsistent state laws and premously enacted mconslstent federal 
statutes. Under Marbury v. Madison,234 one of the most signifi- 
cant functions of the judiciary is to "say what the law 
including, except for political questions, defimng the execuhve's 
obligations owed to indimduals under the Constituhon, treahes, 
and federal statutes.236 
If, for example, a treaty depnved a court of personal junsdic- 
tion, the Supremacy Clause would make t h s  treaty rule supenor 
to premously enacted inconsistent federal statutes and premously 
decided inconsistent federal case law Assume that enforcing the 
treaty rule does not nse to the level of a political queshon. Then, 
under the Take Care Clause, the execuhve is obliged to comply 
with the treaty rule. If the execuhve nevertheless vlolates the 
rule, and if that vlolahon depnves the court of personal junsdic- 
tion, then the court should disrmss. If, however, the tnal court 
denies the motion to disrmss and ultimately issues a judgment of 
convlchon, then the judgment is procedurally defe~hve.~' A 
treaty depnvlng a court of personal junsdichon for state-spon- 
sored hdnapping may not necessarily, however, either expressly 
or impliedly grant the ladnap mctim a cause of acbon for false 
234. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
235. Id. at  177. In an earlier part of the opmon, the Court also noted that the 
"prownce of the court is, solely, to decide on the nghts of mdiwduals, not to enqture 
how the executive or executive officers, performn discretionary duties. Id. a t  170. 
236. See rd. a t  170-71. 
237. "The lone exception to the general rule is that the defendant can successfully 
challenge the court's junsdiction over hu person if he is before the court m violation 
of an international treaty." Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Macham Abduction, 
Standing, Dentals of Justice, and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 551, 557 n.25 (1993) (quoting United States v. Vreeken, 603 F Supp. 715, 717 
(D. Utah 1984), a f d ,  803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 19861, cert. dented, 479 U.S. 1067 
(1987)). Some commentators mdicate that a judgment obtamed without personal juns- 
diction is void; others believe that such a judgment should be considered voidable. Cf: 
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., Civn PROCEDURE 180, 190 (2d ed. 1993) (citing Wyman 
v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937) (holding that fraud affecting personal 
junsdiction amounts to lack of junsdiction), cert. denzed, 303 U.S. 664 (19381, and 
Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F 700, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that fraudulently 
inducmg a defendant into the junsdiction to be served was lnsuffiuent to establish 
personal junsdiction), for the proposition that fraudulently obtammg personal ju- 
risdiction in a uvil matter depnves the court of junsdiction but citing Commerual 
Mutual Accident Co. v. Daws, 213 U.S. 245 (1909), for the proposition that, m such 
cases, "jsdiction exlsts, but the court should decline to exercise it"). 
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imprisonment. The defendantkdnap v l c h  is, however, entitled 
to invoke the treaty to help the court properly deterrmne what the 
law applicable to h s  case is, namely, that it denles the court 
personal jurisdiction. 
Professor Vgzquez explans why the threshold for defensively 
assertmg a treaty is lower than that for affirmabvely seelung to 
imply a treaty-based pnvate nght of aclxon. 
A nght of action is not necessary to mvoke a treaty as a 
defense. For example, it is clear that the Framers mtended 
that a treaty would nullify any mconslstent state law, and that 
a treaty supersedes an earlier federal statute. Thus, a defen- 
dant bemg prosecuted or sued under a state or pnor federal 
law that is mconsistent with a treaty is entitled- to invoke the 
treaty m court to nullify the state or federal law without hav- 
mg to show that the treaty confers a pnvate nght of action. 
Moreover, the Due Process Clause ordinarily reqmes that a 
government depnvatzon of property or liberty be preceded by 
a heanng. Thus, even if the benefiaary of a treaty-based 
pnmary nght were deemed not to possess a nght of actzon, he 
would nevertheless be free to resist a depnvatzon of liberty or 
property that vlolates the treaty and to mvoke the treaty as a 
defense to a government coercive proceeding. The Supremacy 
Clause, by nullifymg offiaal actzon, and the Due Process 
Clause, by r e q m g  a hearvrg at whch the aclxon can be 
challenged (either offensively or defensively), h s h  the legal 
sanctzon that a stnct sanctzomst would consider an essential 
attribute of a law and a legal r~ght.'~' 
The substantme standards for involung a treaty as a defense 
are therefore different fkom and less demanding than those 
concerned with implylng a pnvate cause of action for damages 
fkom a treaty Th~s  comparison necessarily begs the quesbons: 
how much lower are the standards and what standards ought to 
be applied to the defensive invocabon of treahes? Standing 
doctnne was not in emstence at the tlme the Constitubon was 
signed and ratified,239 but whether a defendant may invoke a 
238. VBzquez, supra note 63, at 1143-44 (footnotes omitted). 
239. Cf. Michael S. Gilmore, Standing Law zn Idaho: A Constitutional Wrong Turn, 
31 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 539-41 (1995) (noting that the standing doctrme ongnated m 
1923 in Frothmgham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (19231, even though the Court did not 
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treaty appears to be a standing question. In h e n c a n  law, a 
consensus has not formed con6emng what the standing rules are 
or should be; the Court has been criticized for mampulahng the 
standing rules to advance an ideologcal agenda.240 There does 
appear to be general agreement, however, that the "case or 
controversy" reqwrement of k c l e  I11 of the Constituhon 
demands that the party show that the government has caused hun 
an "injury in fact."241 Aside from injury in fact, the Court also 
has imposed a prudential requrrement on plantiffs that attempt 
to invoke the power of the courts so that the judiciary may "avoid 
deciding questions of broad soclal impo=t where no individual 
nghts would be vindicated and limit access to the federal 
courts to those lihgants best suited to assert a particular 
c1am.n242 
For the reasons mentioned above, defensive invocahon of a 
treaty or statute should necessarily lessen the prudenhal require- 
m e n t ~ . * ~ ~  When the government has already invoked the power 
yet use the term "standing"). 
240. See, e.g., Laura A. Smith, Justiczability and Judiczal Discretion: Standing a t  the 
Forefront of Judiczal Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548 (1993); John C. Yang, 
Standing zn the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1356 (1991); Davld 
A. Domansky, Note, Abuszng Standing: Furtherzng the Conservative Agenda, 29 Whf. 
& MARY L. REV. 387 (1988). 
241. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Amencans United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); United States v. Students Challengmg 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973). Some commentators, 
however, have suggested that the Court has defined mjury in fact restnctively, makmg 
it impossible for any plamtiff to challenge certiun unconstitutional governmental action. 
See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, We the People". John Locke, Collective Constitutional 
Rights, and Standing To Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 92-93 
(1985). 
242. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 79 (5th ed. 1994) (quoting Glad- 
stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979)). 
243. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 184 (2d ed. 1973) (When a defendant m an enforcement proceeding 
resists the unposition of state force upon hm,  he clearly has standing m every sense 
to assert in his defense any clamed constitutional nghts of hs own."). Compare 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (holding that phys~cians lacked standing 
in a civil action to challenge a Connecticut blrth control statute because they lnvoked 
their patients' nghts'instead of them own) with Gnswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
481 (1965) (recognizing that physicians convicted as accessones for violating the same 
Connecticut blrth control statute had standing to r m e  the constitutional nghts of them 
patients). In Gnswold, the Court stated: 
In [Tileston] we thought that the requirements of standing should be stnct, 
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of the court, the litzgant's suitability to invoke the clam is not 
really in Issue, and the possibility of champerty and of litzgants 
using the courts to further ideologcal questzons that are beyond 
the power of the judic~ary is decreased considerably The pruden- 
tzal reqwement spnngs to a great extent from separatzon-of- 
powers concerns.244 In defensive-treaty-mvocatzon cases, howev- 
er, separatzon of powers usually does not pose a problem.245 
Professor Viizquez notes that treatzes lmpose obligatzons on 
governments much in the same way that statutes impose 
obligatzons on adrmmstratzve agencies: ''&like statutes imposlng 
dutzes on adrrmustratzve agencies, treatzes by thew nature impose 
duties on the state. Standing doctrine, whch identifies who may 
enforce statutes that lmpose dutzes on government agencies, 
addresses precisely the same questzon as t h s  branch of the 'self- 
executzon' questzon. He argues that these standing rules 
lest the standards of "case or controversy" m Article 111 of the Constitution 
become blurred. Here those doubts are removed by reason of a c r m a l  ., 
conmction for s m g  marned couples m molation of an ading-and-abetting 
statute. Certady the accessory should have standing to assert that the of- 
fense whch he is charged with assisting IS not, or cannot constitutionally 
be, a cnme. 
Id., see Eisenstadt v. B u d ,  405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Barrd, the Court ruled that a 
blrth control advocate could assert the nghts of unmarned smgles .and therefore had 
standing to challenge hls conmction for distribution of anti-spemadal foam under a 
blrth control law restncting the sale of contraceptives. Id. a t  446. The Court noted 
that the statute mmmalized distribution, not use; therefore, unmamed smgles could 
not have challenged the statute on thew own. Id. But see Rakas v. Illino~s, 439 U.S. 
128, 133-35 (1978) (definmg Fourth Amendment nghts narrowly to limit the ability of 
cnrmnal defendants to assert such nghts); znfia note 276 (discussmg Rakus and its 
progeny). In the context of a cnrmnal prosecution, the defendant must show that she 
has suffered an injury in fact to rase  a treaty or other mternational law clam. See 
United States v. Berngan, 283 F Supp. 336, 341 0. Md. 1968) (finding that Vietnam 
War protesters, who were accused of damagmg draft records, lacked standing to mvoke 
the Nuremberg Pnnclples because they had not been subjected to illegal orders), afd, 
417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 19691, cert. denred, 397 U.S. 909 (1970); see also United States 
v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Ci. 1966) (holding that an allegation that the US was 
conducting the war m Vietnam m molation of several treaties was not a defense m 
a case m whch the defendant was prosecuted for failure to report for mduction mto 
the armed semces), cert. denred, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). 
244. "[Tlhe law of Art. 111 standing IS built on a smgle bas~c idea-the Idea of 
separation of powers." WRIGHT, supra note 242, a t  78 (quoting Allen v. Wnght, 468 
U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). 
245. See supra note 94 and accompanymg W, znfh part IV.C.1. 
246. VAzquez, supra note 63, a t  1135. 
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should apply to affirmahve causes of action under a treaty ''' 
The text and hstory of the Supremacy Clause, the Take Care 
Clause, and Supreme Court precedent suggest that a generous 
standard applies for defensive invocation of a treaty The 
Court has developed such a standard for challengng a h m s t r a -  
tive regulations, the zone-of-interest test, and it should apply to 
defensive invocahon of a treaty 249 
The Court developed the zone-of-interest test in cases interpret- 
ing the Admmstrahve Procedure Act (APA), whch grants 
standing to a person "aggneved by agency actlon withn the 
meamng of a relevant statute."*O In Assoczatz on of Data Process- 
zng Servzce Organzzatzons v. Camp,251 the Court had to decide 
whch classes of persons were so "aggne~ed."~~' A group of data 
processors sued the Comptroller of the Currency for permithng a 
bank to handle data processng for banks and other business- 
Section 4 of the Bank Semce Corporation Act of 1962254 
forbade banks fkom "engag[ing] in any activity other than the 
performance of bank semces for banks."255 Argcung that the 
247. Id. a t  1137. 
248. See rnfra text accompanymg notes 277-83. 
249. See rnfra text accompanymg notes 250-61. 
250. 5 U.S.C. 3 702 (1994). 
251. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
252. Id. a t  153-56. 
253. Id. a t  151. 
254. Pub. L. No. 87-856, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified at  12 U.S.C. 3 1864) (amended 1982). 
255. Id. 8 4. Data Processrng has received scholarly criticism, particularly for malung 
injury m fact the cornerstone for standing. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstem, Wht ' s  Standing 
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 185 
(1992). But see Carl Tobias, Standing To Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 425 (noting 
the madequacy of the injury-m-fact test but obsemng that Data Processrng's "arguably 
withn the zone' requvement functioned pragmatically as a feasible, liberal threshold 
testn). Courts also have criticized the test. See, e.g., Amencan F'nends Serv. Comm. v. 
Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting the difficulty of applymg the test). 
In Webster, the court also criticized a trend m lower federal courts to restnct the test: 
First, a test that focuses on whether Congress zntended to protect or 
benefit certam mterests may be stncter than the Supreme Court's 
statement that the complamant's Interest need only be "arguably w i h  the 
zone of mterests to be protected or regulated by the statute m 
question." Second, it may run counter to the Court's purpose for developing 
the "zonen test-to enlarge the class of people with standing--to deny 
standing to parties who have both suffered concrete injury caused by 
agency action and satisfied other prudential concerns, solely because a 
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data processors lacked standing, the Comptroller correctly noted 
that Congress never intended sechon 4 to benefit data processors 
or other nonbank corn petit or^.^^ Rejechng the Comptroller's 
posihon and the so-called legally-protected-mterest test, the 
Court refused to read the APA's "generous renew pronsions" 
narrowlyz7 Furthermore, the Court held that the Act should 
be construed "not grudgingly but as semng a broadly remedial 
purpo~e. ' '~~~ 
In Data Processzng, the Court established the zone-of-interest 
test.%' The test reqwed the plantiff to demonstrate not only 
that he was adversely affected or aggneved but also that "the 
interest sought to be protected by the complsunant [was] arguably 
w i t h  the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the 
statute or constituhonal guarantee in q u e ~ h o n . " ~ ~ ~  The Court 
search for s~uppets of congressional language about then particular mterest 
reveals nothmg deterrmnative. 
Id. (citing Data Processcng, 397 U.S. a t  153); see also Copper & Brass Fabncators 
Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951, 95455 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (critiuzmg the D.C. Circuit's decisions that restricted the 
zone-of-interest test to requue an mdication of legdative mtent, "however slighf' to 
benefit the class of whlch the plamtiff is a member). Then-Judge Ginsburg quoted with 
approval Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 
(1978): 
Where a party champions hls own nghts (as distingumhed from those of 
a thud party), ztnd where the mjury alleged ~s a concrete and particular- 
ized one whlch will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the 
basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctnne are 
generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met. 
Copper & Brass Fabncators Council, 679 F.2d at  955 (Giburg ,  J., concunulg) (quot- 
mg Duke Power, 438 U.S. a t  80-81). 
256. Cf. Data Processcng, 397 U.S. a t  155 (noting that 5 4 granted standing to a data 
processing company). 
257. Id. a t  156 (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreuo, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)). 
258. Id. Congress may, however, affirmatively deny standing to a particular class. See 
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348 (1984) (holding that milk 
handlers, but not ultimate consumers, had standing to challenge the Secretary of 
Agriculture's deusion that set the pnce of reconstituted milk on the ground that the 
statutory scheme evidenced congressional mtent to deny consumers standing to 
challenge the Secretary's rulings). 
259. See Data Processzng, 397 U.S. a t  153. 
260. Id. (emphasis added). One commentator has noted that Data Processcng had a 
two-fold purpose: %st, it sought to liberalize access to the federal courts. Second, the 
Court attempted to Dve content to the A h s t r a t i v e  Procedure Act's grant of stand- 
mg to a person 'aggneved by agency action w i t h  the m e m g  of a relevant statute." 
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethcnkcg Standing, 72 Cfi. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984). 
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concluded that, though not intended beneficianes, the data 
processors arguably were witbn the zone of interests established 
by section 4.261 
The Court reached a similar result in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. 
Camp:" pennittmg travel agents to sue the Comptroller for 
allomng banks, under their inc~dental powers granted by 12 
U.S.C. 8 24, to provlde travel semces to their customers: "The 
Court found it of no moment that Congress never specifically fo- 
cused on the interests of travel agents in enacbng 8 4 of the Bank 
Semce Corporation In Data Processzng, the Court was 
concerned that the data processors' associabon be "a reliable 
private attorney general to libgate the issues of the public interest 
in the present case."264 In another case, the Court wanted to 
preclude suits by those who would be "more likely to frustrate 
than to further statutory 
In 1987, the Supreme Court applied Data Processzng to  Clarke 
v. Securztzes Industry A s s o c z a ~ o n ~ ~ ~  in whch a stockbrokers' 
261. Data Processzng, 397 U.S. a t  155-57. 
262. 400 U.S. 45 (1970). 
263. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 n.10 (1987) (citing Armld, 
400 U.S. at 46 n.3); see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 618-20 
(1971) (relylng upon Data Processzng and reasomg that, when an association of invest- 
ment compames sued the Comptroller of the Currency for v~olating the Glass-Steagall 
B a n k ~ ~ ~ g  Act of 1933 by authonvng banks to operate mutual mvestment funds, the 
competition that the Comptroller had authonzed caused the plamtiffs an mjury m fact 
and that Congress "had arguably legslated a g m t  the competition that the petitioners 
[the mvestment compames assoc~ationl sought to challenge, and from whlch flowed 
thelr uqury"). Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that, by enacting the b&g 
legslation, Congress never mtended to protect mvestment compames. Id a t  640 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). He critiazed the above quoted language, noting that neither 
the express wording of the Glass-Steagall Act nor its leeslative hstory "evmce[d] any 
congressional concern for the &restsn of the mvestment compames. Id. (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). Justice Harlan noted that, if anythmg, the Act was adopted despite its 
anti-competitive effects. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). His dissent mdicates that the 
Court squarely faced the question of mtended versus direct beneficlary but rejected the 
intended bendficiary doctrine-the legally-protected-mterest t e s t m  favor of the zone-of- 
interest test implicitly granting standing to direct beneficianes. See zd a t  639-42 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
264. Clarke, 479 U.S. a t  397 n.12 (quoting Data Processzg, 397 U.S. a t  154). 
265. See zd. 
266. Id. at  394403. At the same time the Court applied the zone-of-interest test to 
conclude that the direct but uruntended beneficiary had standing, it suggested m dicta 
that the zone-of-interest test was "most usefully understood as a glossn on 8 702 of the 
APA, and "not a test of wversal application." Id. at  400 11.16; WRIGHT, supra note 
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assoc~ahon sued the Comptroller of the Currency under the APA 
for allegedly permithng a bank to set up a discount brokerage 
"branch" out of state.267 The McFadden Act prohibits banks from 
havlng out-of-state branches.268 These banks may, however, 
establish out-of-state offices at whch no "deposits are received, or 
checks psud, or money lentT2" In Clarke, there was little ques- 
lxon that the plantiff would suffer an lnjury in fact as a result of 
the agency's achons; presumably, at least some of the plantiffs 
members would have to compete with the bank's out-of-state 
offices, whch would sell stocks at a cons~derable di~count.2~~ The 
Comptroller argued, however, that the stockbrokers assoc~ahon 
was not under the protechon of the McFadden because 
Congress passed the McFadden Act not to protect securities 
dealers "but to establish competitive equality between state and 
nahonal banks."272 
Rejechng the Comptroller's argument: the Court in Clarke 
stressed that the zone-of-mterest test is "not meant to be especial- 
ly demanding; In parhcular, there need be no indication of 
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be pla~ntiff."'~~ The 
Court's purpose in deslgrmg the zone-of-mterest test was to allow 
parhes to crcumvent the reqwement of shomng that Congress 
242, a t  79 11.58. For the reasons stated above, however, the zonesf-interest test is 
appropnate for defensive invocation of treaties. In any event, regressmg to the legally- 
protected-mterest test has been criticized as contrary to Supreme Court precedent and 
unduly restnctive of p l m t i W  nghts. See Doernberg, supra note 241, a t  53 n.10. 
267. Clarke, 479 U.S. a t  392-93. 
268. McFadden Act, ch. 191, $8 7-8, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228-29 (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. $5 36, 81 (1994)). 
269. 12 U.S.C. $ 36(i) (1994). 
270. See Clarke, 479 U.S. a t  403. 
271. Id. at 391-92. 
272. Id. at 393. 
273. Id. a t  399-400 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)) 
(emphasis added). But see An Comer Conference of Am. v. Amencan Postal Workers 
Umon, 498 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1991) (ramovlng the term "arguably" from the test and 
inqulrmg whether Congress "intended to protect jobs with the Postal S e ~ c e "  by 
enacting comprehensive legdation, mcluding the postal monopoly); Marla E. Mansfield, 
The "New" Old Law of Judicral Access: Toward a Mirror-Imnge Nondelegation Theory, 
45 ADhm. L. REV. 65, 98-100 (1993) (discussmg Azr Courzer). Interpreting the test 
restrictively defeats its purpose of expanding standing and would, if applied to a treaty 
case, unduly restnct a foreign litigant from mvokmg a treaty m our courts as 
envisioned by the Framers. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text. 
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intended to benefit the party asserting standing, a requirement 
that courts had applied in other contexts.274 At the same bme, 
the Court did not wish to grant standing to every possible 
aggneved party In essence, the Court had adopted a direct 
beneficiary test that permitted the implementahon of the Act's 
broad remedial purposes while simultaneously refusing to grant 
standing to all citizens275 solely by vlrtue of their c i t~zenshp .~~~  
274. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 
532-33 (1989); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975); supra note 230. 
275. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Amencans United for Separation of Church 
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Schlesinger v. &?servlsts Comm. To Stop 
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 
(1974). The generalized grievance cases, however, have been criticized for depnvlng 
every possible plantiff of the nght to litigate c e r b n  constitutional issues. See 
Doernberg, supra note 241, a t  97-98. 
276. The Court, however, has adopted a more restrictive test governmg the 
defendants' standing to rase  Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 10406 (1980) (holding that the defendant lacked standing to 
challenge the search of a companion's purse contammg defendant's illicit drugs); United 
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (concluding that defendant, a t h d  
party, lacked standing to mvoke the exclusionary rule when an elaborate governmental 
scheme to burgle a banker's apartment and to take and photocopy documents from the 
banker's briefcase enabled government agents to obtan documents incrunating the 
defendant); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). In Rakas, the Court denied car 
passengers standing to challenge a car search because they were neither the owners 
of the car nor the admitted owners of the seized shotgun and shells found in the car. 
Id. a t  148. Rakas overruled the part of the test established m Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257, 267 (19601, that had recopzed the standing of defendants who were 
"legitimately on [the] *premisesm a t  the time of the search, Rakas, 439 U.S. a t  141-42. 
The Court in Rakas asserted that it made no change in standing doctrme. Id. a t  
139-40 (citing, among other cases, Association of Data Processmg Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970)). Despite the Court's words, one commentator has noted 
that, a t  least m the Fourth Amendment standing cases, the Court has reverted sub 
silentio to the legally-protected-interest test repudiated by Data Processzg. See 
Doernberg, supra note 241, a t  88 n.226. Gommentators have sharply criticized Rakas 
and its progeny for misusmg standing rules to emasculate the Fourth Amendment. See, 
e.g., John M. Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Trrumph 
of an  Inconszstent Excluszonary Doctrzne, 58 OR. L. REV. 151 (1979); Owen M. Fiss, 
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 177-78 (1979) (criticiwng the 
Court for establishing a vague test and for "stretch[ingl too far" towards e l i i a t i n g  
the Jones standard); Ira Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. 
Illinois: From Property to Prrvacy and Back, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 197, 224 (1980- 
1981) ("Rakas and Rawlings allow for the discretionary use of property law in any 
manner necessary to deny a motion to suppress."). But see Christopher Slobogm, 
Capacity To Contest a Search and Sezzure: The Passzng of Old Rules and Some 
Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 387 (1981) (critiuzing the vagueness 
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The "generous renew pronsions" of the APA, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, may be compared to the hstory and plan 
meamng of the Supremacy Clause, in whch the Framers made 
treatzes the 'law of the land," generally enforceable by individuals 
in state and federal courts.277 The Framers authonzed foreigners 
to assert treahes in our courts to help the United States meet its 
treaty obligatzons and thus avoid conflict with other c~untnes .~ '~  
Such a role is analogous to the "pnvate attorney general" role that 
the Court ennsioned under the APA for the direct beneficlanes of 
statutes. The plan meamng and drafbng h~story of the Suprema- 
cy Clause likemse reveal the Framers' desire that the Supremacy 
Clause should not be construed "grudgngly," but broadly 279 
Supreme Court precedent also suggests that a defendant who 
is "arguably w i t h  the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated" by the treaty p r o n s i ~ n ~ ~ ~  may invoke the treaty as a 
of the Rakas test but noting that the Court still affords substantial Fourth 
Amendment protection). 
In any event, Rakas should not apply to treaty vlolation cases. In Rauscher, Ker, 
and Fnsbre, the Court distinguhed government vlolations of domestic law from 
government vlolations of treaties, concluding that the latter requved v~ndication of 
mdivldual nghts while the former did not. See supra notes 168-228 and accompanying 
text. The distinction probably rests, m part, on one of the purposes of the Supremacy 
Clause--that of avolding conflict with other countries and the courts' role m helpmg 
to avold such conflict. Because treaty vlolation cases mvolve the potential for such 
mternational conflict, they warrant different treatment than do cnmmal cases in wbch 
the local constable has vlolated the nghts of the, accused. 
277. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanymg text. 
278. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanymg text. 
279. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanymg text. 
280. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1986) (quoting 
Association of Data Processing Sew. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). Cases 
employmg customary mtemational law, as opposed to treaty law, to protect state 
sovereignty appear only to requve that the party defending a g a s t  the mternational- 
law vlolation show mjury m fact. See, e.g., The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 
(1824) (concluding that United States agents lacked authority to seize a French vessel 
m S p m h  temtory without S p a ' s  consent and, without m q m g  whether the vessel 
owner was a direct beneficlary or an mtended benefiuary of the custom, awarding the 
owner damages for the wrongful seizure). United States agents who trespass upon the 
temtory of another country vlolate an established rule of customary international law: 
"It 18 umversally recopzed, as a corollary of state sovere~gnty, that officials of one 
state may not exerclse them functions m the territory of another state without the 
latter's consent." RESTATEhfENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 432 cmt. b (1987). 
Even those cases rejecting the applicability of customary mternational law appear to 
rest them holdings upon grounds other than the status of the defendant. See, e.g., 
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defense to ~unsdiction.'~~ In Rauscher and Ford, for example, 
when our governmental agents allegedly acted unlawfiilly m 
seizing persons or property from abroad, the Court concentrated 
on the alleged illegality of the agents' conduct, not upon the status 
of the v l c h  invohng international law to challenge the govern- 
mental pro~eeding.'~' One may infer &om the facts of these 
cases, however, that, although they were not intended benefi- 
cianes of the treaty provisions, the fugitzve in Rauscher and the 
s h p  officers in Ford arguably were withn the zone of interests 
protected or regulated by the extraditzon and anti-hovenng 
treaties, respectively 283 
B. Separatzon of Powers and Contractual Prznczples 
Besides standing, the quesbon of self-executzon is complicated 
by the doctnne of separation of powers. If a treaty requlres the 
United States to perform acts solely withn Congress's enumerated 
powers, the treaty is non-self-exe~utmg.~ But no such separa- 
tion-of-powers conflict anses when a defendant asserts the treaty 
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
essentially that customary mternational law E. only an exception to the Kkr-Fnsbze 
doctrme when "the government's conduct [is] outrageous") (citing United States v. 
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Toscamno, 500 F.2d 267 (2d 
Cir. 1974)). Some of these cases reqwe a protest by the defendant's government m 
order for the defendant to have standing to invoke the mternational-law nolation, see, 
e.g., United States v. Yunls, 681 F Supp. 909 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (19881, but 
these cases generally do not otherwise suggest that more is reqwed than showmg 
that the defendant is the direct wctim of the mternational-law violation, see supra note 
10 (discussmg customary international law). A full discuss~on of whether a government 
protest is requied for standing is beyond the scope of t h  Article; however, the text 
and draftiig history of the Supremacy Clause mdicate that protest IS not reqwed. See 
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (implymg that no foreign 
government protest E. reqwed); Vbzquez, supra note 63, a t  1160 (suggesting that no 
protest is requlred for standing under treaties). But see United States ez rel. Lujan v. 
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Ci.) (requlmg a protest m order to assert a treaty 
defensively), cert. denzed, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); Mitchell J. Matonn, Note, Unchaznzng 
the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorral Abduction zn Lzeu of Extradition, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 907, 923-34 (1992) (asserting that standing under an extradition treaty rests on 
an "adequaten protest from the asylum state). 
281. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanyng text. 
282. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanylng text (discussmg Rauscher, Ford, and 
other cases). 
283. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanylng text. 
284. See supra note 92 and accompanyng text. 
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as a defense to a federal prosecut~on.~~~ The executive has direct 
authority over United States prosecutors and law enforcement 
agenc~es .~~  When a treaty mposes a negahve obligahon on the 
United States concerning the conduct of federal law enforcement 
agents, the execuhve does not need congress~onal achon to carry 
out the treaty ~bligahon.~' Such a treaty, therefore, should be 
cons~dered pnma fac~e self-execuhng. 
In summary, a court should find a treaty prowslon self- 
execuhng except when the treaty prowslon vlolates separahon-of- 
powers pnnclples or expressly makes itself or other treaty terms 
Inapplicable In domeshc courts.288 Given the plan language of 
the Supremacy Clause and the Framers' intent,289 Amencan 
courts should construe the doctnne of non-self-execuhon narrowly, 
adoptmg the theme that the doctnne is a limited excephon to the 
general rule of self-execuhng treaties. The proposed test to de- 
t e m n e  whether a treaty term is self-execuhng and invocable as 
a defense rests on the Framers' presumphon that treahes:are self- 
executmg. To rebut t h s  presumphon, the government would have 
to obtan an afiirmahve response to queshons one or two below or 
a negahve response to queshon three: 
1. Would the court's enforcement of the treaty provlslon Invade 
the power of another branch of government? For example: (a) 
Would enforc~ng the treaty trespass on one of the House's 
exclusive, enumerated powers?290 (b) Would enforcing the 
treaty pose a political question?291 or (c) Is the treaty pro- 
vision so vaguely worded that, by .attemptmg to interpret it, a 
court nsks severe encroachment upon the exclusive treaty- 
285. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanymg text. 
286. By vlrtue of the Supremacy Clause, state courts are obligated to follow a legally 
ratified treaty even if state law or a prosecution under state law conflicts with the 
treaty. See Missoun v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that a valid treaty 
prevails over an ~nconslstent state statute); cf. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 
407, 430-31 (1886) cUmf the state court should fail to Dve due effect to the nghts of 
the party under the treaty, a remedy IS found m the judiad branch of the Federal 
government, whlch has been fully recogruzed."). 
287. See supra note 128 and accompanymg text. 
288. See supm note 133 (discussmg Senate reservations). 
289. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanymg text. 
290. See supra note 92. 
291. In an enforcement proceeding, the government will rarely, if ever, be able to 
show how the treaty IS nonjustiaable. See supra note 94. 
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malung power of the President and the Senate?"' 
2. Does the treaty by its own terms prohibit it from operahng 
m United States domesbc courts? For example: (a) Did the 
partles Include a broad, unqualified domesbc unplementation 
clause clearly mdicatmg that the treaty as a whole or the 
treaty provlslon m quesbon will not operate locally without 
domestlc leglslabon?293 (b) Did the Senate attach a reserva- 
bon to the treaty clearly malung the treaty as a whole or the 
treaty provlslon m quesbon non-self-exe~ut;mg?~~~ or (c) Does 
the treaty contan a Cardenas-type provlslon that expressly 
renders the treaty as a whole or the treaty term m queskon 
non-self-exe~utmg?~~~ 
3. Does the defendant have standing? Did the government's 
vlolahon of the treaty cause the defendant to suffer an mjury 
m fact, and 1s the defendant witlun the zone of mterests 
arguably protected or regulated by the treaty?296 
The U.N. Drug TrafIichng Convenbon will be exammed under the 
test set forth above.297 l lxs  Article will examne the treaty's text, 
292. T h s  prong incorporates the requ~rement of preclse and mandatory language. See 
supra notes 95-129 and accompanylng text. 
293. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanymg text. 
294. See supra note 133 and accompanymg text. 
295. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanylng text. 
296. See supra notes 234-83 and accompanymg text. 
297. See supra note 6. Assuming that individuals may assert Articles 2 and 6 m 
United States courts as a bar to personal junsdiction, a court would need to fashlon 
an appropnate remedy. The usual remedy for want of personal junsdiction is disrmss- 
al. See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 
64 (1899); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). When property- or persons 
are wrongfully seized, the remedy is return. See Cosgrove, 174 U.S. a t  68-69. Under 
the Supremacy Clause, not only are treaties the "supreme Law of the Land," but also 
the remedies fashioned as a matter of general and customary International law m 
construing treaties. See Viizquez, supra note 63, a t  1161. Under mternational law, the 
typical remedy for wrongful seizure is to put the parties back to status quo ante. See 
zd. a t  1157. State practice in state-sponsored abduction cases reflects the remedy of 
dismissal and return to the asylum state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 9 432 (1987); see In re Jolis, 7 Ann. Dig. 191-92 (Tribunal Correctionnel 
d'Adresnes 1933) (Fr.) (ordering the return to Belgum of a Belgan national ludnapped 
by French police on Belean soil after Belgum protested); Charles Rousseau, Chroncque 
des Faits Internationaur, 69 REVUE G~~NI~RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, PUBLIC 761, 
834 (1965), translated zn JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL, 
SYSTEM 48-49 (2d ed. 1981) (discussmg an official apology even by Italian police to 
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purpose, and negotiatmg hstory to deterrmne whether the above 
critena are met. Lastly, t h s  Article will exarmne manifest public 
policy considerations that may further support a court's ultimate 
deterrmnation of personal jurisdiction over defendants involnng 
the Convention. 
IV APPLYING THE TEST TO THE U.N. DRUG TRAFFICKING 
CONVENTION 
A. Introduckon to the Conventzon 
For many years, the United States chose to act either alone or 
bilaterally on the enforcement level in attemptmg to curb the 
import of drugs into the United States.''' Because the drug 
the Swiss government for a hdnappmg by an Italian police officer of an Italian 
national from S w ~ s  territory). But see Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: 
A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 86 AM. J. INl"L L. 746, 749 (1992) 
(noting the argument that abduction may not violate mternational law when a state 
abducts an mdiwdual in anticipatory self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter 
but observing that no such grounds w t e d  for Alvarez-Macham's hdnappmg); Paust, 
supra note 237, a t  567 (suggesting that return may not be necessary m extraordinary 
cases but noting that Alvarez-Mmhain did not fit m that category). 
The United States has recogmzed the remedy of return. Dunng the Vietnam War, 
for example, Ronald Anderson, an Amencan citizen and consuentious objector, fled to 
Canada to escape the draft. Alerted that Anderson was gomg to come back, United 
States Customs agents were waiting for hun as he was about to cross the border. The 
agents, however, were impatient and encroached approximately 50 yards mto Canada 
and arrested Anderson while he was still on Canadian soil. After a Canadian protest, 
the United States returned Anderson to Canada. SLVEENEY ET AL., supra, a t  133 (citing 
79 REWE G$&RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 462 (1975)). The United States 
granted ths remedy to one of its own nationals for a m a 1  mtrusion into Canadian 
territory. United States courts should have no difficulty m granting a similar remedy 
to a foreign national m the case of a state-sponsored hdnappmg w i t h  the heartland 
of the host stak. Cf. The Over The Top, 5 P.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925) (holding unlawful 
the seizure of a schooner canylng whskey 19 miles off the United States coast, 
dism~ssing libels agrunst the schooner and its cargo, and mplicitly ordemg vessel and 
cargo returned). 
298. ALFRED W. McCoy, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN 485-87 (1991). From the mception 
of international drug control, however, the United States has been involved in 
establishing r e p e s  to stop the illicit drug trade. Starting with the International 
Opium Convention a t  The Hague of 1912, Convention Internationale de 1'Opium 
[Convention for the Suppression of the Abuse of Opmm and Other Drugs], Jan. 23, 
1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter International Opium Convention], and 
continumg through the rest of the century, the United States played a leading 
international role. See Protocol Amendimg the Smgle Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
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trade, however, operates globally with drug cartels resembling 
mullxnational corporalxons, many governments, including the 
United States, now recogmze that suppressing it reqwes multi- 
lateral cooperation. The U.N. Convention Agmnst Illicit Drugs 
represents the most ambilxous attempt 'to enlist the countries of 
the world in t h s  effort. Adopted by consensus by 106 nations in 
December 1988,299 the Convenlxon is one of the most comprehen- 
sive mmnal-law treaties ever created. As a member of the United 
States delegation stated: "The Convenlxon is one of the most 
detailed and far-reachng instruments ever adopted in the field of 
international cnmnal law,300 and if mdely adopted and effec- 
tively implemented, will be a major force in harmomzlng nalxonal 
laws and enforcement actions around the The United 
States was one of the Convention's chef sponsors.302 
Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; Protocol Llmiting and Regulating the 
Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of International and Wholesale Trade 
in and Use of Opium, June 23, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol 
B m g n g  Under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of 
July 13, 1931, Nov. 19, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 44 U.N.T.S. 277; Proclamation by the 
President, Declaring the Entry into Force of Amendments Set Forth m the Annex to 
the Protocol of December 11, 1946, Respecting Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 
1796, T.I.A.S. No. 1859; Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols 
on Narcotic Drugs, Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 12 U.N.T.S. 179; Convention for 
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 
1931, 48 Stat. 1545, 139 L.N.T.S. 301. 
299. David P Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention 
Agarnst Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropzc Substances, 18 DENV. J. INT'L 
L. & POLT 387, 387 (1990). 
300. The Convention depends on the cooperation of mdivldual states, not on the 
direct operation of an International regme. Professor Bassiouni has criticized the 
signatory states' reluctance to establish an mternational regme m whlch the laws 
would be established on the International level rather than under an agreement to 
enact laws on the nation-state level. Heanngs Before the Senate Forergn Relations 
Comm. on the Ratification of the United Nations Codvention Against Illicit T m f i  in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1989) 
[hereinafter Senate Ratification Hearrngs] (statement of M. Cherif Bassiom, Professor 
of Law); see M. Cherif Bassiouni, :Effective National and hternational Action Against 
Organczed Crzme and Terrorcst Crrmrnal Activities, 4 EMORY INT1. L. REV. 9, 33-39 (1990). 
301. Stewart, supra note 299, a t  388; see D.W Sproule & Paul St-Dems, The UN 
Drug Trafickzng Convention: An Ambitious Step, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263 (1989) 
(explaining provisions of the Convention and evaluating its effectiveness as a weapon 
aganst drug traffickmg). 
302. Stewart, supra note 299, a t  388. 
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The Conventzon requres state parhes to share information on 
drug offenders and cartels:03 to outlaw money laundenng and 
a host of drug offenses:" to regulate sale and distributzon of 
precursor ~hermcals~'~ to extradite certan individuals suspected 
of vlolatzng drug laws:06 to confiscate the assets of drug offend- 
ers:' and to abolish bank secrecy for drug investzgatzve purpos- 
es?" In additzon to requulng state parhes to enact domestzc 
antzdrug legslatzon, the Conventzon contans a mutual legal assis- 
tance treaVo9 (MLAT) and an extraditzon treaty 310 
The Conventzon also amends all emstmg extraditzon treatzes311 
that the parhes have with each other.312 First, the Conventzon 
makes drug and money laundemg offenses "extraditable offences" 
for purposes of any extraditzon treatzes between any of the par- 
tzes?13 Second, the Conventzon declares that the drug offenses 
listed in k c l e  3 shall not be cons~dergd "fiscal offences" or "polit- 
ical offences" or "regarded as politzcally motivated."314 Drug 
offenses thus do not-qualify for the generally recognized political 






309. U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 7. Article 7 of the 
Convention prowdes "the mdest measure of mutual legal assistance" to other state 
parties m "investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedingsn concermng the 
enumerated drug offenses. Id. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are the tool 
whereby one state helps to prowde another state with ewdence of a cnme that is 
admssible m the court of the requesting state. Article 7.2 of the MLAT w i t h  the 
Convention mcludes talung statements, servmg process, executing searches and sei- 
zures, exammmg objects and sites, providing relevant documents, and identifying and 
traclng proceeds, property, and instrumentalities of cnme. Id. art. 7.2. 
310. Id. art. 6. 
311. Although most of the bilateral extradition treaties entered lnto by the United 
States include drug cnmes as extraditable offenses, few of our treaties make money 
laundenng an extraditable offense. Senate Ratification Heanngs, supra note 300, at  127 
(statement of Richard L. Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States). 
Consequently, the Convention, on thls bas= alone, will have a significant unpact on 
extradition law. 
312. Most extradition treaties are-bilateral accords. Some r e ~ o n a l  and multilateral 
extradition treaties, however, are m force. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, ch. I, 1 4, 
a t  25-30. 
313. U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supra note 6, arts. 6.1-.2. 
314. Id. art. 3.10. 
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offense exception to extradition.315 n r d ,  the Convenbon re- 
q w e s  that state parhes either extradite indimdual suspects or try 
them domestically, assurmng that the requested state has juns- 
diction to do so.316 Fourth, the Convenbon itself is intended to 
serve as an extradition treaty between any of the parhes who do 
not have a bilateral treaty 317 
315. But see Sproule & St-Dems, supra note 301, a t  272-75 (noting that the exclusion 
of the political offense exception is essentially hortatory and does not apply to politi- 
cally motivated requests). On the political offense exception generally, see Barbara A. 
Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders*. The Political Offense 
Exception to Extradition cn United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & POL. 169 
(1984) (providing recommendations as to how the exception should be applied). 
316. U.N. Drug Trafticlung Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.9. 
317. Id. art. 6.3; see also cd. art. 6.4 ( requmg the extradition of drug offenders by 
parties who do not demand extradition treaties m order to extradite a suspect). 
By reservation, the United States does not recogmze the Convention as authonz- 
ing the extradition of citizens to countnes with whom we do not have an extradition 
treaty. Apparently, Senator Helms was concerned that the United States would be 
compelled to extradite individuals to certam outlaw states, which he clamed could 
compromse legitimate drug enforcement efforts. See EXEC. REP. NO. 15, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. 52, app. a t  178 (1989) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE REPORT]. The reservation 
provides as follows: 
Resolved (two-thcrds of the Senators Present concurrcng therecn), That the 
Senate advise and consent to the ratification of The United Nations 
Convention Aganst Illicit Traffic m Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, done a t  Vienna on December 20, 1988, subject to the followmg 
understandings: 
(1) Nothng in t h s  Treaty requres or authonzes leeslation or other action 
by the United States of Amenca prohibited by the Constitution of the 
United States. 
(2) The United States shall not consider t h s  convention as the legal bas15 
for extradition of citizens to any country with which the United States has 
no bilateral extradition treaty m force. 
(3) Pursuant to the nghts of the United States under Article 7 of t h s  
treaty to deny requests whch prejudice its essential interests, the United 
States shall deny a request for assistance when the designated authority, 
after consultation with all appropnate mtelligence, anti-narcotic, and foreign 
policy agenaes, has specific mformation that a semor government offiaal 
who will have access to information to be provlded under t h s  treaty is 
engaged m or facilitates the production or distribution of illegal drugs. 
135 CONG. REC. S16,616 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). 
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B. The Draftzng History of Artzcles 2 and 6 and the U.N. Drug 
Trafickzng Conventzon 
The hstory of the Conventzon's extraditzon provision (Artzcle 6) 
is parlzcularly revealing. Coupled with the antiforeign law enforce- 
ment provision (Artzcle 2), the hstory indicates that the parhes 
mplicitly intended to bar state-sponsored ladnapping. The United 
States proposed a provision r e q u n g  each state to extradite its 
own nationals. The proposal was overwhelrmngly rejected: 
The United States had hoped to mclude a broad obligatzon to 
extradite one's own natzonals m t h s  mcle .  Unfortunately 
there was ovenvhelrmng oppositzon from countries whch, for 
either political or legal reasons, would not accept any promsion 
on the extradition of then- natzonals, even a hortatory prom- 
sion. Thus, [ahcle 61 contams no promsion on the extraditzon 
of  national^.^" 
318. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supm note 317, a t  50 (commenting on Article 6 of the 
Convention); see also zd. app. a t  132 (testimony of Richard L. Thornburgh, Attorney 
General of the United States). Paragraph 5 of the ongmal draft of the extradition 
Article provlded: "A request for extradition with respect to any of the offenses to whch 
t h s  article applies shall not be refused: (a) On the ground that the person sought is 
a national of the requested Party, unless such refusal zs requrred by the constitution 
of the requested Party." 1 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention 
Agaznst Illicit Traffic zn Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropzc Substances, a t  5, art. 4, para. 
5, U.N. Doc. ElCONF.82116 (1994) heremafter 1 Ofiurl Records] (emphasis added). 
The United States proposed that the language followmg "unlessn be deleted. Workrng 
Document on the Draft Convention Agaznst Illicit Trafiic zn Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropzc Substances, Divlslon of Narcotic Drugs, a t  55, para. 412, U.N. Doc. 
DND/DCIT/WP.1(1987) [heremafter Workzg Document]. The United States argued that 
"permit[tingl traffickers to avoid extradition on the basls of nationality, would undercut 
the spuit and the mtent of the Convention." Id. Not only did the parties reject the 
United States' proposal, they also overwhelrmngly rejected the ongmal draft as overly 
broad. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, a t  50; see also Sproule & St-Dems, supra 
note 301, a t  279-80 (dicussmg the limitations on extradition). Instead, the followmg 
paragraphs were adopted: 
Paragraph 5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provlded for by 
the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, znclud- 
zng the grounds upon whzch the requested Party may refuse extradition. 
Paragraph 10. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcmg a sentence, 
1s refused because the person sought IS a national of the requested Party, 
the requested Party shall, if its law so permits and m conformity with the 
requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting Party, 
conslder the enforcement of the sentence whlch has been unposed under 
the law of the requesting Party, or the remamder thereof. 
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The vast majority of the countnes opposing such a requrement 
noted that their domesbc law extradition of their 
nationals, indicating an intent to sheld such nationals fkom 
extradition.319 In the words of the Norwegan delegate speahng 
for the Scandinanan countnes, "[blelievmg that the protectton of 
the rzghts of the person sought was one of the most significant 
principles in internabonal law, [the Scandinanan countnes] 
considered that a State should never be obliged to extradite its 
nationals."320 Only a few states asserted state sovereignty as the 
basis for refusing to  extradite their own nationals.321 The over- 
U.N. Drug Traffichng Convention, sup& note 6, art. 6 (emphasis added); see also 2 
United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Agaznst Illicit Traffic rn 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotroprc Substances, a t  107, paras. 26-30, U.N. Doc. 
E/CONJ?.82/l6/Add.l (1991) [heremafter 2 OfFclal Records] (relating the comments of 
the United States delegate, who believed that extradition is the most "effective and 
powerful" weapon agalnst drug trafficlung); Workzng Document, supra, a t  55-56, paras. 
404-11, 413-14 (1987) (suggesting that the parties mvolved--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Den- 
mark, Belpum, Hungary, Switzerland, Romama, Greece, Czechoslovalaa, Spam, Poland, 
Portugal, and Japan-sought either to weaken the effect of the ongmal draft or to 
delete it outnght). The drafting history suggests that the United States' proposal to 
strengthen the ongmal draft was not senously considered. The United States' position, 
however, is understandable because states that refuse to extradite thew nationals oRen 
do not prosecute them for the cnme(s) m question. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The 
Evolution of United States Involvement m the International Rendition of Fugitive Cnmr- 
nals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 815 (1993). State-sponsored hdnappmg is, 
however, not the solution. We and other members of the international community must 
persuade these countnes to prosecute the cnmmals and must provlde mutual legal 
assistance to facilitate the prosecutions. Accordingly, the Convention generally requrres 
requested states to prosecute the offender, mcludig a national, found m them 
junsdiction if they do not surrender her. See U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra 
note 6, art. 6.9. 
319. See 2 Offictal Records, supra note 318, a t  105-10, paras. 7-87; see also Id. a t  
117, para. 22 (noting that "the majority of States could not extradite thew own 
nationalsn); 1 rd. a t  36, para. 64. 
320. 2 rd. a t  105, para. 7 (emphasis added). The Norwepan delegate stressed, 
however, that the Nordic countnes did pumsh thew own nationals for offenses commit- 
ted abroad and were prepared to continue to do so. Id. a t  105 para. 9. Other countnes 
expressly indicating that extraditing nationals would vlolate them constitutions or 
domestic law ~ncluded Afghmstan, Brazil, Cameroon, Czechoslovalua, Egypt, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Memco, Morocco, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. Id. a t  105-11, paras. 7-102. 
Other countnes expressing them opposition m the debates mclude Algena, Austna, 
Chma, Jamsuca, Japan, and Israel. Id. The United States expressly supported the 
proposal to extradite nationals. Id. a t  107, paras. 26-30. Argentina and Mauitanus 
appeared to stake out a compromse position. Id. a t  109, paras. 67, 69. 
321. See 1 zd. a t  36, para. 63 (stating that some states felt that "the discretion of 
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whelmng opposihon to a weaker mandatory extradihon reqwre- 
ment than that wlvch the United States had proposed suggests 
that the p&es to the Convent-lon intended to safeguard the 
nghts of their nat-lonals from the law enforcement agencies of 
other countries. 
Later in the negotiat-lons of the treaty, Mexlco, whch had been 
a mnor player, demanded that an arhcle be added to the Conven- 
hon that would effectzvely prohibit foreign law enforcement agents 
from operahng on another country's territory without that 
country's consent.322 In the words of one delegate, Mexlco's 
proposal came as a The United States strongly 
opposed the additzon, apparently believing that the proposal would 
sabotage the entne convenhon by permihng the parhes to escape 
their obligahons under the treaty324 The Report of the Senate 
Foreign Relahons Committee noted that the negotiahng hstory 
of t h s  controversial arhcle "differ[ed] significantly from that of all 
others in the C~nvent-lon."~~~ Mexlco's limitahon read: 
Nothg m h s  Convention empowers, m any way whatsoever, 
the authorihes of one of the States Parties to undertake, to 
attempt t o  undertake or to exerase pressure m order to be 
allowed, m the territorial jUrISdi~ti0n of any of the other States 
Parhes, the exerase and performance of funchons whose 
jUnSdi~ti0n or competence are exclusively reserved to the 
authorities of each of those other States P h e s  by thelr 
respective nahonal laws and regulat~ons.~~~ 
sovereign States to refuse extradition should not be restrictedn). 
322. See EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 22-24. The general outline of every 
other article of the Convention was known and essentially accepted early m the 
negotiations. Id. a t  22. Article 2, however, was not proposed until July 1988, cd., only 
SLX months before the Convention's conclusion, after four years of preparation, mcludimg 
two years m negotiation, d a t  2. 
323. Telephone I n t e ~ e w  with a Delegate to the Convention Who Requested 
Anonymity (July 22, 1994). 
324. The United States "strongly opposedn Mernw's proposal, EXECUTIVE REPORT, 
supra note 317, a t  22, whch "[iln broad outline would have charactenzed the 
Convention very narrowly as an 'instrument of mternational cooperation', the 
unplementation of which would be limited by 'the most stnct respect for' the mternal 
legal system of each Party," zd., see cnfia note 483 and accompanying text (reproducmg 
paragraphs 1 through 4 of Mernw's proposed article). 
325. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, a t  22. 
326. 1 Officcd Record., supra note 318, a t  76. Thls is paragraph 2 of the ongmal 
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Mexlco apparently proposed the article after a spate of Amencan 
Drug Enforcement Admirustration (DEA) operabons on Memcan 
soil, including the hdnapping of Mexlcans by United States 
agents.327 
Although the United States strongly opposed Mexlco's proposal, 
forty-two countries quickly supported a slightly modified ver- 
~ l ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Canada and Mexlco co-sponsored ths modi f i~abon .~~~ 
Mexlcan proposal. See rnfra note 483 and accompanying text (contslmmg the full text 
of the proposal). 
327. The proposal was made a h r  the Camarena and Urqudez cases, both of whch 
caused concern in Memco about the role of United States DEA agents m that country. 
Telephone Interview with Miguel Ruz  Cabaiias, M i s t e r  of Border M m s  of the 
Memcan Embassy (July 21, 1994) [heremafter Cabaiias I n t e ~ e w l .  Mr. Cabaiias was 
attached to the Mexlcan delegation dumg the negotiations on the Convention Aganst 
Illicit Drugs. Id. In 1985, Ennque Camarena, an undercover DEA agent, was tortured 
and killed by suspected drug dealers in Guadalajara, Mexlco. See Jay Matthews, U.S. 
Obtarns Recording of Drug Agent's Torture, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1986, a t  A3. In 1986, 
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended in Melnco by Mexlcan police officers, 
turned over to the DEA, and taken to the United States for tnal. United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 19911, vacated and remanded, 505 
U.S. 1201 (1992). He was never formally extradited. See rd. A federal grand jury 
Indicted hlm on charges relating to the death of Camarena. Id. Subsequently, Melnco 
lodged "'a formal complamt regarding the ludnappmg of Verdugo," allepng that the 
police officers were "surreptitiously hlred by the DEA" to abduct hm.  Id. (quoting 
letters from the Mexlcan Embassy to the U.S. Department of State). These two cases 
caused a heated debate in Mexlco. Many Mexlcans were surprised to learn that DEA 
agents were operating in their country. Cabaiias I n t e ~ e w ,  supm. 
328. See Amendment Submitted by Afghanatan et aL, United Nations Conference 
for the Adoption of a Convention Agalnst Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/C.l/L.1/Rev.2/Add.l (1988) [heremafbr 
Sponsors]. The Canadian-Memcan proposed article simplified the language of the onp-  
nal Mexlcan proposal while continuing the theme that each party's sovereignty and 
territory should be respected. The Canadian-Mexlcan proposal provided as follows: 
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION 
1. This Convention constitutes an instrument of mter-national co-operation, 
amed at  ensunng maxlmum effectiveness in the struggle of the States 
Parties aganst the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances. Its provisions are directed at  all aspects of the problem with 
strict respect for the provisions of the internal system of each State Party. 
2. Nothmg m this Convention derogates from the principles of the 
sovereign equality and territonal integrity of States or that of non- 
intervention in the domestic affars of States. 
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The Canadian representatwe emphasized that the magnitude of 
t b s  cnmnal-law treaty reqwed assurances that every state 
would respect the territory of every other state: "Not surpnsmgly, 
when States were asked to assume obligabons in new fields they 
were, and legitunately so, concerned that those did not infhnge on 
umversally recogmzed legal principles such as the sovereign 
equality and territonal integrity of States."330 
3. Nothmg m thls Convention empowers the authorities of one of the 
States Parties to undertake, m the territonal junsdiction of any of the 
other States Parties, the exerclse and performance of functions whose 
junsdiction or competence are exclusively reserved for the authorities of 
those other States Parties by them national laws and regulations. 
Amendment Submitted by Canada and M m o ,  United Nations Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention Agamst Illicit Traffic m Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/C.l/L.l (1988) [heremafter Canadian & Mazcan 
Amendment]. 
329. See Canadian & Mexzcan Amendment, supra note 328. Aside from Canada and 
Mexlco, there were a considerable number of countries from the Western hemsphere 
among the 42 states that co-sponsored the article: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivla, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaca, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Sponsors, supra note 328. 
The Canadian-Mexlcan proposal did weaken the onginal Mexlcan proposal to some 
extent; the o n p a l  proposal prohibited one state from "exercsfingl pressure in order 
to be allowedn to operate m the territory of the weaker state. See rnfra note 483 and 
accompanymg text (emphasis added). The Canadian-Memcan proposal deleted the 
emphasized phrase from Mexlco's ongmal. See supra note 328. Presumably, the 
Convention permits the exeruse of such pressure to mduce cooperation but does 
requue cooperation by the requested state m the form of affirmative permission to 
conduct any type of police operation on its soil or withm its waters. For example, the 
DEA operation conducted to ludnap Alvarez-Macham was carned out without official 
cooperation from Mexlco. See United States v. Caro-Qumtero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. 
Cal. 1990), afd, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 19911, rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
Consequently, the ludnappmg would have vlolated Article 2 had the Convention been 
in effect a t  the time. If, however, the United States had pressured Mexlco mto pvmg 
up Alvarez-Macham or m permitting U.S. agents to apprehend h, then the United 
States wauld not have vlolated the Article. 
330. 2 Officral Records, supra note 318, a t  155, para. 87. The proposal, however, 
did not allow the parties to use then domestic law to avoid them obligations under 
the treaty and added that the "prowsion merely reiterated accepted and well-recogmzed 
international law concenung the territonal mtegrity of States, nothng more." Id. a t  
155, paras. 88-89 (relating the comments of the Canadian delegate). Despite the 
delegate's disclauner, "merely reiterating" such recogmzed mternational law would have 
been unnecessary and superfluous because of its generally accepted character. By 
insisting, over considerable opposition, that the language appear as an article, as 
opposed to a preamble as the United States m h e d ,  and that it contam far more 
specificity than Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the controversial Article 2 of the Drug 
Trafficlung Convention assumes greater dimension. 
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Given its breadth, the Convention needed an antiforeign law 
enforcement arbcle to make clear, at  the outset, the absolute 
respect for each country's territory 331 Because ths Convenbon 
was "significantly broader in scope pdcular ly  with regard to 
its cnrmnal law provl~ions"~~~ than the 1961 Single Conven- 
the 1971 Convenbon on Psychotrop~c Substan~es,3~~ and 
the 1972 Protoc01,3~~ such an d c l e  was r e q ~ x r e d . ~ ~ ~  
The Canadian representative explaned that the ban on law 
enforcement fkom trespassing upon another state's territory did 
not prevent one country fkom permitbng another to operate in 
such a manner.337 The purpose of the article was, instead, to 
prevent parties from "unilaterally extend[ing their] junsdictIon 
beyond their borders."338 Over the strong objections of the United 
States, the proposed m c l e  and its subsequent draf'ts garnered 
mde support fkom other ~ o u n t n e s . ~ ~ ~  As it became obvlous that 
the United States' objections would fail? the United States 
331. See zd. a t  155, paras. 90-92. 
332. Id. a t  155 para. 91. 
333. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supm note 298. 
334. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 298. 
335. Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 298. 
336. See 2 Ofjiccal Records, supra note 318, at  155, paras. 87-92. The Canadian 
representative recogmzed that the proposed Convention contamed other safeguards. Id. 
Nonetheless, he emphasized that stating general pmciples at  the b e ~ n ~ m g  of the 
Convention avoided misunderstandings and helped to reassure the state parties about 
assuming their other obligations under the Convention. Id. a t  155, para. 92. The 
Canadian representative stated: 
In response the sponsors would emphasize that none of the principles 
contamed in article 1 bls [the Canadian and Meruean proposal1 went 
beyond those contamed in the other articles of the draft convention. It was 
useful, however, to emphasize such general principles [prohibiting one state 
from exercising law enforcement functions m another statel.- a t  the 
begmmng of the convention so that there could be no rmsunde&anding. 
Moreover. the sDonsors were confident that with the clarification ~rovided 
by article' 1 bls -[the proposed article], delegations and ~overnments would 
feel reassured and less hesitant to assume the obligations contamed m the ' 
other articles of the convention. 
Id. 
337. See cd. a t  155, para. 90. "[The proposed article] was not intended to prevent 
joint co-operation in areas normally reserved for the exclusive jwsdiction of one 
Party." Id. 
338. Id. 
339. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supm note 317, at  23. 
340. Id. Despite United States opposition, the &view Group sent the proposal on 
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made its own proposal, whch changed some language but left 
Memco's paragraph 2 (now Arbcle 2.3) virtually intact:341 
3. Nothmg m t h s  Convenhon empowers the authorihes of one 
of the States P h e s  to undertake, m the territo~~al junsdidion 
of any of the other States Parties, the exerase and perfor- 
mance of functions whose jUrI~didZ0n or competence are 
exclus~vely reserved for the authorities of those other States 
Parhes by then nahonal laws and reg~ lahons .~~~  A State 
Party to the present Convention shall not undertake m the 
territory of another State Party the independent exerase of 
jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively 
reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its 
national law and regulations.343 
The amended thrd  paragraph uses mandatory language-"[a] 
State Party shall not ~ndertake"~~~-that denotes and 
connotes legal obligat~on.~~~ The earlier version used the abso- 
lute negahve-'Ynlothzng in t h s  Convenhon empower~"~~~-but 
the deletion of that prefatory phrase and the use of the phrase 
"shall not undertake" alone appeared to make the obligahon 
equally strong.347 The Mexlcan and Canadian representahves 
to the Plempotentiary conference. At thai conference, a Canadian-Mexlcan proposal was 
substituted for Mexlco's ongmal. Id. Although finding the substitute proposal "less 
objectionable," the United States delegation still opposed it, charactenmg the jomt 
Canadian-Mexlcan proposal as "superfluous, premature and mappropnate." Id. Debate 
in the conference revealed that a number of Western countnes supported the proposal 
or some other form of scope article. f i s  debate convinced the United States delegation 
that 'the Convention would "for political reasons" need to contam a scope article. Id. 
The United States also had argued that part of the proposal should be in the 
preamble, as being part of the background and general pmclples behmd the treaty, 
but gave up on t h s  point. Id 
341. Id. After mformal consultation with other delegations, Including Mexlco, the 
United States proposed a scope article. Id. 
342. Canadian & Mexzcan Amendment, supra note 328. 
343. 2 Offiml Records, supra note 318, a t  171, para. 8 (the United States' proposal 
is shaded; the Canadian-Mexlcan portion of the proposal IS not). The United States' 
proposed second paragraph phrased the parties' obligations m a t i v e l y  rather than 
negatively: "States Parties shall carry out their obligations under the present 
Convention m a manner consistent with the pmclples of sovereign equality and 
temtorial integrity of States. " Id 
344. Id. 
345. The phrase "shall notn creates a negative obligation: "To create a duty not to 
act (i.e., a prohibition), say 'shall not." DICKERSON, supra note 84, a t  214. 
346. Canadian & Mexrcan Amendment, supra note 328, a t  para. 3 (emphasis added). 
347. Webster's defines "undertake" as, among other thmgs, "to engage m," WEBSTER'S 
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discerned no substantive difference between their joint proposal 
and the language proposed by the United States.348 The amend- 
ed Unlted States proposal was slightly modified and subsequently 
became Article 2 of the Convent~on.~~~ 
The United States Senate Report confirms the parhes' intent m 
crafting Article 2, paragraph 3: 
The t h d  paragraph restates the corresponding provision of 
the o n p a l  Mexlcan proposal, whch reflected concern that the 
Conventzon not be znterpreted to allow law enforcement ofizals  
of one Party to operate on the terrztory of another Party zn drug 
cases absent agreement between the two Parties concerned. 
Paragraph 3 does no more than state m more specific terms 
one aspect of the duty to respect territonal Integrity and not to 
intervene in domestic affmrs contamed m paragraph 2.350 
The negotiation hstory as a whole thus indicates that the 
parties to the Convention sought to prevent; foreign law enforce- 
ment from encroachng upon the= soil and waters to interdict the 
illicit drug trade. Coupling Article 2's hstory with that of M c l e  
6 indicates, at  a minimum, that the parties intended to prohibit 
one state's law enforcement agents fkom trespassing upon another 
state and ludnapping that state's nationals. 
C. Applyzng the Proposed Test to Artzcles 2 and 6 
Under the proposed test, defendants may invoke Artrcles 2 and 
6 of the Convention to challenge a tnal court's jmsdiction when 
government agents have brought the defendants before the court 
by ludnapping them abroad.351 Each prong of the test will be 
applied in turn. Although the test must necessarily focus on the 
basis for rebutbng the presumpbon of self-execubng treabes, that 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2491 (1986), and "empower" as "to gwe 
authority to," zd. at 744. 
348. See 2 Officzal Records, supra note 318, at 176, paras. 2-6. 
349. For the final version, reflecting slight changes in the U.S. proposal, see 
EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 22. 
350. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). The Report to the Senate noted that the preceding 
paragraph (Article 2.2) restated "the concepts of sovereign equality, territonal integrity 
and non-intervention in domestic affmrs, as they are enshrined m Article 2 of the UN 
Charter." Id. 
351. See supra part I11 (discussing the proposed test). 
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presumpbon 1s the starhng polnt of the analysis. 
1. Separatzon of Powers: Would the Courts' Enforcement of the 
Treaty Provzszon Invade the Power of Another Branch of 
Government? 
'lks prong involves three pnnclpal lunds of separation-of- 
powers concerns: (1) whether the treaty language at issue is 
sufficiently mandatory and prease, (2) whether enforcing the 
treaty provision m queslzon would trespass upon one of Congress's 
exclusive, enumerated powers, and (3) whether enforang the 
treaty would pose a polibcal quesbon. 
First, k c l e s  2 and 6.5 appear to pass the mandatory and 
precise test.352 Both k c l e s  are cast in mandatory terms. Article 
2.3 directs that the parhes "shall not undertake [law enforcement 
functions] in the territory of another Party "353 k c l e  6.5 states 
that extradibon "shall be subject to" the laws and treaties of the 
state prohibibng extradibon of its na t z~na l s .~~~  The emphasized 
language closely resembles the language that the Supreme Court 
indicated was mandatory and presumably self-executzng m INS v. 
Cardoza-F0nseca,3~~ discussed earlier.356 
Arbcles 2 and 6.5 likemse are sufficiently prease. Art;lcle 2.3 
compels the state parties not to "undertake m the territory of 
another Party" any law enforcement a c t ~ o n s . ~ ~ ~  The word "under- 
352. Extradition treaties generally are considered self-executing and usually do not 
pose separation-of-powers Issues. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supm note 94, a t  39-40. Some of 
the subparagraphs of Article 6, however, do conkan hortatory language and thus are 
not self-executing. See, e.g., U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.7 
("[tlhe Parties shall endeavor to expedite extradition proceduresn) (emphasls added). 
Article 6.5, however, uses mandatory language and does not contemplate the enactment 
of unplementing leqslation: UExtradition shall be subject to the conditions provlded for 
by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, lncludlng the 
grounds upon whlch the requested Party may refuse extradition." Id. art. 6.5. It IS, 
therefore, self-executing. 
353. U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3 (emphasls added). 
354. Id. art. 6.5 (emphasls added). 
355. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
356. See supra notes 97-101 and acwmpanymg text (suggesting that Article 33 of 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 
176, was mandatory: UNo Contracting State shall expel or return (Yrefoulern) a refugee 
m any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of temtones where hs life or freedom 
would be threatened. " (emphasls added)). 
357. U.N. Drug Trafiickmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3. That Article 2 IS 
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take" is synonymous with "engage" and conveys the definite idea 
that certsun conduct is prohibited on another country's 
The next two phrases in the M c l e  appear to be terms of art that, 
when combined, mean the performance of law enforcement func- 
t i on~ :~~ '  " [Tlhe exercise of jmsdiction and performance of 
funchons whch are exclusively reserved for the authoribes of that 
other Party by its domestic law "360 Supreme Court precedent 
and United States prachce support the special meamng given to 
these phrases.361 Article 6.5 conditions extradibon on the laws 
and treaties of the requested state and expressly permits every 
party to deny extradition on the grounds provlded in thew laws or 
treaties.362 If any doubt about the meamng of either arhcle 
remsuns, resort may be made to the drafting hstory, whch 
indicates that Article 2.3 bars foreign law enforcement agents 
from actxng w i t h  a country without its consent and that the par- 
ties amended M c l e  6.5 to protect nationals from extradition.363 
Enforcing M c l e s  2.3 and 6.5 would not encroach upon 
Congress's exclusive enumerated powers. M c l e  2.3 is phrased 
negatively, telling the executive and its law enforcement agents 
what they may not and Article 6.5 deals solely with 
extradition.365 Neither aficle reqwres any allocation of funds, 
calls for a declaratxon of war, nor involves any of Congress's other 
enumerated powers. Consequently, the government would be 
unable to show a separahon-of-powers conflict regarding t h s  part 
of the prong. 
The last part of t h s  prong involves political quesbons: would 
enforcing the Convenhon and ousting the tnal court of personal 
junsdichon over a defendant ludnapped in violation of the 
Convention pose a politxcal que~bon?~" Since M c l e  I11 and the 
phrased negatively also supports a finding that it 1s sufficiently preclse. See supra 
notes 126-29 and accompanymg text. 
358. See supra note 347. 
359. See znfra notes 396-420 and accompanymg text. 
360. U.N. Drug Traff~clung Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3. 
361. See rnfra notes 416-20 and accompanyng text. 
362. U.N. Drug Traficlung Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.5. 
363. See supm part W.B. 
364. U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6, art 2.3. 
365. Id. art. 6.5. 
366. See supra note 94 (discussmg political questions in thls context). 
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Supremacy Clause empower the judiaary to Interpret treaties, a 
court's interpretmg the Convenhon does not usurp a power 
constituhonally committed to another branch and thus does not 
meet the first critenon for lnvohng the polihcal questlon doc- 
t r ~ n e . ~ ~ ~  Given the judiaary's expenence In adjudicating the 
nghts of cnmnal defendants?' In deterrmmng the existence of 
personal junsdichon, and In constrcung extradihon treahe~,3~' 
ruling on abducted defendants' treaty nghts 1s well withn the 
judiaarfs competence and thus does not meet the second critenon 
for lnvohng the polihcal queshon do~tnne.~~O Although a court's 
decision regarding whether it has personal junsdichon over an 
extradited fugihve may have policy undertones-partzcularly if the 
fugihve 1s extradited as part of the so-called drug war-rewemng 
t h s  type of queshon 1s a core funchon of the judiciary 371 Conse- 
quently, courts have not held such decisions to be political 
ques t~ons .~~~  Because a state-sponsored hdnapping closely 
resembles a speaalty rule wolahon, the same reasomng applies 
to adjudicahng the personal junsdiction of an abducted defendant. 
A defendant mnvolnng the Drug Traffichng Convenhon would be 
aslnng a court to Interpret the Convenhon's extradition article 
together with the antiforeign law enforcement arhcle, an analyt- 
ical process similar to a rouhne mnterpretahon of an extradihon 
treaty 
The last critenon of the polihcal question doctnne, the so-called 
"prudenhal" critenon, primarily addresses whether there is "an 
unusual need for unquestlomng adherence to a polihcal decis~on 
already made."373 In the context of exerclsmg personal junsdic- 
tlon In contravenhon of the Convenhon, that Issue 1s whether the 
367. See supra note 94. 
368. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 187 (1962) (arguing 
for a fawly broad political question doctnne but noting that adrrrrmstration of the 
cnminal law is "well w i t h  [the Court's] expenence"). 
369. Federal courts have mterpreted extradition treaties smce 1799. United States 
v. Robbms, 27 F Cas. 825 0.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). Since a t  least 1886, federal 
courts have detemuned whether they have personal junsdiction over extradited 
fugitives. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
370. See supra note 94. 
371. See BICKEL supra note 368, a t  187; Goum, supra note 94, a t  781. 
372. See BICKEL, supra note 368, a t  187; Goum, supra note 94, a t  781. 
373. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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need to speak with one voice in foreign &ms makes t h s  queshon 
non~ushciable.~~~ Although such a concern mght apply when the 
president and h s  senior advlsors make a foreign policy iniixahve, 
it does not emst when lower federal officials engage in autono- 
mous foreign a d ~ e n t u n n g . ~ ~ ~  Whether these prudenhal concerns 
may be applied to foreclose a defense in a cnmnal case is 
One mght reasonably argue that, when the Presi- 
dent personally orders the capture of a head of state abroad, as in 
the General Nonega case, prudenhal concerns mght preclude the 
court's revlew of the issue. Even such an unusual case377 deals 
with the core function of the judiclw "A court cannot depnve one 
of h s  liberty without ensunng an opportunity to  have h s  con- 
stitutional clam de t em~ned . "~~~  Because the Supremacy Clause 
elevates treahes to  the same status as federal statutes and the 
374. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 243, a t  233; supra note 94. 
375. See Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Forezgn Abduction After Alvarez- 
Machan, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 946 (1993); Vtizquez, supra note 63, a t  113. Contra 
Fernandez v. Willunson, 505 F Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980) (granting habeas corpus to 
a Manel-Cuban refugee on grounds that hls Indefinite detention violated customary 
international law), affd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. W i h s o n ,  
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 5 702 
(1987) ("A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, i t  practices, 
encourages, or condones prolonged arbitrary detention. 3; but see Garcla-Mir 
v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.) (holding that a Manel-Cuban refugee's challenge 
that his Indefinite detention by order of the Attorney General violated customary inter- 
national law posed a political question), cert. denled, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). 
376. BATOR ET AL., supra note 243, a t  241; see ~ o u m ,  supra note 94, a t  781. 
377. Never before had the United States forcibly brought a foreign head of state to 
t h s  country to face cnminal charges. United States v. Nonega, 746 F Supp. 1506, 
1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
378. Gouin, supra note 94, a t  811 n.353 (quoting Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, 
Political Question Doctrzne and Allocation of the Forezgn Affarrs Power, 13 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 215, 235 (1985) (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)); see 
Champlin & Schwarz, supra, a t  234 11.81 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (5-4 decision)). Justice Jackson stated: 
My duties as a justice as I see them do not requlre me to make a military 
judgment as to whether General DeWitt's evacuation and detention 
program [to d e w ,  among others, Amencan citizens of Japanese ancest~yl 
was a reasonable military necessity. I do not suggest that the courts 
should have attempted to Interfere with the Army in carrying out its task. 
But I do not think [the court.] may be asked to execute a military 
expedient that has no place in law under the Constitution. I would reverse 
the judgment and discharge the pnsoner. 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Constit~hon,3'~ a court likemse should not depnve a defendant 
of her liberty without ensunng an opportunity to have her treaty 
clam d e t e m ~ n e d . ~ ~ ~  
Because the Constitutzon expressly authonzes the judiciary to 
interpret trealxes, because the courts have considerable expenence 
in interprehng extradilxon treatzes similar to the Convenhon 
provlsions, and because an abducted defendant would invoke the 
treaty only as a defense to a cnrmnal prosecutzon, the political 
queshon doctnne would not apply Justice Powell noted that only 
an abject usurpahon of execuhve power renders a treaty queshon 
nonjuslxciable: "Such a case would anse if we were asked to 
decide, for example, whether a treaty reqwred the president to 
order troops into a foreign country "'" A court's exarmnation of 
whether United States agents have hdnapped a single person in 
vlolatzon of a treaty is a far cry from detemmng whether a 
President must order troops into a foreign country382 Conse- 
quently, the polilxcal questzon doctnne has little applicability to 
an abduchon case under the Con~entzon.~~~ 
379. VBzquez, supra note 63, a t  1134; see also supra part II.A.2.a (discussmg the 
Framers' mtent regarding the supremacy of treaties). 
380. In Norzega, the dishct court determmed that the defendant lacked standing 
to mvoke alleged treaty nolations because Panama did not protest hs capture and 
arrest. Norrega, 746 F Supp. a t  1533. Whether the state of the abducted national 
must protest for the national to have standing to mvoke the Convention agamst illicit 
drugs ~s beyond the scope of t h ~ ~  Article. The ewdence of the Framers' mtent mdicates 
that such a protest is unnecessary. See supra note 280. 
381. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concumg). 
382. Cf. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (disrmssmg, on political 
question grounds, a suit by 110 members of Congress that challenged President 
Reagan's alleged nolation of the War Powers Resolution m carrymg out military action 
in the Persian Gulf). But see Michael J. Glennon, Forergn Affarrs and the Political 
Question Doctrine, m FOREIGN AFFNiZS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 107, 112-13 (Louis 
Henkm et al. eds., 1990) (criticlung Lowry as an abdication of judicial rewew). 
383. Contra Halberstam, supra note 94, a t  736. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (19931, the Court suggested, m a two-paragraph alternative 
holding, that it was a political question to enforce the Protocol on Refugess m order 
to stop the Presidenfs program of mterdicting Haitians on the h g h  seas and forcibly 
repatnating them without affording them an opportunity to petition for political 
asylum. 
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2. Prznczples of Contract: Does the Treaty by Its Own Terms 
Prohibzt It From Operatzng zn Unzted States Domestzc Courts? 
n s  prong lnvolves contract pnnclples that deal manly but not 
exclusively with domestic implembntahon clauses, Senate 
reservations, and Cardenas-type provlsions that expressly render 
a treaty in whole or in part non-self-executing.384 Because the 
Senate did not attach a reservation to the Convention that made 
any of its provlsions non-self-executing and because the Conven- 
kon contans no Cardenas-type provlsions, these excephons to self- 
execution do not apply The remamng queshon is whether the 
Convention contans a broad, unqualified domestic implementa- 
tion clause malung fb-hcles 2 and 6, or the Convenhon as a whole, 
non-self-executing without a congressional enactment. 
A treaty may have some provlsions that are non-self-executmg 
and others that are self-e~ecuhng.~'~ Similarly, a treaty may 
have domeskc mplementahon clauses that requlre domeskc l e ~ s -  
lation to carry out some treaty provlsions, but not others.386 
Some terms of the Drug Traffichng Convenhon are expressly non- 
self-executing; they call upon each state party to enact certan 
laws outlamng use and sale of illicit drugs.387 Other terms are 
self-executing. The parties intended those to have immediate ef- 
f e~ t .~"  The relevant provlsions of the extradition article389 and 
some withn the Mutual Legal Assistance article? for example, 
384. For a fuller exposition of these issues, see supra notes 130-42 and ac- 
companymg text. 
385. See supra note 142. 
386. See Iwasawa, supra note 14, a t  658-60. 
387. See U.N. Drug Trafickmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 3. Article 3 of the 
Convention requlres that each party adopt laws cnmmaliung the production, 
cultivation, sale, purchase, and possession of narcotic drugs and psychotrop~c 
substances. Id. 
388. See zd. arts. 2.3, 6.2, 7; see also znfra notes 392-95 and accompanymg text (dis- 
cussing the effect. of self-executing terms). 
389. Article 6.2 amends every extradition treaty between any of the parties to add, 
if not already listed, the drug offenses described in Article 3: "Each of the offenses to 
which thls article applies shall be deemed to be zncluded as an extraditable offence m 
any extradition treaty exlsting between Parties." U.N. Drug Traffidang Convention, 
supra note 6, art. 6 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Article 6.3 permits the Convention 
to serve as an extradition treaty between any parties that have not concluded an 
extradition treaty. Id. art. 6.3; see supra note 259 (quoting Article 6.5 in full); see also 
supra note 317 (discussmg the Senate reservation concernrng the extradition treaty). 
390. For example, Article 7, paragraph 18, provldes specific procedures for obtammg 
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fall into t h s  category of self-executzng terms, as does Art;lcle 
2.3.391 Nothng m its language or hstory suggests an intent to 
the testimony of witnesses: 
A witness, expert or other person who consents to e v e  evidence m a 
proceeding or to asslst m an mvestigation, prosecution or judiclal 
proceeding m the territory of the requesting Party, shall not be prosecuted, 
detamed, p w h e d  or subjected to any other restnction of hls personal 
liberty m that territory m respect of acts, ormssions or convlctions pnor to 
hls departure from the territory of the requested Party. Such safe conduct 
shall cease when the witness, expert or other person havmg had, for a 
penod of f i h n  consecutive days, or for any penod agreed upon by the 
Parties, from the date on whch he has been officially mformed that b 
presence ls no longer requlred by the judiad authorities, an opportunity 
of leavmg, has nevertheless remtuned voluntarily m the territory or, havmg 
left it, has returned of hls own free will. 
U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 4. 
391. The government could argue that, had the parties mtended to e v e  mdivlduals 
nghts under Article 2, the parties could have easily done so expressly. Article 18 
demonstrates that, when the parties m h e d  to provlde mdivldual nghts, they knew 
how to do so. See rd art. 18. The parties easily could have added an  additional 
paragraph to Article 2 stating: "No state party shall mtermgate, detam, apprehend, 
p w h  or prosecute any mdivldual m vlolation of thls Article." Such an argument, 
however, rmspercelves the nature of treaties m Amencan law. Possessmg an express 
cause of action w i t h  the treaty ls not a condition precedent for mvolung a treaty m 
court and ls not the way treaties are written. See supm parts II.A.2.a-.B.2. 
Furthermore, Article 18 IS a standard clause m a MLAT treaty. Article 2 is a 
foundational article, added late m the negotiating process to ensure that states do not 
trespass on the soil of other states. The mportance of the Article ls underscored by 
the controversy i t  engendered but also by the significant support it qulckly garnered. 
See supm part 1V.B. 
Mexlco, the ongmal sponsor of Article 2, was particularly concerned about United 
States Drug Enforcement Agents violating thew territory and abusmg the authority 
granted to them. See supm notes 322-50 and accompanymg text. Such abuses fall 
directly on Mexlcan nationals and others under Mexlco's protection whom the DEA 
suspects of bemg m some way mvolved m illicit drug trafficlung or possession. See 
supra note 350 and accompanymg text. One state's surreptitious entry mto another 
state to hdnap a national from that state not only affronts the dignity of that state 
but also grievously mjures that state's hdnapped national. In fact, the drafting hlstory 
and text of Article 6.5 mdicate that the parties mtended to protect the requested 
states' nationals. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanymg text. The problem of 
havmg the DEA act outslde its authority and exerclse law enforcement functions on 
Mexlcan soil prompted Mexlco to offer the article. See supra note 350 and accompany- 
mg text. The Camarena case and the alleged hdnappmg of Verdugo-Urquldez occurred 
before Mexlco proposed the article. See supm note 350. Reading Article 2 and Article 
6 together suggests that the parties mplicitly mtended to protect thew nationals from 
state-sponsored hdnappmg. See supra notes 322-50. Consequently, just like the 
defendants m the extradition specialty cases and the s h p  master and the defendants 
m the Liquor Treaty cases, hdnap vlctims should be entitled to assert the treaty as  
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requre each state to enact enabling le~slahon to make b c l e  2.3 
effechve. On the contrary, Article 2.3 was intended to be a 
condition precedent to hamng the parbes carry out their other 
obligations under the treaty392 Sevenng the self-execuhng 
articles from the non-self-execuhng articles of the Convenhon is 
relahvely easy because the non-self-execuhng &cles have then 
own domestic implementahon cla~ses .3~~ Other articles have no 
such clauses.394 Notably, neither b c l e  2 nor M c l e  6 has such 
an implementation clause, nor does any such clause in the treaty 
expressly or implicitly cover these arti~les.3~~ 
3. Standing: Do Unzted States Agents Violate the U.N Drug 
Trafickzng Conventton and Cause a Forezgn Natzonal Injury zn 
Fact When They Abduct a Forezgn Natzonal from Her Country2 
Is Such a Forezgn Natzonal Arguably Withzn the Zone of 
Interests Protected or Regulated by the Treaty2 
Abductmg a foreign national in violation of the Convenhon 
easily satisfies the injury-ln-fact req~rement .~ '~  To deterrmne 
whether such an indimdual is arguably withn the zone of 
interests protected or regulated by the Convenhon requnes 
a defense. See supra notes 168-228 and accompanymg text. 
392. See supra notes 322-38. 
393. For example, Article 3 begms as follows: "Each Party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to establish as clvnlnal offences under its domestic law, 
when committed intentionally:. " U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supra note 6, 
art. 3. Article 4, dealing with jmsdiction, and Article 5, dealing with confiscation, also 
contam such an implementing clause at  the begmrung. Id. arts. 4-5. 
394. These include, for example, Article 6 on extradition, Article 7 on mutual legal 
assistance, Article 9 on other forms of cooperation, and Article 10 on International 
cooperation and assistance. Id. arts. 6-7, 9-10. 
395. See zd. arts. 2, 6. In any event, the domestic mplementation clauses that are 
contamed in and refer to other Convention articles are neither broad nor unqualified 
and thus do not deprive the articles to whch they refer of them selfexecuting 
character. For example, the domestic mplementation clause contamed m Article 3, 
quoted supra note 393, should not render Article 3 non-self-executing. The language 
of the clause indicates that it is auned at  states that do not recogmze the doctnne of 
self-executing treaties. See supra note 137 and accompanymg text. Note the words 
"may be necessary," suggesting that Article 3 comes into force immediately if such 
mplementing le~slation is not necessary. See supra note 393; see also supm notes 
130-42 and accompanymg text (discussing t h s  principle m more detail). 
396. Cf. BATOR ET AL., supra note 243, at  18491 (discussing standing under the 
Constitution). 
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applylng the plam meamng, drafbng hstory, and purposes of the 
relevant arhcles and the Conventzon as a whole to a state- 
sponsored ladnapping. The plan meamng of Arizcle 6.5 is that 
states have the nght to "refuse extraditzon" on the grounds 
permitted by the requested state's domestzc law or treat~es.~" 
Reading b c l e  6.5 together with b c l e  6.10 Indicates that one 
such common ground is that the fugibve sought is a national of 
the requested state?" The Convenbon thus r e a r m s  the nght 
of states to refuse extraditzon of ther  nabonals if that nght is. 
provlded by thew respectzve domestzc law or treaties?" The 
plan meamng of Arhcles 2.2 and 2.3 prohibits any unauthonzed 
foreign law enforcement operabon on a party's territory 400 Ariz- 
cle 2.2 repeats each nabon's obligatzon under the U.N. Charter4'' 
concemng the inviolability of each natzon's territonal integn- 
ty 402 Whereas b c l e  2.2 states the general obligatzon to respect 
another country's territory, Arhcle 2.3 specifically prohibits a state 
fkom exercising law enforcement powers in another state.403 
397. See supra note 318 (quoting Articles 6.5 and 6.10 m full). 
398. See supra note 318. 
399. Treaties should be read m pan matena if they deal with the same subject. See 
generally EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION F STATUTES 3 231 (1940) ("Statutes 
in pan matena [are] those whlch relate to the same matter or subject. They 
are to be construed together as if they constituted one act."). 
400. U.N. Drug TraiEclung Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2.2--3. 
401. Article 2(4) provldes as follows: "All Members shall refram m then mternation- 
al relations from the threat or use of force agamst the territonal mtegrity or political 
independence of any state, or m any other manner mconslstent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 2(7) promdes as follows: 
Nothmg contamed m the present Charter shall authonze the United 
Nations to mtervene m matters whch are essentially w i h  the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall requme the Members to submit such mat- 
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but t h  principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
Id. art. 2, para. 7. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has been construed to prohibit 
state-sponsored ludnapplng m a foreign state. See supra note 330; see also CHARTER 
OF THE ORGANEATION OF AMERICAN STATES, supm note 103, arts. 3, 18. 
402. Thls paragraph appears to restate customarg mternational law that prohibits 
temtonal mvasions. Thls prohibition has been construed to bar state-sponsored 
hdnappmg. See supm note 297. 
Article 2 reads: T h e  Parties shall carry out then obligations under t h ~ s  
Convention in a manner conslstent with the pnnclples of sovereign equality and 
temtonal mtegrity of States and that of non-mtervention m the domestic affm of 
other States." U.N. Drug Trafficlang Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.2. 
403. Id. art. 2.3. 
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Parsing Article 2.3 ylelds the follomng: 
wuA Party shall not undertake m the territory of another 
Party".4M Parhes are expressly prohibited from engagmg m 
certam conduct m the territory of another state party; 
muthe exerclse of j ~ ~ d i ~ h ~ n " ' ~ ~ ~  States may not use thev 
state power on another party's soil. Given that the treaty deals 
exclusively with cnrmnal law, the exerclse of jUI'IsdiCt'I0n pre- 
sumably means the exercise of law enforcement power; 
muand performance of funhons whch are exclusively reserved 
for the authorihes of that other Party by its domeshc law "406 
The Convenhon deals solely with cnrmnal law "Plerformance 
of funCt'Ions whch are exclusively reserved for the authorihes 
of that other Party by its domestic law" thus refers to law 
enforcement funchons. 
Law enforcement functions are "exclusively reserved"407 for the 
authorities of each state as a matter of custom and sometunes as 





408. See zd. The Justice Department has unplicitly recopzed the territonal 
sovereignty of foreign states over law enforcement w i t h  thelr territory. The 
Department of Justice Instructions to U.S. Marshals for Processzng Requests for Servzng 
Amencan Judiczal Documents Abroad prohibits U.S. Marshals from "travel[ingl to 
foreign countnes to deliver subpoenas m either cnrmnal or uvil cases." SWEENEY ET 
AL., supra note 297, a t  134-35 (quoting 16 I.L.M. 1331, 1338 (1978)) (requmng that 
U.S. Marshals receive the "express approvaln of and "guidance by" the Director of the 
United States Marshals S e ~ c e  before servlng subpoenas abroad). 
Other countnes have expressly forbidden foreign law enforcement agents from 
operating without consent. Article 271 of the SWISS Penal Code provides: 'Whoever, 
without being so authonzed, engages on Swiss territory on behalf of a foreign state 
in acts [the exercise of whlchl appertams to the [Swiss] public authorities shall be 
punished by mpnsonment." Id. a t  134 (quoting 78 REVUE GENERAL DE DROR INTERNA- 
TIONAL PUBLIC 851 (1974) (editors' translation)). 
Note also that Mexlco's domestic law mpliedly prohibits foreigners from engagmg 
m law enforcement functions m Mexico. Article 16 of the Mexlcan Constitution 
provides: "No one shall be disturbed m hls person, family, domicile, documents or 
possessions except by virtue of a written order by the competent authority stating the 
legal grounds and justification for the action taken." Bnef for the United Mexican 
States as Amzcus Curcue m Support of Affirmance .at 15 n.8, United States v. Alvarez- 
Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712) (quoting Article 16 of the Memcan Political 
Constitution). Article 14 of the Ley de Extradition Internaclonal (International 
Extradition Law) is equally clear: "No Mexlcan shall be extradited to a foreign state 
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"domestzc law" to statutes, r e q u n g  the vlolated state to reserve 
expressly all law enforcement functzons for its own authon- 
ties.409 By using the general term "domest;lc law,'*'' however, 
the drafters of the Conventzon presumably intended to encompass 
all categories of law, whch include (in additzon to statutes) 
constitutzons, custom,4" court opmons, treatzes, adrmmstratzve 
regulatzons, adrmmstratzve agency decisions, and executzve 
orders.412 
Consideratzon of the plan mearung of paragraphs 2 and 3 
together demonstrates that the parhes intended to require law 
enforcement to respect the territory of other states and, in 
parhcular, to prohibit any law enforcement functions withn 
another state's territory without that state's consent.413 State- 
sponsored hdnapping is a major cnme in the asylum state and 
vlolates national sovereignty, customary internatzonal law, and 
except m exceptional cases m the discretion of the Executive." Id. a t  14 n.6 (informal 
translation); see d s o  SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 297, a t  135-36 (reprinting a trans- 
lation of an Austnan Supreme Court case from 1961 that appeared m 38 Int'l L. Rep. 
133 (1969) (voiding the judgment a g m t  a German citizen tned on crmunal charges 
m absentia because the German defendant had been served by mail m Germany m 
violation of German sovereignty and an ~nternational treaty)). But see SEC v. Bnggs, 
234 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Oho 1964) (finding that semce by a British Columbia Deputy 
Sheriff on the defendant, a U.S. citizen, did not vlolate Canadian sovereignty); contra 
ITC v. Compagme de S m t  Gobam-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(holding that the mail semce of a subpoena duces tecum m France on a French 
national was mproper because it vlolated general pnnclples of international law). For 
a discussion of Compagnre de Sarnt, see SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 297, a t  137-38. 
409. U.N. Drug TrafEckmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3. 
410. A s  noted m the prewous section, m the final draft, "domestic law" was 
substituted for 'national laws and regulations." See znfia notes 530-32 and accompany- 
ing text. The o n p a l  phrasmg could have been mterpreted as referring only to 
statutes and constitutions ("national laws"), as well as national adms t r a t ive  
regulations, although "national" appears to modify both Yawsn and "regulations." If the 
parties had intended to limit the term "domestic law" to national l e ~ l a t i o n ,  they 
could have kept the ongmal wording or crafted more specific language to accomplish 
that result. 
411. Black's Law Dictionary defines "custom and usagen as: "A usage or practice of 
the people, whch, by common adoption and acqmescence, and by long and unvarymg 
habit, has become compulsory, and has acqulred the force of a law with respect to the 
place or subject-matter to whlch it relates." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 
1990) (citation omitted); see d so  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COhMENTARIES *68-70 
(recopzmg the mportance of custom as law). 
412. See WILLIAM P STATSTY, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 14-15 (3d ed. 1986). 
413. U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2.2, 2.3. 
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treaties. Furthermore, t h s  type of hdnapping is an illegal arrest 
and, as such, falls withn the proscribed law enforcement 
f u n c b ~ n s . ~ ~ ~  Consequently, the plan meamng of the Convenbon 
bars state-sponsored ludnapp~ng.~~~ 
Aside from a stnct plan meamng analys~s, Supreme Court 
precedent and United States pracbce indicate that such an 
- 
interpretation of h c l e  2's language is correct. From the early 
years of the Republic, the United States has both expressly and 
implicitly recogmzed that state sovereignty is inviolable and that 
law enforcement is an "exercise of junsdicbon and performance of 
funchons exclusively reserved for the authoribes of that other 
[country] by its domeshc law "*16 When legal proceedings were 
brought aganst a French vessel of war, the Supreme Court, 
spealung through Chef Justice Marshall, observed that the 
"junsdiction of the nation witkn its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute."417 A dozen years later, when United 
414. Drug law enforcement operations mclude but are not limited to mtemewmg 
potential witnesses, obtsllllng and cultivating mformants, placlng agents undercover, 
executing searches of persons or places, mamtammg surveillance of suspects, engagmg 
in aenal surveillance and spraymg of fields m whlch source crops are cultivated, 
searchmg and destroymg c o m e  growmg and processmg sites, arrangmg controlled 
drug purchases ("stings"), and arresting suspects. See JAMES N. GILBERT, CRIhfINAL 
INVESTIGATION 365-77 (3d ed. 1993). State-sponsored hdnappmg wolates Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter as well as Article 18 of the OAS Charter. United States v. 
Toscamno, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Ci. 1974); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 0 432(2) (1987). 
415. Analyzing the plam meamng of Article 6 mdicates that the Convention 
expressly preserves the nghts of requested states to refuse to extradite thew own 
nationals if thew domestic law or treaties so prowde. See U.N. Drug Traffickmg 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 6. Reading Articles 2 and 6 together from a stnctly 
p lan  meamng perspective thus mdicates that the Convention bars state-sponsored 
hdnappmg and mpliedly protects from such hdnappmg nationals of those states 
whose treaties or domestic law prohibits extraditing thew own nationals. In other 
words, Article 2 alone does not necessarily make ludnapping victims Intended 
benefiaanes of its prowsions, but Article 6 mplicitly makes the nationals of requested 
states such benefiaanes. See zd. arts. 2, 6. 
416. Id. art. 2.3. 
417. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). In 
that case, Napoleon had added an Amencan merchant vessel to b navy, havlng 
wrongfklly seized it on the h g h  seas. The vessel subsequently entered an Amencan 
port, and the former owners brought a libel a g w t  it. The issue was whether the 
vessel was unmune from suit, belng part of the temtory of France. Ruling a- 
matively, the Court, m a prelimmary part of the opmon, discussed the nature of a 
state's junsdiction over its own soil and waters: 
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States tax agents seized a French shp  fkom Flonda (then Spmsh 
territory) without Spamsh consent, Jusbce Story, writing for the 
Court, concluded that the agents lacked the "power to  arrest" 
withn the exclusive territory of a foreign nabon: "It would be 
monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authonzed to 
enter into foreign ports and territones, for the purpose of seinng 
vessels whch had offended agmnst our laws."418 Similarly, when 
[A nation's junsdiction over its temtory] is susceptible of no limitation not 
imposed by itself. Any restnction upon it, denvlng validity from an ex- 
ternal source, would mply a d i i u t i o n  of its sovereignty to the extent of 
the restnction. 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation 
w i t h  its own temtones, must be traced up to the consent of the nation 
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. 
Id. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, human nghts conventions, and the Decla- 
ration on Human Rights, however, do limit a nation's sovereignty to a limited extent 
not relevant to the discussion here. See LILLICH & NEW?&W, supra note 14, a t  148-49 
(quoting Hauser, United Nations Law on Rac~al Discnmznution, 1970 AM. SOC'Y INT1, 
L. PROC. 114, 114-18) (describmg the doctnne of sovereignty as a "real problem"). 
418. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824). In that case, the Apollon 
was carrymg a cargo bound for Charleston, South Carolina. Neanng Charleston, the 
captam learned that Congress had passed an act mposmg punitive tariffs on cargoes 
carned by French shps. Id. a t  364. The United States levied these tariffs m retalia- 
tion for France's mposition of restnctions on vessels canymg the United States flag. 
Id. a t  375. Consequently, he changed course and landed m Flonda, then a S p m h  
territory, and pad  the applicable Spamsh duties. Id. a t  364. Without any authonzation 
from Spamsh authorities, United States tax agents later entered thls Spamsh territory, 
seized the shp, and brought it to Georpa for disposition. Id. a t  365. The ostensible 
grounds for the seizure were the alleged attempt of the Apollon to evade the United 
States tariff. Id While under S p m h  control, Flonda was apparently a stagmg pomt 
for extensive smuggling of goods mto the United States. Id. a t  374. The Court 
determmed that the seizure was unlawful and ordered the return of the shlp and the 
payment of damages. Justice Story reasoned that the seizure wolated the law of 
nations. 
But, even supposmg, for a moment, that our laws had reqwed an entry 
of the Apollon, m her transit, does it follow that the power to arrest her 
was meant to be pven, after she had passed mto the exclus~ve temtory 
of a foreign nation? We thdc not. It cannot be presumed that 
Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of 
nations. 
Id. a t  370-71. But see The Memo, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391 (1824); The Richmond, 13 
U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815) (holding that Amencan-repstered vessels seized m foreign 
waters by the U.S. Navy are subject to United States junsdiction). The Supreme Court 
in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), distinguished The Menno and The 
Richmond on the ground that the vessels seized m those cases were Amencan- 
repstered and that "the seizures did not wolate any treaty, but were merely violations 
of the law of nations because made w i t h  the territory of another sovereign." Id. a t  
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the USSR attempted to hdnap a Sovlet cihzen fkom its Wash- 
ington embassy, the State Department declared that "the Gov- 
ernment of the United States cannot permit the exerclse withn 
the United States of the police power of any foreign government" 
and, for t h s  msconduct, expelled a Sovlet diplomat.419 These 
examples show that the United States regards law enforcement 
functions withn a country's borders as "exclusively reserved" to 
that country 420 
The Conventzon's drafhng hstory supports the plam memng 
interpretation that Article 2 and Article 6.5 bar state-sponsored 
hdnapping of a country's nahonals. The United States played an 
active role on the losing side of both of these &cles.4" In a real 
sense, h c l e  2 was sumed at the United States. The Mexlcan 
delegate sad  that he was able to persuade delegahon &r delega- 
tion to support the proposed arttcle because they feared that 
United States law enforcement, and the DEB in parhcular, would 
rouhnely overstep their authority4" and encroach upon other 
counlmes' territory and nah0nals.4~~ 
The parttes' overwhelmng rejechon of the United States' 
proposed amendment to Arlzcle 6.5 and their refusal to include 
even a hortatory provision concemng extradition of nahonals 
suggests, among other thngs, an intent to protect a state's 
nationals from ext~aditzon.~~~ Given t h s  hstory and the &cle's 
122. 
419. See U.S. Rejects Sovwt Charges Concernrng Refwal of Two Russlan Teachers 
To Return to Sovwt Unron, DEP'T ST. BUU., Aug. 29, 1948, a t  251, 253. 
420. See U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supm note 6; see also RESTATEhiENT 
('I'm) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 5 432(2) (1987) (noting that mternational law bars one 
state's exerclse of law enforcement functions m another state absent that state's 
consent). "A state's law enforcement officers may exerczse therr finctions m the temtory 
of another state only with the consent of the other state, aven by duly authomed 
officials of that state." Id. (emphasis added). The language of the Restatement 
resembles that of Article 2.3. See U.N. Drug T r a f f i h g  Convention, supra note 6, art. 
2.3. 
421. See supra notes 318, 324 and accompanpg text. 
422. A DEA-sponsored hdnappmg m a foreign state party's temtory would be 
considered a direct affront to that country's soveragnty, repudiating typlcal 
arrangements made between other governments and the DEA and thereby wolating 
Article 2. See U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6, art. 2; znfra notes 454, 
457. 
423. Telephone Intemew with Alberta Szekely, the Head of the Mexlcan Delegation 
to the Convention (July 24, 1994) [heremafter Szekely Intemewl. 
424. Many delegates to the Convention proposed the deletion of the ongmal dratt 
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text, one can Infer that, at  the very least, the parhes lmplicitly 
intended to  protect nattonals agmnst state-sponsored Indnapping, 
a much more egregious vlolahon of both the nghts of the nattonal 
and her ~ t a t e . 4 ~ ~  The Supreme Court In Alvarez-Machazn, 
however, rejected such an arg~ment .4~~ The Court refused to 
follow the Ninth Circuit's reason~ng~~' that the United States' 
of Article 6.5, argclmg that the ongmal conflicted with them uconstitution, national 
leplation, and customary legal practice." See 1 OfFcral Records, supra note 318, at 
36, para. 64. A few delegates argued that the proposed Article 6 mfrmged on the 
sovereignty of states and them nght to refuse extradition. Id at  36, para. 63. Those 
opposmg the draft prevailed, and the amended proposal not only deleted the 
requuement of extraditing nationals, but also made extradition expressly subject to the 
requested state's domestic law and applicable treaties "including the grounds upon 
whch the requested Party may refuse extradition." U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, 
supra note 6, art. 6.5. 
Thls h t o r y  mdicates that the majority mtended to protect theu nationals, Sven 
that them laws, treaties, and m some cases constitutions so protected them. The 
proposed draft would have been "contrary" to those laws. I d ,  see 2 cd. a t  105-06, 
paras. 7-10 (statement of the Norwepan delegate on behalf of the Scandinavian 
countries) (expressmg theu mtent to "protect[] the nghts of the person," theu 
national, from extradition). Even those delegates who based them opposition on the 
notion that the ongrnal draft h g e d  on sovereign discretion to refuse extradition 
mplicitly mtended to protect nationals as well. Treaties, like admmstrative regula- 
tions, may serve more than one purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 
407 (1886) (finding that an extradition treaty served to surrender fugitives to a 
requesting state but also protected mdivldual fugitives from bemg tned for 
nonextraditable offenses); see Viizquez, supra note 63, a t  1082-83. Adrrrrmstrative 
regulations may advance the general good and, a t  the same time, they may be mvoked 
by one directly Injured as a result of the government's vlolation of them nghts. See, 
e.g., Association of Data Processmg Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
Recogmung a state's nght to refuse extradition of its nationals, the amended article 
thus lmplicitly protects t h  class of mdivlduals. 
425. U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6, a t  art. 6.5. 
426. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
427. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 19911, rev'd and 
remanded, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty between the United 
States and Mexlco provldes as follows: 
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own 
nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not 
prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up 
if, m its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so. 
2. If extradition IS not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of thls Article, the 
requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution, provlded that Party has jurisdiction over the 
offense. 
Alvarez-Mahum, 504 U.S. a t  663 (citation omitted) (quoting Extradition Treaty, May 
4, 1978, [19791 U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065). 
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abduction of a nahonal would defeat the purpose of a provision 
prohibiting the extradihon of nationals.428 The Court reasoned 
that Mexlco had long known of the Ker-Frzsbze d o ~ t n n e ~ ~ ~  and 
had never sought to negohate an arhcle prohibiting abduc- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Unlike the bilateral extradihon treaty in Bvarez-Machazn, over 
100 countries have signed the U.N. Drug Trafficlung Conven- 
t ~ o n . ~ ~ '  Although a neighbor with whom we share a conhnent- 
428. Alvarez-Machazn, 504 U.S. at 667-68; see also United States v. Matta- 
Ballesteros, 7 1  F.3d 754, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Alvarez-Machazn 
compelled the rejection of  a Honduran national's argument that h s  ludnappmg f?om 
Honduras by United States Marshals divested the tnal court of personal jurisdiction, 
gwen that the extradition treaty did not specifically prohibit forcible abduction of  
foreign nationals). Commentators have mdely condemned the Court's ~nterpretation of  
the extradition treaty. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Is the Preszdent Above Customaly 
International Law?, 86 AM. J. INTT. L. 757 (1992); Heman de J. Rmz-Bravo, Monstrous 
Deczszon: Kidnappzng Is Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993); Andrew L. 
Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme 
Court's Abduction Deczszon zn Alvarez-Macham, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994); Hector 
H. Cfirdenas, Jr., Casenote, United States v. Alvarez-Macham Result Onented 
Jurisprudence, 16 HOUS. J. INT1. L. 101 (1993); Bngette B. Homng, Comment, 
Abduction As an Alternative to Extradition-A Dangerous Method To Obtaan Juns- 
diction over Crzmznal Defendants, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1993); Analisa W 
Serunger, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Macham Forcible Abduction As an 
Acceptable Alternative Means of Gaznzng Jurzsdiction, 7 TEMP. INT1. L. & COW. L.J. 
369 (1993); Stephame A. Fb5, Recent Development, "The Treaty Doesn't Say We Can't 
Kidnap Anyonen--Government Sponsored Kidnappzng As a Means of Circumventing 
Extradition Treaties, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 265 (1993). But see 
Halberstam, supra note 94 (defending the dec~s~on on political question grounds, an 
Issue discussed supra note 94); Semmelman, supra note 227, at 517 11.23; Symposium, 
Kidnappzng Forezgn Crzmznal Suspects, 15 W m R  L. REV. 419 (1994) (contammg the 
panel discussion comments of  Manuel A. Medrano, federal prosecutor m Alvarez- 
Machazn); Matbrin, supra note 280, at 907; Edmund S. McAlister, Note, The Hydmulic 
Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Macham and the Case for a Justificrble 
Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 449 (1994); Jacqueline A. welsman, Comment, 
Extraordinary Rendition: A One-way Ticket to the U.S. or Is It?, 41 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 149 (1991). 
429. See supra note 192 and accompanylng text. 
430. Alvarez-Machazn, 504 U.S. at 667-68. Ker, however, IS distingushable. Unlike 
the pad agents m Alvarez-Machazn, the Pinkerton detective who ludnapped Ker was 
not ordered to do so by the United States government. See supra notes 192-227 and 
accompanylng text. Note, however, that, on remand, the distnct court disrmssed the 
case aganst defendant Alvarez-Machan on the ground of mufficlent  ev~dence. HENKIN 
ET AL., supra note 161 (citing Seth Mydons, Judge Clears Mexlcan zn Agent's Killing, 
N.Y. T I M E S ,  Dec. 15, 1992, at A20). 
431. See U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6. 
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mde border and who is one of our chef trading partners may be 
deemed to know our law regarding the Ker-Frzsbze doctrme, 
unput;mg such knowledge to all the part-les to the Drug Traflickmg 
Conventzon is much more difficult. Furthermore, the extradition 
treaty at Issue In Alvarez-Machazn did not contsun an artlcle 
equvalent to M c l e  2.432 Like statutes, provlslons in the same 
treaty should be read together to establish the drafters' Intent and 
purp0se.4~~ From the revlew session in whch M c l e  2 was 
proposed to its final adophon by consensus, the drafizng hstory 
materials mdicate that the purpose of the &cle was to prevent 
432. See AZvarez-Mcrchazn, 504 U.S. a t  663 (quoting the treaty a t  issue). 
433. As one commentator explamed: 
The Sutherland treatise Identifies [four] approaches that have been used: 
[(ill mterpretation of each section m Isolation from the others; [(i)] Inter- 
pretation of all the sections of each part of a statute together; [(iii)] 
resolution of ambiguities based upon the purposes and goals set forth m 
the preamble to the statute; and [(iv)] mterpretation of each section m the 
context of the whole enactment. The treatise endorses the "whole act rule" 
as "the most realistic m wew of the fact that a lesslature passes judgment 
upon the act as an entity, not gvmg one portion of the act any greater 
authority than another. Thus any attempt to segregate any portion or 
exclude any other portion &om consideration IS almost certam to distort 
the legxilative mtent." 
The U.S. Supreme Court agrees. "When 'interpreting a statute, the 
court will not look merely to a particular clause m whch general 
words may be used, but will take m connection with it the whole stat- 
ute and the objects and policy of the law, as mdicated by its 
vanous provmons, and Sve to it such a construction as will carry mto 
execution the will of the l e ~ l a t u r e . ~  The key to the whole act ap- 
proach is, therefore, that all promlons and other features of the enact- 
ment must be pven force, and promions must be interpreted so as not 
to derogate from the force of other prowsions and features of the whole 
statute." 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR & PHILIP P. F R I C ~ ,  CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA- 
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 643-44 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting 
2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 8 47.02 (Norman Singer ed., 
5th ed. 1992); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)) (citations omitted). The 
government could argue that the whole act doctnne mcludes considering the preambles. 
The preamble to the U.N. Drug Traffickg Convention states that the parties 
"[rlecogmzen that illicit traffic IS an international cnmmal activity, the suppression of 
whch demands urgent attention and the hghest pnority." See U.N. Drug Traf£ickmg 
Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. Preambles peld to the prowslons of the treaty or 
statute itself. Although Articles 2 and 6 counter the generally stated purpose even m 
the preamble, one may, m fact, construe those articles as consistent therewith, even 
the damage to mternational law enforcement efforts that a state-sponsored hdnappmg 
may cause m the long run. See znfra notes 454, 457. 
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foreign law enforcement agents from penetratzng a state party's 
borders and carrying out law enforcement f~nc t zons .~~~  The 
Court In Alvarez-Machazn complaned that, by basing the case on 
the bar agsunst the extradit~on of natzonals, Avarez-Macham was 
ashng the Court to make "a much larger ~nferent~al leap"435 
than did the Court in Rauscher when lmplylng a treaty r ~ g h t . ~ ~ ~  
Coupling Artzcle 2 with Artlcle 6 of the U.N. Drug Traffichng 
Convention shortens that leap to a mere step. 
The Conventzon partzes evidenced their intent to protect 
nahonals from stale-sponsored kidnapping far more strongly than 
the parhes to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty did to protect 
extradited fuatives from be~ng charged with non-extraditable 
434. For the proposition that the prohibited law enforcement functions mclude state- 
sponsored ludnappmg, see supra note 414 (noting that state-sponsored ludnappmg 
vlolates U.N. and OAS charters); see also supra notes 322-50 and accompanymg text 
(describmg the drafting hstory of the Convention). 
435. AZvarez-Machazn, 504 U.S. a t  669. Given the generality of the Webster- 
Ashburton Treaty at Issue m Rauscher as compared to the more specific language of 
the Mexican-United States extradition treaty, the Court's complamt m AZvarez-Machuzn 
appears groundless. In regard to the U.N. Drug T r a f f i h g  Convention, the 
government could argue that Article 6 only applies to states whose domestic law or 
treaties prohibit them from extraditing thew nationals. Nationals of countnes like the 
United States, whch generally extradite thew own nationals, would not be protected 
from such abductions. Such an argument, however, should fail, because of lack of 
mutuality. See ARTHUR L. CORBm, C O R B ~  ON CONTRACTS 8 152 (one vol. ed. 1952) 
(discussmg mutuality of obligation); 1 Officzal Records, supra note 318, a t  66, para. 102 
(recording when a delegate from a country permitting extradition of nationals 
supported the deletion of the reqwement: "[Slince most of Ithel other countnes had 
legal obstacles to the extradition of nationals, the paragraph would m practice have 
no application because of lack of reciprocity."). Note, however, that the United States 
reservation expressly protects our nationals from extradition to countnes with whom 
we do not have an extradition treaty and refuses to make the Convention operate as 
an extradition treaty with such countnes. See supra note 317. 
Civil-law wuntnes generally prohibit the extradition of thew nationals. Among 
those countnes that prohibit extradition of their nationals are: Argentina, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Uruguay. See SATYA D. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN LAW AND 
PRACTICE 94 nn.52-54 (1968). Some other countnes generally do not extradite thew 
own nationals but provlde limited exceptions when, under an mternational treaty or 
~n other exceptional c~rcumstances, they may grant extradition. Examples mclude: 
Hungary, Italy, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Memco. Id. a t  95 nn.55-57. Common-law 
countnes generally permit the extradition of thew nationals. These countnes mclude 
Australia, Canada, India, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. a t  
97. 
436. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
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0ffenses.4~' In Rauscher, the treaty mentzoned nothng more than 
the offenses that would form the basis of e~traditzon.4~~ The
Court, however, .mplied that the absence of other authorized 
offenses prohibited chargng the defendant-fugitzve for any other 
cn.1nes.4~' Likemse, in Data Proces~zng44~ and Clarke,441 no 
evldence suggested that, by limitzng the types of operatzons in 
whch banks could engage, Congress intended to benefit either 
data processors or stockbrokers, respectzvely In both cases, 
however, the Court concluded that these plamtiffs would suffer 
injury in fact and that they were direct, although unmtended, 
beneficlanes of congressional enactments regulatzng the banlnng 
The data processors and stockbrokers thus were 
witbn the zone of interest arguably protected or regulated by the 
statute.443 
If the DEA were to abduct a foreign drug suspect fi-om her 
country, such a suspect would be able to show not only that she 
was a direct beneficiary of Arhcles 2 and 6, but also that the 
parties to the Conventzon unplicitly intended to protect natzonals 
like herself fkom state-sponsored hdnappmg. She would satzsfy 
not only the zone-of-interest test but also the hgher, more 
difficult legally-protected-interest test.444 Because Artzcles 2.3 
and 6.5 do not pose any separatzon-of-powers conflicts, because the 
Conventzon itself renders neither h c l e  2.3 nor Arhcle 6.5 non- 
self-executmg, and because foreigners lndnapped by United States 
agents fkom abroad have suffered injury m fact and are withn the 
zone of Interests protected by the Conventzon, they are entitled to 
invoke the Conventzon to challenge the junsdictzon of the tnal 
court. 
437. See rd. 
438. See supra notes 168-91 and accompanymg text. 
439. See supra notes 168-91 and accompanymg text. 
440. See supra notes 251-65 and accompanymg text. 
441. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanymg text. 
442. See supra notes 251-73 and accompanymg text. 
443. See supra notes 251-73 and accompanymg text. 
444. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); see also supra notes 259-63 and accompanymg text (discussmg the 
evolution of the legally-protected-mterest test). 
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D. Effectuatzng the Conventzon's Purpose and Promokng World 
Order and the Rule of Law 
Construing the Convenbon to allow such abducted defendants 
to challenge jurisdiction likemse advances the Convenbon's 
general purpose to "promote co-operabon" among nabon-states m 
fighting the illicit drug trade.445 Tahng Arhcle 2.1 together with 
Articles 2.2 and 2.3 provldes one of the Convenbon's fundaments. 
Nations must work together to stop the internabonal drug 
trade.446 To accomplish that result, nations must respect one 
another and, in particular, refran from sending law enforcement 
agents onto the territory of another state that 1s a party to the 
Convenhon, at least not without that party's consent. Stemrmng 
the drug trade requires, among other thngs, detailed and 
accurate intelligence.447 United States drug enforcement agents 
cannot obtsun t h s  informat~on on their own. They need the 
cooperahon of law enforcement in source countnes, in countnes 
semng as transshpment points, and in countnes where the drug 
money is l a ~ n d e r e d . ~ ~  Furthermore, law enforcement offic~als in 
the host countnes and in the United States depend on civilians for 
a great deal of the necessary information.449 
Encroachng on another country's soil and abducbng a nabonal 
from that country insults the host country's government and its 
445. The Convention's purpose is to "promote co-operation" among states m order: 
(1) to enact a full panoply of laws targeting every actor m the illicit drug trade, 
including the grower, manufacturer, exporter, ~mporter, distributor, street seller, and 
street user; (2) to extradite drug offenders; and (3) to help each other to gather 
endence agamst drug offenders (for example, deposmg witnesses and tummg over 
suspects' bank accounts). See U.N. Drug Traffickmg Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.1; 
supra notes 300-17 and accompanying text, znfia note 525 (quoting Article 2.1 m full). 
446. Some commentators note that unilateral mterdiction can, m some cases, 
increase the profits of drug dealers by rmsmg pnces. See, e.g., Raphael F Perl, The 
United States, zn SCOTT B. MACDONm & BRUCE ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 
ON DRUG CONTROL 67, 78 (1992) ("Interdiction as part of a coordinated plan [with 
other countnes], however, can have a strong disrupting and destabilizmg effect on 
trafficker operations."). 
447. See Bruce Zagans & Scott B. MacDonald, Mexrco, rn MACDONALD & ZAG-, 
supra note 446, a t  187-88. 
448. See cd. 
449. See CHARLES R. SWANSON ET AL., POLICE ADMINISTRATION 18-19 (3d ed. 1993) 
(discussing "community policing" in the United States). 
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pe0ple.4~~ Such a trespass tends to discourage that country's 
officials and avilians fkom cooperating with the United 
Reactmg to such a transgression, they may declde to withhold 
vital informahon from United States law enforcement. 
By holding that the treaty bars state-sponsored hdnapping of 
nahonals, the Court would thus effectuate one of the purposes of 
the treaty-that of fostenng international cooperahon in combat- 
hng the illegal drug trade. Such a holding is consistent with the 
plan meamng interpretahon of M c l e s  2 and 6, as well as with 
the drafhng hstory of those two artz~les.4~~ In addihon, such a 
holding would also cany out one of the purposes of the Supremacy 
Clause-that of reducing conflict with other c0untnes.4~~ 
If, m attemptmg to stop the illicit drug trade, the United States 
runs roughshod over internahonal law by hdnapping individuals 
from foreign states m vlolahon of treaty and internahonal custom, 
our reputahon as a law-abiding nahon suffers. We justifiably 
condemn states that engage m internahonal lawlessness, includ- 
ing state-sponsored abduchons, assassinahons, and other acts of 
terronsm. By vlolahng a treaty-partzcularly one that we 
sponsored-the United States would be creahng a double 
standard?" It is then hy-pocrihcal to protest other states who 
450. Witness Mexlco's reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling m United States v. 
Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). See znfra notes 454, 457 and accompanymg text. 
451. See znfia notes 454, 457 and accompanymg text. 
452. See U.N. Drug Trafficlong Convention, supra note 6; supra part N.B. 
453. 'THE FEDERALIST No. 80, a t  53436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
454. The Supreme Court's declslon m Alvarez-Mmhazn outraged most Mexlcans. 
They vlewed the decision as condorung trespass by United States law enforcement, a 
h d  of trespass that they felt would have brought certrlm and swift retribution had 
Mexlco hdnapped an Amencan citizen and brought her to Mexlco for tnal. Mexlcans 
were particularly mcensed, even theu fwly  vlgorous prosecution of drug offenders 
mvolved m the Camarena torture and killing. Nine of the perpetrators were even jail 
sentences, a t  least one of the perpetrators belng sentenced to a term of 40 years, see 
United States v. Alvarez-Madam, 504 U.S. 655, 671 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
the maxunum term available under Mexlcan law, cf Macans  Given 40 Years for 
Killing Agent, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1989, a t  A32 (emphaslzmg the lack of opportunity 
for parole). 
For days followmg the case, Mexlcan newspapers headlined the Supreme Court's 
declslon. A column~~t from El Excelsror, a major daily newspaper of Mexlco City, began 
hls June 30, 1992, column as follows: "[The more than 100 countries whch have 
extradition treaties with the United States can throw them m the garbage].'' Martin 
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vlolate treaties of vital Interest to Given our initial posi- 
L. Guzman Ferrer, Matanga Duo la Chunga, EL EXCELSIOR, June 30, 1992, a t  7-A, 7-A 
(translation by Author). He noted that the Supreme Court's declsion "[affronts the 
entire world community, not just Mexico. But there's no doubt that the ludnapped 
vlctims are Memcans, not Chmese. Furthermore, let's see if the Drug Enforcement 
Agency will dedicate itself to ludnappmg SWISS, Swedish or Saudi citizens]." Id. 
(translation by Author); see also Divld Aponte, Dificil Momento Vive la Relacwn 
Mixcco-EU: Solanu, EL UNIVERSAL, June 28, 1992, a t  1 (quoting Mexlco's Secretary of 
State as havlng said that the Alvarez-Machnrn case had provoked one of the gravest 
cnses between the two countnes and that "[it is essential to reach a solution that 
assures unrestricted respect for Memcan territorial junsdiction to emphasize the 
international concern that the law of the jungle' is encroachmg upon law and order]") 
(translation by Author); Eduardo Chlmely, Pide la Corte Suspender Plagws, EL 
EXCELSIOR, June 28, 1992, a t  1, 10 (discussmg Mexlcan religous leaders who 
condemned the decision as violative of sovereignty and human nghts); Deshonro a EU 
su Pretensc6n de Junsdiccron Extraterritorial, PUtUO, June 29, 1992, a t  1, 13 
(con-g a lead headline m 36-pomt type on page one that stated: "Deshonrb a EU 
su pretension de junsdiccion extratemtonal [U.S. dishonors itself with its pretension 
of extratemtonal junsdiction]") (translation by Author); Carlos Fauo, Barr, el 
Justiczero, EL FINANCIERO, June 30, 1992, a t  47 (condemmng the Alvarez-Machuzn 
declsion as lmpenalistic and contemptuous of mternational law and concluding that 
"[the lost of Attorney General Barr [who m an advisory opmon asserted the legality 
of state-sponsored abductions]-the end justifies the means-1s comparable to that of 
Libyan ludnappers and other terronsts roundly condemned by the United States]") 
(translation by Author); Tratado scn Honor, PUNTO, June 29, 1992, a t  2 (conbmng an 
editonal denouncmg the opimon as violating the extradition treaty and questioned the 
United States' willingness to meet treaty obligations). 
Canada, Colombia, and numerous other countnes also denounced the declsion. 
Alan J. Kreczko, The Alvarez-Macham Decucon, U.S. DEFT ST. DISPATCH 614, 615 
(1992). The presidents of Argentina, Bolivla, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay all 
requested that the case be referred to the OAS. Id., El Fallo de la Suprema Corte & 
EU Sobre 10s Secuestros, Tema de la Cumbre del Cono Sur, EL EXCEISIOR, June 28, 
1992, a t  10-A. 
455. United States compames lose a consenratively estimated one billion dollars 
annually from Chmese concerns' manufacturing pirated software, compact discs, and 
video cassettes in violation of the mternational copyright conventions and the 
Memorandum of Understanding Between Chma and the United States signed m 
January 1992. Seth Fason, Copyright Pirates Prosper zn Chcnu Despite Promzses, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, a t  A1 (noting that Chma's copynght enforcement efforts have 
been weak); Margaret McKeown & H. Ping Kiang, IP Protections cn Chcnu-Reality or 
Virtual Unreality, LEGAL TIMES, May 15, 1995, a t  8; Wanda Szeto, Undercover Bid To 
Find Chcna's Disc Pirates, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 14, 1995, a t  3, available zn 
LEXIS, News Library, SChina File (relating how Windows 95 "turned up" m local 
Chmese computer stores "two weeks before its official launch"); see also Julia Preston, 
As Piracy Grows cn Mexcco, U.S. Companzes Shout Foul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, 
a t  1 (estimating that United States compames lose $485 million each year because of 
pirated compact discs, video cassettes, and computer software copied ln Memco). 
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tzons on the proposed Arhcles 2 and 6,456 refusing to honor them 
suggests that we do not take our obligahons under the Conventzon 
seriously If we can disregard those provisions that we dislike, 
other parlxes to the Conventzon may do likemse, thereby weaken- 
ing the Conventzon and internatzonal law generally 457 
Failing to pennit individuals to invoke Arhcles 2 and 6 would 
increase the likelihood that such mternatzonal law violations will 
go unaddressed.458 Public clamor about the insidious effects of 
456. See supra part 1V.B. 
457. One prormnent Mmcan scholar responded to the Alvarez-Macham decmion as  
follows: 'We are offended by thw mpenalistic judgment. We understand your 
anger, but not your methods. There is no difference ethcally between what 
terrorists do and what the U.S. has done." Interview with Dr. Victor C. Garcia-Moreno, 
Professor of International Law at  Umversity Autonoma of Mexlco, Mexlco City, Mex. 
(July 22, 1992) (noting that Mmco ~s wormed about whether the United States "will 
keep its wordn and stating that-assummg that the evldence was sufficient-Mexlco 
would have prosecuted Alvarez-Macham). 
In response to Mmcan complamts regarding the Alvarez-Macham hdnappmg and 
the Supreme Court decmlon, the United States negotiated and signed a treaty with 
Mexlco outlawmg such abductions. See Marcus Stern, Zedillo Concerned That Prop. 187 
Could Become National Policy, SAN DEGO UNION, Nov. 24, 1994, a t  A-18. President 
Clinton, however, has not submitted the treaty (called T h e  Abduction Treaty") to the 
Senate for ratification because of a dispute with Mmco concemmg Mexlco's apparent 
renegmg on a prormse to extradite one of its nationals suspected m the United States 
of rapmg a mmor. Tim Golden, Dispute Holds Up US. Extradition Trea& with Memo, 
N.Y. TIhZES, May 15, 1994, 8 1, a t  6; Doyle McManus, Rem To Protest Mexrco's Plan 
To Withhold Suspect zn Rape, L A  TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A-4. If and when 
submitted, the treaty faces an uncerkun fate m the Senate. See EXTRAZIITION: 
Congress Is Right To Turn Up the Heat on Mexzco, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 12, 
1995, a t  2J (noting the Initial opposition of Jesse Helms, Cham of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, because of Mexlco's refusal to extradite one of its nationals who 
allegedly raped a Califorma gml). 
458. The plam meanmg and drafting hwtory of the Supremacy Clause mplicitly 
view mdivlduals and the judiciary as helpmg to enforce treaty obligations. See supra 
part II.A.2.a. The Haitian refugee case illustrates thw pmciple. See Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); supra note 154 (discussmg Sale). Neither 
President Bush nor President Clinton was willing to carry out the United States' 
obligations under the Protocol protecting refugees, see Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, supra note 98, presumably because of the broad public opposition to the 
mmgration of Haitian refugees, see Steven A. Holmes, Pressure Builds over Return 
of Boat People to Haiti, N.Y. TmIES, Dec. 17, 1993, 8 1, a t  A17; The Truth Rebuked 
on Haiti, N.Y. mas, Dec. 17, 1993, 8 1, a t  A38. In one of its most stramed mter- 
pretations of a treaty m recent memory, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Admuustration's mterdiction of the Haitians on the h g h  seas and then forced return 
to Haiti without even a cursory check to d e t e m e  whether any of the refugees 
qualified for political asylum. Sale, 113 S. Ct. a t  2567. Had the Supreme Court 
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illicit drugs has, unfortunately, often drowned out those who call 
for respecting International law and protectzng basic human and 
constitutional nghts. Sensing the majority will, low-level law 
enforcement officials may be tempted to engage in foreign 
adventunng at the cost of future law enforcement benefits, 
thereby eroding respect for the rule of law 469 Given the unap- 
pealing character of abducted drug defendants, the execubve 
branch may be unwilling to enforce our International obligabons 
vigorously 
Those who argue that state-sponsored lndnappmg prevents drug 
dealers fkom seelnng havens in sympathehc states460 put short- 
term results ahead of long-term solutions.461 Kidnapping weak- 
ens the Convenbon because it leads to distrust and disrespect, 
thereby erecbng barners to cornmumcabon, cooperabon, and 
exchange of lnformatzon. If the United States abducts drug 
suspects in vlolabon of the Convenbon, countnes like the 
followed the clear language of the treaty, language that was consistent with the 
treaty's purpose, the Court would have helped the United States to comply with its 
treaty obligations. The Court m Sale, however, abdicated its responsibilities as an 
Impartial arbiter of the law. 
459. Alvarez-Macham made thls argument m hls bnef in the United States Supreme 
Court. Respondent's Bnef a t  13, United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) 
(NO. 91-712). 
460. See Semmelman, supm note 227, a t  563; Symposium, supra note 428, a t  427- 
28 (recounting the assertions of Alvarez-Macham's prosecutor that the brutal nature 
of Ennque Camarena's killing, officlal Mexican corruption, and the ability to deter 
traffickers from similarly torturing and murdemg our agents m other cases justified 
Alvarez-Macham's abduction); Matonn, supra note 280, a t  931-32; Welsman, supm note 
428, a t  173. Admittedly, the safe havens argument IS not a hvolous one. Certam 
countnes do play thls role, and some government officials are Subject to corruption. 
Resorting to the expedient of a state-sponsored hdnapplng rather than to lawful 
bilateral and multilateral remedies, however, generally underrmnes over the long term, 
effective mternational law enforcement efforts. See mnjk notes 461-67 and accompany- 
mg text. 
461. Countnes that establish havens for mqor drug traffickers may be subject to 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 41; 
cf G.A. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. a t  52, U.N. Doc SIRd47th 
(1992) (imposmg econormc sanctions on Libya for its refusal to surrender two fugitives 
charged with complicity m the bombmg of Pam Am Flight 103, the Lockerb~e case). 
Providing havens for such operators may constitute a suffic~ent "threat to peace" to 
tngger U.N. sanctions. Cf G.A.Res. 48, supm (citing such a threat as the bas15 for the 
Security Council's sanctions). The United States also can unilaterally lmpose trade 
sanctions on such haven countnes and attempt to get its allies to do likeme. See 
U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1. 
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Bahamas can equally justify refusing to provlde access to b a h n g  
records. Ending bank secrecy and thereby m k n g  money 
laundering far more difficult was one of the Conventxon's major 
achevements and a long-sought goal of United States law 
enforcement.462 State-sponsored hdnappings over time, there- 
fore, act as a drag on effectwe internatzonal law enforcement463 
462. Cf. U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supra note 6 (makmg c-al the 
conversion or concealment of property ebbed from drug trficlung activities). 
463. State-sponsored hdnappmgs may thwart effective multilateral law enforcement 
efforts. For example, the United States focuses much of its drug mterdiction effort on 
the Americas-Mexlw, Central Amenca, and South Amenca. See Zagans & MacDonald, 
supra note 447, a t  188. Some Latin Amencan countnes, however, have been less than 
stalwart allies m the United States' war agamst drugs. See zd. Because most of these 
countnes do not have a major domestic drug problem comparable to that of the United 
States, they have mewed the drug cns~s as our problem: if the demand went down, 
the drug problem would disappear. Id at 190; GILBERT, supra note 414, a t  366 
("[many South Amencan countnes have not vlewed the narcotics problem as h a m g  
the same urgency as m the United States."). Increasmgly, Mexlco has treated the 
production and distribution of drugs senously. Id Jim Kolbe, the Republican Congress 
member who sponsored a bill to stop such hdnappmgs m the future, noted that 
Mexlco has become a key fighter m the .war agamst drugs. Mary Benanti, Kolbe Calls 
for Clarification of Mexrco Extradition Treaty, Gannent News Serv., June 19, 1992, 
auailable cn LEXIS, News Library, Gns File; Sam Dillon, Mace Arrests a Top Suspect 
cn Drug Trade, N.Y. T m S ,  Jan. 16, 1996, a t  A1 (relating how Mexlco arrested and 
handed over to United States authorities Juan Garcia Abrego, who was on the FBI's 
"10 most-wanted Lst" and who was accused of bemg "one of the hemsphere's most 
powerful and murderous drug lords"); Ann Devroy & Pierre Thomas, Clinton Adursed 
To Certify Mexrco As Cooperative zn Drug War, WASH. POST Mar. 1, 1996, a t  A19, 
(relating how Clinton Adrrrrmstration offimals have d e t e m e d  that, despite havlng an 
unportant role as a conduit of illicit drugs to the United States, Mexlco has "made 
stndes m its anti-narcotics effortsn); Habrci Nueua Audienccu del Congreso para 
Angalizar el Caso Aluarez Mcichacn, EL NACIONAL, June 30, 1992, a t  13; Jorge Pinto, 
Credit Mexcco for Drug War Successes, N.Y. !ITbiES, Aug. 7, 1995, 5 1, at  A12 (noting 
that, m 1994, Mexlcan authorities confiscated drugs with a street value of nearly $100 
billion). But see Sympos~um, supra note 428, a t  428-29 (allegmg offimal corruption ~n 
Merncan drug enforcement eff01.t~); Sam Dillon, Mexrcans Tire of Police Grafl As Drug 
Lords Razse Stakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, a t  A3 (allegmg institutional corruption 
~n Mernw's police forces); Tim Golden, To Help Kkep Mexlco Stable, US. Soft-Pedaled 
Drug War, N.Y. !hiES, July 31, 1995, a t  1; Damd Johnston, Clinton Urged To Cite 
Memo for Drug Flow, N.Y. TIhiES, Feb. 18, 1996, a t  1, 12 (noting that some unnamed 
United States narcotics offic~als are concerned about the growth of Mexlcan drug 
cartels). Mexlco can serve as an honest broker between the United States and other 
Latin Amencan source and transshpment countnes. By t a h g  strong steps agamst 
drug trafficlung and production, Mexlco, an admitted leader m Latin Amenca, s well 
positioned to encourage other Latin Amencan countnes to do likeme. Zagans & 
McDonald, supra note 447, a t  190. The diplomacy of the United States may not be as 
effective m these countnes as Mexlw's example and effort. A senes of state-sponsored 
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in much the same way that a hostile police force entenng a 
rmnority community often provokes resentment, causing the 
community to refuse to cooperate with the resultmg in 
fewer arrests and convlctzons. As Alvarez-Machazn 
such a policy may not be limited to states who are sympathetzc to 
the illicit drug trade but may embrace allies committed to the 
fight aganst illicit drugs and psychotropic substances. 
Justice Brandeis, though in a domestic context, conveyed the 
consequences of government agents' vlolatzon of the law in the 
name of enforcing the law. 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
Imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously Our 
Government IS the potent, the ommpresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Cnme is 
contagous. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto 
h s e l f ;  it Invites anarchy To declare that in the a h s t r a -  
hon of the cnrmnal law the end justifies the means-to declare 
that the Government may commit cnmes m order to secure the 
convlchon of a pnvate criminal-would bnng terrible retribu- 
lon .  Agmst  that pemclous doctrme tlxs Court should 
resolutely set its 
The United States has a long tradition of using law to resolve 
disputes at home.467 Justice Brandeis's words apply equally to 
how we conduct ourselves toward other countries and therr 
citizens in the increasingly small and interdependent global 
community 
hdnappmgs, however, might dissuade Mexlco from zealously cooperating with the 
United States on mternational drug enforcement. Senate ratification of the Abduction 
Treaty, see supra note 457, may end the controversy concemg the abduction of Mern- 
cans from their country, but whether the President will submit the treaty to the 
Senate or whether the Senate will ratify it is by no means c e r t . .  
464. See, e.g., h g h t  L. Greene, Foreword: Drug Decnmznalization: A Chorus m 
Need of Masterrap's Vorce, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 457, 491 (1990). If the United States 
w~shed to arrest a major trafficker who fled to Mernco, some Merncans, resentful of the 
U.S. hdnappmg of Alvarez-Macham, mght refuse to come forward with mformation 
about the major trafficker. 
465. See United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 668-70 (1992); Zagam & 
MacDonald, supra note 447, a t  188. 
466. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandels, J., dissenting). 
467. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text. 
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By vlolatmg the Treaty of Peace of 1783 with Great Britaun, the 
individual confederated United States provoked Britzsh retaliabon 
and nsked the f i t s  of the hard-won independen~e.4~' Dunng 
the Constitubonal Conventzon in 1787 and the states' ratificabon 
process, whch lasted until 1788, the Framers were keenly aware 
of the dangerous consequences of vlolahng treat1es.4~' As a 
result, they made treatzes the supreme law of the land? 
enforceable by indimduals in state and federal c0urts.4~~ Because 
the states had vlolated the Tones' treaty nghts, the Framers 
particularly wanted to ensure that Tones and other foreigners 
would have access to our c0urts.4~~ Empowered to invoke trea- 
hes, the Framers believed that these foreigners would be less 
likely to complan to thew home countries about maltreatment at 
the hands of the United States.473 If our government infringes 
upon foreigners' nghts, the potenbal for internahonal conflict is 
greater than if pnvate parhes do ~ 0 . 4 ~ ~  Consequently, when a 
foreigner invokes a treaty to defend agmnst a governmental 
proceeding, the court should presume that the treaty or relevant 
treaty provlsion is self-execuhng. The government may rebut the 
presumphon of self-executzon only upon shomng that (1) the trea- 
ty or relevant treaty promsion manifestly makes itself non-self- 
executing by its own terms, (2) enforcing the treaty would vlolate 
the Constitutzon's separatzon of powers, or (3) the indimdual 
defensively assertmg the treaty provlsion is not arguably withn 
the zone of Interests protected by the treaty or treaty promslon In 
quesb0n.4~' 
The hstory of hlzcles 2 and 6 of the U.N. Convenbon Agaunst 
468. See supm notes 26-53 and accompanymg text. 
469. See supra notes 51-74 and accompanymg text. 
470. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanymg text. 
471. See supra note 63 and accompanymg text. 
472. See supra note 63 and accompanymg text. 
473. See supra note 63 and accompanymg text. 
474. Cfi supra note 63 and accompanyng text (discussmg Alexander Hamilton's 
concern over fore~gners' complamts to the= home countries regarding unjust treatment 
at the hands of the Amencan government). 
475. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanymg text. 
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Illicit Traffic in Narcohc Drugs and Psychotropic Sub~tances*~~ 
demonstrates that the arhcles neither pose a separahon-of-powers 
conflict nor make themselves non-self-executing by thew own 
Furthermore, reading Wc le s  2 and 6 together shows 
that the parhes implicitly intended to protect thew nahonals &om 
state-sponsored abdu~tions.4~~ Wc le s  2 and 6 are thus self- 
executing. Co-sponsored by our neighbors, Canada and Memco, 
Article 2 underscored fears that United States agents would 
disregard boundaries and trample upon sovereign nghts of other 
countries and their n a h ~ n a l s . ~ ~ ~  Article 2 was a qud  pro quo to 
the p&es7 acceptance of their other obligahons under the 
Convention, the most sweeping cnrmnal-law convention ever 
agreed upon. Coincidentally, not only did the United States 
strenuously oppose the proposed b c l e  2:'' but we also mgor- 
ously supported a much stncter draft of W c l e  6, reqmng states 
to extradite thew nationals.481 Defeated on both counts, the 
United States would appear to be mochg  the Convenhon and the 
rule of law if our agents ludnap foreign nahonals from their 
countries in an apparent attempt to overcome our losses at the 
conference table. 
Given the Framers' intent to avoid conflict with foreign govern- 
ments, courts should allow foreign nationals who are the direct 
objects of our government's treaty molations to invoke the treaty 
to challenge a court's jurisdiction over them and to obtmn a 
dismssal and an order r e t m n g  them to the asylum country 
Such a result helps fulfill the United States' treaty obligahons, 
avoids &chon with other countries, and mds in effectuahng the 
Convention by promoting cooperahon among the parties in the 
fight agmnst the illiclt drug trade. Lastly, such a result advances 
respect for the rule of law, parhcularly gven the United States' 
stance towards Articles 2 and 6 when proposed. As Judge Oakes 
of the Second Circuit stated concerning a state-sponsored 
abduction in another contexl: 
476. U.N. Drug Traffichng Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2,6. 
477. See supra part 1V.B. 
478. See supra part N.B. 
479. See supra notes 329-50 and accompanymg text. 
480. See supra notes 324, 328 and accompanymg text. 
481. See supra note 318 and accompanymg text. 
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That respect for the soverelgn mtegrity of other nations is, m 
additron to conforrmng to high moral pmclples, a self-servmg 
pragmatic vlewpomt for the United States to take; we can 
better demand m the mternational court of public opuuon 
similar respect for our soverelgn 111tegrity if we extend such 
respect to others?82 
482. United States v. h a ,  515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurrmg), cert. 
dented, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). 
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Draftrng History of Artrcle 2 of the U.N Drug Trafickzng 
Conventron 
The full text of Memco's ongmal proposal 1s as follows: 
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION 
In full compliance with the pnnaples of mternational law 
regarding legal equality and sovereign equality of States, as 
well as the pmaple  of non-mtemenhon m domeshc &am 
whch are essentzally w i h  the exclusive competence of 
States, the Padzes agree thak 
1. !llus Conventzon constitutes an mstrument of mternational 
co-operation, amed at e n s m g  maximum effectiveness m the 
struggle of the States Parlxes a g m s t  the illicit t r a c  m 
narcotzc drugs and psychotropmc substances, m all aspects of 
the problem as a whole, m all cases withm [SIC] the most s t r~ct  
respect for, and m full compliance with, the limits set by the 
provlslons of the respective mternal legal system of each State 
Party, and m the framework of applicable treatzes m force on 
the matter. 
2. Nothmg m h s  Convention empowers, m any way whatsoev- 
er, the au;thoritzes of one of the States Parties to undertake, to 
attempt to undertake or to exerase pressure m order to be al- 
lowed, m the territonal jmsdichon of any of the other States 
Padzes, the exerase and performance of funchons whose 
jmsdichon or competence are exclus~vely resemed to the 
authoritzes of each of those other States Padzes by thelr 
respectzve nalxonal laws and regulat~ons. 
3. T h ~ s  Convenhon in no case Implies and cannot be mnterpret- 
ed m the sense that, m order to comply with it, a State Party 
has undertaken, by vlrtue of its provlslons, to take measures 
itself or to authonze measures m its territonal jmsdicbon 
whch m any way exceed its legal jmsdicbon or competence, 
or whch m any other manner are not expressly permitted by 
its legal provlslons m force, or whch may, m the judgment of 
that State Party, prejudice its security, public order or any 
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other essenhal mterest. 
4. In conformity with the above paragraphs, none of the 
provlsions of I h s  Convenhon shall be mvoked or utilized as a 
pretext t o  attempt to go beyond the preclse limits of its scope, 
m contravention of the provlslons of i h s  arhclePa3 
The Canadian-Mexrcan amendment changed the ongnal as 
follows: 
1. %s Convenhon constitutes an mstrument of urternahonal 
co-operahon, amed at ensuring maxunum effehveness m the 
struggle of the States Parhes agamst the illicit traffic m 
narcohc drugs and psychotropic s~bstances:'~ 
-485 Its provlsions are directed at all aspects of the 
problem wikh strict respect for the provisions of the internal 
system of each State F&ty?86 
The Canadian-Mexlcan amendment collapsed paragraphs 3 and 
4 of the o n p a l  into the second paragraph: 
483. 1 OfFcral Records, supra note 318, at 76. 
484. Id. 
485. Id. 
486. Canndian & M m a n  Amendment, supra note 328. 
487. 1 Oficral Records, supra note 318, at 76. 
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2. N o h g  m t h s  Convention derogates from the pmclples of 
the sovereign equality and territonal Integrity of States or that 
of non-mtervention m the domesbc affairs of StatesPa9 
The Canadian-Mexlcan amendment moved the second para- 
graph to the th rd  paragraph: 
3. Nothmg m t h s  Convenhon empo~ers,4~" 
-491 the authorihes of one of the States Parhes to 
~ndertake,4~~ 
.,:93 m the territonal junsdichon of any 
of the other States Parhes, the exerase and performance of 
funcbons whose jmsdichon or competence are exclusively 
reserved to the authori t~es~~~ of nnnl,95 those other States 
Parhes by thew respechve nahonal laws and regulationsPg6 
The first paragraph of the Canadian-Mexlcan proposal was 
modified slightly by Canada and Mexlco shortly after it was 
proposed. As amended, the proposed art~cle read: 
1. 'Ibs Convenbon constitutes an mstrument of mternahonal 
co-operahon, amed at e n s m g  m m u m  effechveness m the 
struggle of the States Parties agamst the illicit tralKc m 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.497 
Its provlsions, whch are directed at all aspects of the problem, 
establish obligations which are to be implemented and 
executed with strxct respect for the provlsions of the mternal 
system of each State P a r t ~ 2 ~ ~  
488. Id. 
489. Canadian & Mexrcan Amendment, supm note 328. 






496. Canadian & Mextcan Amendment, supm note 328. 
497. 1 Offiral Records, supra note 318, at 76. 
498. Id. 
499. Amendment Submitted by Canada and M m o ,  United Nations Conference for 
the Adoption of a Convention A g w t  Illicit T r a c  m Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
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A few days later, forty-two countnes, ~ncluding Canada and 
Mexlco, agsun amended the &st paragraph, also modifying the 
second sentence of that paragraph. In t h s .  amendment, that 
sentence read as follows: "Its provlslons, whch are directed at all 
aspects of the problem, establish obligahons whch are to be 
Implemented and executed with stnct respect for the fundamental 
provlslons of the internal legal system of each State Party "500 
The United States conbnued to oppose the proposed arhcle. The 
United States delegate stated: 
95. Mr. Newlin (United States of Amenca) sad  that h s  
delegation was opposed to the arhcle 1 bzs set forth m docu- 
ment E~CONF'.82~C.l/L.l/Rev.2. m e  United States delegatxon] 
believed that the convention did not need an &cle on its 
scope. Moreover, several parts of the proposed &cle were 
already covered by exlsting provlslons. For example, the first 
sentence of paragraph 1 and the whole of paragraph 2 were 
more suitable for the preamble to the convention. As to the 
second sentence of paragraph 1, it could be mterpreted as a 
savrng clause whch would call mto queskon the obligahons of 
the Parties under the conventxon to change then natxonal 
leglslaixon m order t o  bmg it lnto conformity with the 
conventxon. That result rmght not have been the one mtended 
by the ongmal sponsors of article 1 bm but it was unfortunate- 
ly a possible mterpretatxon of the sentence m quesixon. It was 
also lvghly questxonable whether a safeguard clause of a gen- 
eral character m &cle 1 was needed when there were already 
safeguard clauses m a number of arhcles of the convention, 
such as articles 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
96. Paragraph 3 of the proposed &cle 1 bm dealt with a very 
mmor issue whch was already covered by arhcle 6, paragraph 
Ua). 
97 In conclus~on, all the elements m the proposed &cle 1 bm 
Substances, U.N. Doc. EICONF.82/C.l/T,.1IRev.l (1988) (amended language shaded, 
ongmal language struck). 
500. Amendment Submitted by Afghunlstan et al., United Nations Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention A g m t  Illicit Traffic m Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, U.N. Doc. EICONF.82/C.l/L.1IRev.2 (1988) (amended language emphasized). 
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were either unnecessary because they were to be found 
elsewhere m the draft or undesirable because they were likely 
to have harmful consequences on the convenhon if adopted. He 
accordingly urged the Committee to reject the proposal.501 
The United Kingdom submitted an amendment to modify the 
second sentence of the first paragraph. Austna, Belgum, Den- 
mark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Span, and 
Sweden also sponsored the United Kingdom's amendment. The 
U.K.'s amendment substituted the follomng language for the 
second sentence of the first paragraph: "In mplemenhng and 
executmg their obligations under the Convenkon, States Parhes 
shall take any necessary measures, including l e~s l ahve  and 
a h m s t r a t i v e  measures, in conformity with the fundamental 
promsions of their internal legal systems."502 
The U.K.'s amendment appeared to attempt to strike a balance 
between requmng state parhes to fulfill the= obligations under 
the Convention and recopzing the constitutional limitahons of 
the indimdual states. Three days later, the United States 
introduced its own proposal. In offenng the proposal, the United 
States delegate explaned that the United States wanted to 
change the tone of the proposal from the negative to the posihve: 
5. Mr. MEYER (United States of Amenca) s a d  that h s  
delegabon did not believe that an arhcle on the scope of the 
convent~on was necessary m an mstrument of the present 
type, although he saw merit in the amended text referred to 
by the previous speaker [the U.K. delegate]. The mam 
difficulty whch h s  delegabon found with that text was the 
prevailingly negabve tone of the wording. It had accordingly 
redrafted the text with the a m  of g~vmg it a more posibve 
mode of expression.603 
Retamng the United Kingdom's language in the second 
sentence of paragraph 1, the United States proposal changed the 
language of the first sentence of paragraph 1. 
501. 2 Offwzal Records, supra note 318, at 156. 
502. Id. 
503. Id. at 171. 
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1 . 1  
1 5 n n r l  The plfheose 
of the present Convention is to assist States Padies to address 
more effectively t%e various aspects of the drug abuse problein 
havlng an international. d imensi~a=~ In implementing and 
executmg them obligahons under the Convenhon States Par- 
hes shall take any necessary measures, including legdative 
and a h s t r a h v e  measures, m conformity with the funda- 
mental provlslons of them mternal legal systems.6ffi 
The United States' proposed second paragraph phrased the 
state part~es' obligahons affirmahvely rather than negahvely* 
2. 
C5"' States 
Parties shall carry out their obligations under the present 
Convenhon ur a manner consistent with the principles of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and thae 
of non-intervention in the domestic affm of other StatesPo' 
As to the last paragraph, the United States proposal hghtened 
up the language, omitlmg some verbose phrasmg, without altenng 
the substance of the onwal: 
3. 
S F w  A Stab P e  
to  the present Convention shaIi not undertake in the territory 
of another State Party the independent exercise m"d perfor- .* 
504. 1 zd at 76.  
505. 2 zd at 171. 
506. Id. at 156. 
507. Canadian & Meman Amendment, supm note 328. 
508. 2 Ofizal Records, supra note 318, at 171. 
509. Canadian & Meman Amendment, supm note 328. 
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mance of fnnctiom which are reserved for the authorities of that 
other State Party by its national law and regulations.510 
Note that the word "independent" was added to paragraph 3 to 
include the possibility of joint operabons. Delegate Meyer ex- 
planed the change as follows: 
9. One slightly new element had been Introduced mto para- 
graph 2, namely the word "independent", whch was mtended 
to ensure that there was no possible conflict between arhcle 1 
bzs and arhcle 6, whch dealt with jomt operations. Apart from 
that, no element previously present m the 42-nation proposal 
had been omitted or modified.'ll 
After subsequent consultation with some of the delegates, 
apparently including Memco and Canada;l2 the United States 
modified its proposed scope article, dropping, among other thmgs, 
the word Mr. Meyer explamed the modifica- 
tions as follows: 
2. Mr. MEYER (United States of Amenca) sad  that, as a 
result of consultations with other delegations on the text of h s  
proposals, he had Introduced some changes whch he hoped 
would make a consensus on dele 1 bzs more likely The 
revlsed text was before the Committee ~n document 
E/COKF.82/C.l/L.38. The Committee would note that, m the 
first sentence of paragraph 1, the words "to asslst States 
Parhes to address more effehvely" now read "to promote co- 
operakon among States Parhes so that they may address more 
effehvely" In paragraph 3, the words "the mdependent 
exercise and performance of functions whch are reserved for 
the authorities" had been amended to read "the exerase of 
j~SdiCb0n and performance of funhons wluch are exclusively 
reserved for the authorities.n514 
As amended, the United States proposal read as follows: 
510. 2 Offic~al Records, supra note 318, at 171. 
511. Id. 
512. Id. at 176. 
513. Id. 
514. Id. 
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1. The purpose of the present convention is5" 
D 
A &I6 to promote co- 
operation among States Parties so that they may address more 
effectivelf17 the vanous aspects of the drug abuse problem 
havlng an mternahonal dimen~ion.5~~ In mplementmg and 
executmg thew obligahons under the Convention States 
Parlxes shall take any necessary measures, mcluding leg-lsla- 
hve and a h s t r a h v e  measures, m conformity with the 
fundamental provisions of thew mternal legal systems?lS 
2. States Parlxes shall carry out thew obligahons under the 
present Convention m a manner consistent with the pmciples 
of sovereign equality and territonal Integrity of States and 
that of non-mtervention m the domestic affaws of other 
States?" 
3. A State Party to the present Convention shall not undertake 
m the territory of another State P e l  
-52 the exercise of jurisdiction and performance 
of functions whch are exclus~vely reserved for the author- 
i t ~ e s ~ ~ ~  of that other State Party by its nahonal law and 
reg~lahons.5~~ 
The amended language shaded above does not appear to make 
any substanhve changes, other than to state expressly the 
purpose of the Convenhon, when the earlier draft had mplied it. 
The amended U.S. proposal underwent slight, subsequent 
amendments and then became Arhcle 2 of the Convenhon: 
515. Id. at 171. 
516. Id. 
517. Id. at 176. 
518. Id. at 171. 
519. Id. at 156. 
520. Id. at 171. 
521. Id. 
522. Id. 
523. Id. at 176. 
524. Id. at 171 (amended language shaded, ongmal language struck). 
Heinonline - -  37 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1511 1995-1996 
1512 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW w01. 37: 1401 
Arhcle 2 - SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION 
1. The purpose of t h s  Convenbon IS to promote co-operabon 
among the Parhes so that they may address more effehvely 
the vmous aspects ofz5 526 illicit 
tr&c in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances5= hav- 
mg an mternabonal dimension. In carrylng out thew obliga- 
kons under the Convention, the Parhes shall take necessary 
measures, mcluding 1eg.lslative and adrrrrmstrabve measures, 
m conformity with the fundamental provlslons of thew re- 
spehve domesbc legslabve systerns.s2' 
2. The Parhes shall carry out thew obligabons under t h s  
Convenbon m a manner consistent with the pmaples of 
sovereign equality and territonal mtegrity of States and that 
of non-mtervenbon m the domesbc affms of other States.'jZ9 
3. A Party shall not undertake m the territory of another Party 
the exerase of jmsdihon and performance of funhons whch 
are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party 
by its530 nnhnnn1531 domestic law 532 
525. U.N. Drug T r a f f i h g  Convention, supra note 6. 
526. 2 Offizcrl Records, supra note 318, at 171. 




531. 2 Officzal Records, supra note 318, at 171. 
532. U.N. Drug Trafficlung Convention, supm note 6 (amended language shaded, 
prevlous draft's language struck). 
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